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ABSTRACT
In 1970 four young racially moderate Democrats won the 
governor's chairs of Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina and 
Georgia. These southern gubernatorial elections and the 
subsequent inaugural speeches signaled a transformation of 
racial politics in the region. As the campaigns began, 
however, persistent ambivalence concerning the pace of 
integration and court-ordered busing of school children to 
achieve racial balances tempted many politicians to exploit 
these concerns. Their efforts failed; southerners had 
decided to obey the law. The successful candidates 
understood that the electorate had come to this decision 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm and that their campaigns 
must reflect this ambivalence; they must eschew the 
rhetoric of resistance without uttering strong words in 
favor of desegregation and busing. The 197 0 gubernatorial 
campaigns marked the first time in southern politics that 
those who refused to exploit racial prejudice won office. 
Elusive evasion of racially charged issues appealed to a 
moderate electorate that had grown weary of upheaval. The 
finessing of race by the men who would become the New South 
governors of 197 0, however, set an example that subsequent 
candidates would follow and missed an opportunity to 
establish a morally binding biracial coalition that could 
have strengthened the southern wing of the Democratic party 
beyond 1970.
iii
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CHAPTER 1  
MIGHTY PECULIAR ELECTIONS
In 1970 four young racial moderates won the governor's 
chairs of Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia. 
Although their campaigns each reflected unique aspects of 
their states' contemporary circumstances, history and 
political idiosyncrasies, taken together the four races 
reveal a great deal about the politics and condition in the 
South at the time. The winning candidates in each of the 
four gubernatorial campaigns eschewed the traditional 
politics of racial antagonism and demagoguery. "Always 
before, you could tell right easy how somebody stood on the 
nigras," said a retired Georgia farmer, puzzled by the 
racial stance of the gubernatorial candidates during the 
election in 1970. "I don't say it isn't a good thing, but 
it does make for a mighty peculiar election."1
Peculiar elections did indeed signal a change across 
most of the South. South Carolina Governor John West 
believed that 1970 marked the first southern election with 
"racial overtones where the moderates won." Florida 
Governor Reubin Askew saw the election of moderates across 
the South as "a departure from the custom wherein the 
person who took the hard racial line always won." Arkansas 
Governor Dale Bumpers asserted that his election and the 
victories of Governors Carter in Georgia, West in South 
Carolina and Askew in Florida were not coincidences, but
1
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the result of "a cry for new leadership in the South."
These elections prompted both the southern and the national 
media to herald a new South. Time magazine placed Georgia 
Governor Jimmy Carter on its cover and wrote of a "New Day 
A'Coming in the South" in the accompanying story that also 
included Bumpers, Askew and West. "Something remarkable 
and significant is happening in this part of the country," 
James Reston wrote of the South in the New York Times.
"The men who have been appealing to regional and racial 
prejudice are declining." The elections of 1970 signalled 
the arrival of "a new market of southern governors," 
observed southern journalist Edwin Yoder, "all young, all 
anxious to put the slogans, the fears, the divisions, the 
despairs of the sixties behind them." Even a radical 
journal, the Progressive, joined in the celebration: "The 
coming of a 'New South' that will reject race and regional 
prejudice has been heralded prematurely a number of times, 
but now, at last, it may be nearing a reality -- if some 
new Southern governors keep the pledges they made at their 
inaugurals. "2
In Arkansas, Democrat Dale Bumpers won a Democratic 
primary victory over former Governor Orval Faubus, who 
symbolized southern intransigence when in 1957 he ordered 
the state militia to prevent school integration in Little 
Rock. Bumpers downplayed the busing issue while Faubus 
sought to make it the center-piece of his 1970 campaign.
2
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Bumpers took office promoting a vision of a future that 
"must be shaped and shared by all Arkansans: old and young, 
black and white, rich and poor."3
In Florida, Reubin Askew defeated the incumbent 
governor who during the campaign took over a school 
district to thwart a court-ordered school desegregation 
plan that included busing. Askew took office with a pledge 
of "equal rights for all of our people, . . . black as well 
as white.114
In South Carolina, the incumbent Democratic Lieutenant 
Governor John West ran against a Republican who frequently 
voiced fiery anti-integration rhetoric. "The politics of 
race and divisiveness," West declared in his inaugural 
address, "have been soundly repudiated in South Carolina." 
West promised to run a "color blind" administration that 
would "eliminate from our government any vestige of 
discrimination because of race, creed, sex, religion or any 
other barrier to fairness for all citizens."5
In Georgia, Jimmy Carter, a peanut farmer and nuclear 
submarine officer, succeeded Lester Maddox. Known for his 
virulent anti-integration rhetoric, Maddox had established 
and maintained his hard-line segregationist reputation by 
autographing ax handles, mementos of the weapon he used 
years earlier to prevent blacks from entering his chicken 
restaurant. But as Carter took office he declared "the 
time for racial discrimination is over."6
3
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Three southern governors elected at about the same 
time as Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter will not be 
examined here, Lynwood Holton of Virginia, Winfield Dunn of 
Tennessee and Alabama's George Wallace. While Holton and 
Wallace's inaugurations echoed the New South governor's 
rhetoric of racial tolerance, commentators at the time did 
not consider them part of this political phenomena.
Although both the inaugurations and subsequent actions in 
office of Holton and Wallace testified to the changing 
political environment of the South, their elections did not 
demonstrate the transformation of racial politics in 
Democratic gubernatorial campaigns. Lynwood Holton's 
Republican candidacy in 1969, the year before the four 
discussed here, reflected the collapse of an aging 
Democratic machine rather than a transformation of racial 
politics. Holton, whose subsequent inaugural address and 
actions in office diverged from the Republican southern 
strategy of his president and party, later claimed that 
black leaders promised him support at the polls that he 
would not have to seek publicly. Neither Holton nor his 
Democratic opponent made race an issue in that campaign. 
After the election the national media viewed Virginia more 
as a suburb of Washington than the home of massive 
resistance.7
In Tennessee a campaign that had little to do with 
racial politics or partisan change in the South pitted a
4
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Republican dentist, Dr. Winfield Dunn of Memphis, against 
Nashville attorney John Jay Hooker. As the general 
election campaign began, Hooker's involvement in the 
speculative collapse of a fried chicken franchise business 
led to his political demise. The campaign's outcome 
resulted primarily from the taint of scandal and does not 
reflect the racial attitudes of the electorate or the 
politicians who sought their votes.8
George Wallace, an old stalwart of southern racial 
politics, ran true to form in 1970, warning of his 
opponent's dependence on the "black bloc vote." Only after 
staging a narrow come-from-behind victory did Wallace 
realize that the old style politics he had mastered had 
changed. At his inauguration he made no mention of 
segregation and even sought to include blacks in the 
inaugural festivities. Although Wallace made his familiar 
complaint about the "despotic tyranny" of the federal 
government, one newspaper observed that "his heart didn't 
seem to be in it this time." The content and tone of his 
speech clearly indicated that Wallace recognized "a shift 
toward moderation on the part of the white electorate in 
the South, a reluctant acceptance of change, a disillusion 
with the old politics of race."9
Wallace had narrowly escaped defeat in 1970. Even 
though he learned from that near loss he can not be 
included in the group examined in this work. Wallace
5
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represents a figure from the demagogic past who recognized 
a change in the South. The New South Governors of 1970 
embodied that transformation. One of the distinguishing 
characteristics of this new kind of politician was that 
they were not associated with the discredited politics of 
the past.
Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter shared several common 
characteristics. A campaign strategy emerged among these 
candidates that some observers have called "new populism." 
Like its antecedent of the 1830s, new populism promoted the 
interests of common folk, but relied primarily on image and 
style rather than issues to attract support. Candidates 
tapped into the pervasive alienation within the electorate 
and portrayed themselves as good men who understood the 
problems of the average voter. Employing this strategy 
political outsiders escaped association with the ills of 
the past while sidestepping controversial issues of the 
present. Bright, ambitious young men could demonstrate 
their knowledge of the issues without taking controversial 
stands by convincing voters to trust them to do the right 
thing. Issues became subservient to style.
In portraying themselves in the style of populism the 
successful candidates effectively employed a relatively new 
and powerful political tool. All these young candidates 
came of age as the medium of television began to exert a 
pervasive influence on society and culture. The
6
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presidential elections of 1960, 1964 and 1968 swayed voters 
with television images of candidates. As southerners these 
men had a special understanding of the power of the new 
medium. The civil rights movement capitalized on images of 
persecution and injustice while southern demagogues 
presented a picture of immorality and backwardness. The 
power of television was not lost on these young southern 
politicians. In their campaigns they employed effective 
television strategies that emphasized their best qualities 
or planted seeds of doubt about their opponents in voters' 
minds. All of them benefitted to some degree from their 
opponents' lack of understanding of the new medium. Some 
of the losing candidates presented their competitors with a 
gift by taking actions that produced negative television 
images. Others, employing demagogic practices of yore, 
yelled and screamed on television in the same manner that 
they had in open air rallies of the distant past.
Successful candidates perceived the diminishing power of 
party loyalty, political machines and power brokers that 
controlled large groups of voters, and began to appeal 
directly to voters through the medium of television.
The new South governors of 1970 also shared political 
ambitions that extended beyond the region. All these young 
men had aspirations that stretched beyond their home 
states. Dale Bumpers would leave the governor's office and 
serve twenty-four years in the United States Senate.
7
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Reubin Askew twice campaigned for the presidency. John 
West became America's ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Jimmy 
Carter's national ambitions actually affected the way he 
governed Georgia. Carter's gubernatorial administration 
broke several symbolic barriers of racism, and he used the 
office as a springboard for his candidacy for the 
presidency in 1976. These southerners realized that once 
de jure segregation ended they could become viable national 
candidates. Racial problems afflicted all parts of the 
nation. The country reflected the ambivalence of the 
South. States outside the South, long accustomed to de 
facto segregation, seemed unable to cope with the problems 
spurred by that pattern of integration and challenged 
busing desegregation plans in the courts and the streets. 
President Richard M. Nixon seemed intent on slowing down 
executive enforcement of desegregation. The National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders had declared that 
the United States "was moving toward two societies, one 
white, one black -- separate and unequal." Southern 
leaders realized that they had more experience and, at that 
moment in history, more success in dealing with racial 
integration than northerners. These four bright, young, 
ambitious men realized that perhaps development of positive 
measures to remedy segregation's problems could g amer 
national political appeal for southerners who could 
transcend the race issue, or at least the stereotype of
8
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racial demagoguery, associated with southern politicians of 
the past.10
These four politicians also shared a final 
characteristic; they all appreciated the fact that changing 
attitudes dictated a new approach to the old politics of 
race. The southern gubernatorial elections of 1970 and the 
subsequent inaugural speeches signaled a transformation of 
racial politics for the region. As the campaigns began, 
however, persistent ambivalence concerning the pace of 
integration and court-ordered busing of school children to 
achieve racial balances tempted many politicians to exploit 
these concerns. The 1970 elections demonstrated that 
southerners had decided to obey the law. The successful 
candidates understood that the electorate had come to this 
decision with varying degrees of enthusiasm and that their 
campaigns must reflect their constituents' ambivalence; 
they must eschew the rhetoric of resistance without 
uttering strong words in favor of desegregation and 
particularly busing. Noisy challengers conducting 
campaigns of the past allowed most of the eventual winners 
to conduct' quiet campaigns that included no overt gestures 
to gain the support of blacks.
The subsequent elections of 1970 not only feature a 
new type of candidate, but they also took place in a 
drastically changed political context. During the 1960s 
the South flirted with the GOP for the first time since
9
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Reconstruction and elected many Republicans to office.
After the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, even the most 
recalcitrant southerners realized that racial integration 
had moved beyond politics and that the law would be 
enforced no matter which party held office. Politicians no 
longer found it necessary to demonstrate a devotion to 
white supremacy and segregation in order to gain office in 
the region. The implications of this acceptance of 
integration affected the gubernatorial campaigns and the 
candidates who participated in them. Although black voters 
constituted no more than twenty-five percent of the 
electorate in any of the four southern states examined in 
this work, the cohesion of black voters combined with the 
growing white moderate vote often represented the balance 
of power in statewide elections. Because of federal civil 
rights legislation and national appeals by the Democratic 
Party, the black vote moved solidly into the Democratic 
camp in the South. Republicans lost a golden political 
opportunity to control or influence a potential swing vote. 
Instead, the GOP appealed to traditional southern 
prejudices and politics. It therefore attracted many 
conservative voters, but the southern electorate had grown 
jaded by decades of opportunistic racial appeals.
Even though southern Democrats knew how to count votes 
and did not want to alienate black or moderate voters, they 
still stopped short of forming a viable, morally binding
10
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coalition. Partly this resulted from the knowledge that 
black voters had nowhere else to go in the face of the 
Republicans' southern strategy that attempted to play on 
white southerners' anxieties concerning desegregation. 
Although not catering to racial fears, the successful 
candidates in 1970 at least gave a nod to those 
apprehensions by neglecting to reach out to black voters. 
All the candidates both diverted attention from the racial 
issue to some degree and made no substantial effort to 
incorporate blacks into the Democratic coalition. In 
Arkansas Dale Bumpers could calmly respond to Orval Faubus' 
frenzied attempts to make busing the main issue of the 
campaign by simply saying that all the candidates opposed 
busing but that until the Supreme Court made a ruling there 
was nothing that any of them could do. In Florida, before 
the campaign season began, the incumbent Republican 
governor unsuccessfully challenged federal authority over a 
court-ordered desegregation plan that included busing.
When campaigning began in earnest, the eventual winner, 
Reubin Askew, could ignore the busing issue and emphasize 
an issue that had economic appeal. Similarly in South 
Carolina, the Republican candidate drew unfavorable 
national attention with his fiery anti-busing rhetoric that 
seemed to contribute to an incident in which angry white 
parents overturned a bus that had carried black school 
children. This allowed John West to follow a middle path
11
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that promised little more than compliance with the law. 
Jimmy Carter in Georgia faced the most difficult campaign 
because his main adversary had already established his 
place at the middle of the political spectrum. Running 
against a moderate former governor, Carter had to stake out 
a position that would appeal to those on the right of the 
political spectrum without alienating the growing numbers 
of black and moderate voters. Successfully running a 
campaign of subterfuge, diverting attention from racial 
prejudice without condemning it, Carter set the pattern for 
political campaigns for the future that ultimately 
propelled him onto a national political stage.
Taken together the elections of these four moderate 
southern governors reveal a great deal about a pivotal 
period in Southern political history. As Dale Bumpers' 
asserted, his election and the victories of Askew, West and 
Carter had not come about by happenstance, they resulted 
from a cry for new leadership in the South. All four of 
the newly elected governors demonstrated leadership 
qualities in their inaugural addresses that announced that 
the South no longer sought to perpetuate racism. They 
later took constructive steps toward establishing better 
race relations, but an evaluation of the gubernatorial 
administrations is not the topic of this study. It 
investigates their gubernatorial campaigns. Electoral 
pursuits provide a more accurate portrayal of public
12
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attitudes than the actions of a governor. Candidates must 
function in the political environment in which they pursue 
election. For that reason, the study begins by examining 
the transformed political landscape of the South in 1970.
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CHAPTER 2 
A CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
Politicians seldom initiate social change, rather they 
mirror the electorate that put them into office. The 
southern governors elected in 1970 won office because they 
convinced voters that they held the same beliefs and would, 
if elected, act on those issues important to voters. In 
other words, these politicians did not lead, but followed 
the electorate from which they sought favor.
Writing at the time of the 1970 election of a "new 
mood in the South," Tom wicker, of the New York Times, 
noted that these new governors described themselves as 
"products of a particular time and mood in the South, 
rather than as creators of a movement." Reubin Askew, the 
newly elected governor of Florida, believed that southern 
whites had changed their attitude on the race question. 
"That question, is, I believe," said Askew, "fading away as 
an overriding political consideration." Jimmy Carter, the 
newly elected governor of Georgia, asserted that it would 
be a serious mistake for a candidate to revive racism as a 
campaign theme. "I know my people, and I am saying what 
they are thinking," Carter told Time. "We have a lot of 
problems still left concerning race, but we are no longer 
preoccupied with this problem to the exclusion of others. 
There is a new dynamic, a new freedom that exists 
throughout the South."1
14
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Many things did seem new in the South of 1970, 
although to herald change in the region was not new at all. 
"New Souths" had been proclaimed since the 1880s when Henry 
W. Grady, and other optimistic southerners envisioned a 
region rising out of the ashes of Civil War and 
Reconstruction. The term "New South," according to 
historian Paul Gaston, "bespoke harmonious reconciliation 
of sectional differences, racial peace, and a new economic 
and social order based on industry and scientific, 
diversified agriculture -- all of which would lead, 
eventually, to the South's dominance in the reunited 
nation." During the 1920s an infusion of new and expanding 
industries in the region prompted Richard Edmonds, the 
patriarch of southern boosters, to claim that the region 
was "writing an Epic of Progress and Prosperity in Letters 
of Gold." During World War II the South benefitted from 
the increased presence of defense industries. The region 
emerged from the conflict, as H.C. Nixon said, with "a 
standard of living for the common man that was undreamt of 
in its prewar philosophy." Although the postwar South held 
promise, the region could not adjust to the onslaught of 
social change brought on by economic and racial 
adjustments. Over and over, southerners had sought 
redemption from the past with optimistic proclamations for 
the future -- while refusing to deal with the problems of 
the present.2
15
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By 1970, however, there seemed little doubt that the 
South had changed for the better. Some even called the 
region the "Good South" to communicate the positive changes 
occurring. Evidence of a good South abounded. The 1970 
census reflected significant gains in education, wealth and 
population in the region. The number of people moving into 
the South exceeded out-migration for the first time since 
Reconstruction. Many northern blacks returned to the land 
of their ancestral roots, feeling more comfortable there 
than in other regions of the nation. The South had 
created, albeit reluctantly, a new society which most found 
better than the old one they had been forced to leave 
behind. "By accepting the legal direction to obey the 
Constitution and do what was morally right.." Atlanta 
journalist, Ralph McGill observed in 1968, "the Southern 
white man was freed to advance his economy, to remove his 
political system from bondage, and to begin improving the 
quality of his education so that it would give Southern 
children equal opportunity . . . with children in the rest 
of the nation."3
No change, however, proved more important in the 1970 
election than those related to race relations. By 1970 
southern attitudes suggested less rigid, more accommodating 
race relations. The fact that these new more agreeable 
relations came about after years of civil rights struggles 
and federal pressure to alleviate de jure segregation did
16
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not diminish the transformation. In the fall of 1970, 
sixteen years after the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of 
Education decision ended legal school segregation, southern 
schools became the most thoroughly integrated in the 
nation.
As southerners grappled with desegregation they also 
elected a group of governors who manifested an attitude of 
racial moderation. These southern politicians were not, as 
the old saying goes, just whistling Dixie. Their tune had 
changed. Although their election in 1970 did not mark a 
total transformation of the South, it did suggest a subtle 
shift in the balance of power. Although the rhetoric of 
racism, resistance and defiance could still be heard, by 
1970 southerners had realized the futility of opposition to 
federal civil rights policies and no longer wanted to hear 
political candidates singing the old refrains of racial 
antagonism. Political campaigns dominated by racial 
harangues sounded discordant to a region attuned to the 
harmonious sounds of moderation.
Although better race relations came about primarily 
through federal coercion, individuals across the South 
displayed a growing desire to work toward some sort of 
racial accommodation. Deeply held notions concerning the 
impropriety of integration did not disappear easily. Many 
southerners required prodding before stepping outside the 
circle of racial segregation that had surrounded them all
17
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their lives. Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General 
for Civil Rights, found that many school superintendents in 
the South had desegregation plans in their bottom desk 
drawers, but were unwilling to use them unless court orders 
required implementation. "Often they would tell us, 'You 
must make us do it if you want us to do it.'" Pat Watters, 
of the Southern Regional Council, made a similar point: 
"Many white southerners still need the excuse that they are 
being forced to do what they know is right about race.”*
The transformation in southern politics and race 
relations that shaped the electoral battle of 1970 came 
about for several reasons. The civil rights movement awoke 
a sense of guilt over the costs of segregation in some 
white southerners who now accepted integration without 
question. Many worried that the region suffered from the 
stigma of segregation. The taint of racism distorted how 
some southerners pictured themselves, while others feared 
that rancorous race relations threatened the prosperity 
brought on by urbanization and industrialization. Still 
other southerners realized that they could not stop change 
and either altered their racial attitudes accordingly or 
remained opposed to racial accommodation. The factors 
mentioned above influenced southerners in various degrees; 
some may have been affected to an extent by all of them and 
some by one or a few. Some southerners became true 
converts, others moved grudgingly toward accommodation.
18
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But little doubt remained that most southerners, aside from 
those few who held firm to the old notion of maintaining a 
strict caste system, modified their racial attitudes.
By 1970 many white southerners had come to appreciate 
the injustice of segregation. R.A. Fennell, school 
superintendent in Williamsburg County, South Carolina, 
found himself faced with the inequities of a social system 
he had helped perpetuate. After Fennell's mostly black 
school district desegregated, teachers tested 160 black 
seventh graders and learned that one out of three could not 
read. "They're my product," lamented Fennell, recounting 
that all those children had started school while he had 
been superintendent. "I think that, as educators, we have 
to level with the people and be frank about the kind of 
education we've provided for the Negro children in the 
past. We haven't been candid in the past." The civil 
rights movement also stirred a deep-seated sense of guilt 
that lay just beneath the surface of the southern 
experience. The media images of brutal repression toward 
peaceful blacks seeking simple justice awoke many white 
southerners to the injustices of a social system that most 
had never questioned. Richard E. Yates spoke for many 
whites when he wrote of the shame he felt about the system 
of segregation in which he had grown up, and to which he 
"gave unthinking approval to until demagogues like Wallace
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and Faubus, without intending, taught me the errors of my 
ways."5
A second group of southerners altered their thinking 
about race relations due to the stigmas or the costs 
associated with segregation. Ironically, southern leaders 
who demanded defiance of desegregation changed racial 
attitudes in ways that no one would have suspected.
Elected officials had presided over efforts to prevent 
black children from entering schools, condoned the use of 
fire hoses and attack dogs to thwart peaceful 
demonstrators, promoted agitation that resulted in 
violence, and defied civil authority while denying simple 
justice to black citizens. Such behavior began to alter 
the thinking of many southerners, even individuals steeped 
in segregation who believed that the alternative would 
produce devastating results, and embarrassed a people long 
convinced of the appropriateness of polite behavior. The 
incongruent behavior of their own public officials swayed 
many southerners disgusted by the lawlessness of urban 
rioters and student protests.
Some very practical costs and benefits also induced 
changes in the attitudes of rank and file members of the 
1970 New South. White southerners displayed a desire to 
avoid further racial unrest. A growing body of white 
middle-class, business-oriented suburbanites in the region 
realized racial turmoil stymied efforts to invigorate the
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business community, discouraged northern investment and 
impeded the economic progress that accompanied urban 
centers. Bayard Rustin, widely recognized as one of the 
leading tacticians of the civil rights movement, developed 
a strategy of actions designed to portray segregation as 
anachronistic. By attacking urban focal points such as 
hotels, lunch counters, transportation terminals, 
libraries, and swimming pools, black protestors 
demonstrated the glaring contradiction of segregation in a 
modem, industrialized region. Jim Crow, Rustin contended, 
impeded the flow of commerce in the broadest sense: "it is 
a nuisance in a society on the move (and on the make)." 
Business leaders across the South reordered their 
priorities when they realized they could not maintain 
traditional race relations and at the same time pursue 
economic revitalization. Boosters who sought to paint the 
South in the colors of progress found their efforts 
diminished by the patina of racism which covered the 
region.8
The new concern with the southern image became acute 
during the process of urbanization. A pattern of 
accommodation in the cities of the South preceded the more 
moderate climate throughout the region in the early 1970s. 
Atlanta led the way. While other southern cities received 
negative national media coverage of racial incidents, 
businessmen, politicians, editors, and civic leaders in the
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Georgia capital decided to avoid confrontation and called 
itself "the city too busy to hate." Their decision to 
accommodate rather than resist social change contributed to 
the revitalization of the city and region. Those governors 
elected in 1970 often repeated scenes played out by mayors 
of southern cities during the previous decade. Atlanta's 
Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., had rallied a black-white coalition 
that sought to improve the city's image and also became the 
first southern politician to testify before Congress in 
favor of passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. City 
officials across the South eventually sought cooperation 
from black leaders. Some acquiesced after defiance 
produced negative publicity for their cities; others sought 
out black cooperation before harmful consequences could be 
brought about by racial incidents and federal pressure.
Thus the urbanization of the South played a major role in 
racial accommodation. Southern cities, as Blaine Brownell 
and David Goldfield have argued, always served as "links 
between the traditional South and the contrary influences 
of northern capitalism and the American 'mainstream.'"7
Some southerners, even if they were not truly 
converted, grasped the inevitability of racial change. By 
the early 1970's even the most adamant segregationists 
realized that school desegregation and black voting could 
not be reversed. As Governor Lester Maddox ended his term 
in 1971, many liberals conceded that their fears of four
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years earlier had not materialized. Although Maddox 
noisily protested federal interference with desegregation 
during his administration, he presided over more 
integration than in any previous period in the state's 
history and appointed blacks to state boards for the first 
time in Georgia. "He did not practice what he preached," 
said Charles Weltner, an Atlanta lawyer who gave up a seat 
in Congress rather than run for re-election on the same 
ballot with Maddox. In August 1971, Ebony. a magazine with 
a predominantly black readership, ran a special edition on 
conditions in the South. It included interviews with 
several prominent political leaders, including George 
Wallace. The very fact that Wallace would agree to an 
interview with Ebony spoke volumes about the changing 
attitudes of the white South. Wallace told the magazine 
that the South had "fewer problems in regard to race than 
does the rest of the nation. The federal government can 
use the South as an example for other states to emulate in 
years to come." In 1971 Senator Strom Thurmond, the 
Dixiecrat presidential candidate of 1948 turned southern 
strategy Republican, appointed a black staff assistant. 
Thurmond also spoke to Ebony and asserted that "we have 
more in common as Southerners than we have reason to oppose 
each other because of race."8
Indeed, it seemed something southern united its 
inhabitants, whatever their color or background. Pat
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Watters described a distinct southern culture belonging to 
black and white alike, which "gave the most promise of 
achievement finally of a real interracial society." Using 
thirty-two questions from ten national public opinion 
surveys Leonard Broom and Norval Glenn concluded that 
"Negro-white differences are smaller than the differences 
between Southern and non-Southern whites." The South had 
somehow maintained its unique culture. Once the onus of a 
segregated social system had been removed, the South 
offered hope of an integrated society that might work.9
Many southerners hoped that their region, long 
despised, ridiculed, and pitied by the rest of the nation, 
might somehow attain redemption by leading the way toward a 
more just society. A letter to the New York Times from 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, suggested that the South "despite 
its record of documented social injustices, has a great 
opportunity to lead this country in the resolution of 
racial conflict." Jimmy Carter spoke of a feeling that 
southerners had "been afflicted both personally and in the 
national press with . . . unfair criticism because of the 
racial problems in the South. . . . With the alleviation of 
this particular aspect of the South's problem -- which is 
now a nationwide problem - - w e  have been brought along with 
some moderation toward the center and into a feeling that 
the South is now truly representative of the finer 
characteristics of all Americans." Many believed that
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since the problems of integration extended to many other 
parts of the nation, the South, with more experience, more 
practical and realistic solutions, could lead the way 
toward better race relations in America. "Racial division 
is the sickness of the nation, and the region longest and 
most sharply afflicted has surely undergone the most 
drastic treatment," observed Tom Wicker, a southerner and 
columnist for the New York Times. "Perhaps, therefore, 
Southerners -- slowly but surely dealing with their racial 
ills while other Americans only begin to face theirs -- 
have found their energies more nearly freed, their spirits 
more nearly lifted, than anyone else."10
Hope that the South might lead the nation toward a 
racial reconciliation sprang from outsiders as well as from 
many southerners. Jon Nordheimer, of the New York Times, 
after describing a vastly improved South reflected in the 
recent census figures, wrote of the opportunity for the 
South to help salvage the Union. Richard N. Goodwin, 
speaking before a meeting of the L.Q.C. Lamar Society, a 
group of liberal southerners, said he believed that the 
South was capable of not only solving its own problems, but 
of imparting its values to an America which was "confused, 
divided and in turmoil."11
The chance seemed to have arrived. A new South 
emerged in many facets of the southern experience. The 
1970 Southern Baptist Convention meeting in Denver
25
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displayed a general desire for moderation and middle-of- 
the-road policies within the organization. The members 
selected a new president regarded as a moderate and, more 
significantly, allowed an unscheduled appearance by a group 
of black students who lectured the Baptists on following 
the principles of Jesus in regard to race relations. In 
one Mississippi town, school board members could not decide 
whether to desegregate on their own or take their case to
court. The chairman decided to take a secret vote in the
town's service clubs. The service club members -- all 
white, middle class businessmen -- voted against 
challenging integration. The school board took this as the 
mandate they needed to implement a plan.12
More than most aspects of life, it would be the 
desegregation of southern schools that illustrated how the 
South had changed, why it had changed, and perhaps
ultimately how it had not changed. By 1970 school
desegregation in the South seemed to work in the places 
where it had taken hold. In general, once exposed to 
school integration, most people seemed to favor it. In the 
spring of 1969 the Department of Health Education and 
Welfare conducted a survey in thirteen southeastern school 
districts that had experienced substantial desegregation 
over a two-year period or longer. Teachers, parents, and 
high school students answered questions concerning their 
feelings about desegregation. Almost every person
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interviewed stated that the process had gone better than 
expected. Seven out of ten black high school students 
interviewed believed that they received a better education 
in integrated schools. More than nine out of ten white 
students saw no difference in the education they received. 
Both black and white students expressed satisfaction with 
teacher desegregation. The great majority of students felt 
that the race of the teacher made no difference in the 
quality of teaching and that the teachers generally taught 
without racial favor.13
White southerners had indeed adjusted their attitudes 
toward school desegregation. Studying the period between 
1961 and 1976, Earl Black and Merle Black saw a marked 
transformation. "The magnitude of cleavage separating the 
races had moderated, with most of the change concentrated 
among white southerners. No longer does an atmosphere of 
impending crisis pervade the region." A May 1970 Gallup 
Poll indicated that white southern parental objection to 
sending their children to racially mixed schools had 
dropped from sixty-one percent in 1963 down to only sixteen 
percent in 1970. This led George Gallup to remark that 
this drastic reduction represented "one of the most 
dramatic shifts in the history of public opinion polling." 
By the end of 1970, a Harris Poll found that southerners 
accepted the judgement that de -jure school segregation was 
"wrong" by a forty-eighty to twenty-eight percent margin.14
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Southerners had not arrived at acceptance of school 
desegregation easily. Numan Bartley argued in The Rise of 
Massive Resistance that southerners acquiesced in the 
interest of social stability. When the South realized that 
the Supreme Court would not give in, and that the executive 
branch would not allow southern state governments to defy 
court orders, state officials could only close the schools. 
"Such a policy of calculated anarchy assaulted public 
education and threatened the whole structure of southern 
society, the regions' economic future, and the vested 
interest of southern institutions." Thus, Bartley argued, 
the central issues changed from desegregation to the future 
of public education and the stability of the governmental 
process.15
Earle Black and Merle Black, made much the same 
argument using the Center for Political Studies of the 
University of Michigan (formerly the Survey Research 
Center), SRC-CPS, presidential election year surveys. They 
found waning support for strict segregation after 1968, 
with most white southerners opting for something in-between 
segregation and desegregation. The authors reasoned that 
this change in southern white attitudes resulted from the 
fact that "many whites appear to have decided that the 
price of maintaining complete segregation . . . was 
prohibitive. To insist on total segregation in the face of 
escalating black protest and increasing federal
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intervention meant that other valued goods -- public 
schools, economic development, an orderly and peaceful 
society -- might be denied white southerners."16
Most white southerners realized that if they did not 
share social benefits with blacks, they would compromise or 
lose those assets themselves. Despite widespread 
predictions of disorder, when the schools opened in the 
fall of 1970, a resigned acceptance prevailed throughout 
the South. Implementation of near-total desegregation of 
the region's schools proceed smoothly and with amazingly 
little disruption.17
While many whites did not support school integration, 
those politicians who sought to exploit the situation 
received little support. George Wallace, a private citizen 
in September 1969, urged parents to defy court orders and 
enter their children in the schools of their choice. But 
schools receiving desegregation mandates opened without 
incident. In 1970, Georgia parents ignored a newly passed 
state law and the public urging of Governor Lester Maddox 
to defy court ordered desegregation and sent their children 
to their assigned schools. And plans for white boycotts in 
Richmond, Virginia, and Augusta, Georgia, never 
materialized. 18
For most parents, welfare of the schools outweighed 
any other considerations -- even local control or the 
traditional culture of the South. In 1970 Professor James
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H. Chubbuck, director of the Institute of Politics at 
Loyola University in New Orleans, Louisiana, saw a 
coalition of blacks and middle-class whites forming because 
of their concerns "about the needs of quality education and 
economic development." In an article entitled "The Schools 
Must Survive," the Birmingham News urged the people of 
Alabama to "avoid doing or saying anything which might 
endanger the physical or educational well-being of the 
children who will be attending the schools." In South 
Carolina state officials expressed relief and pleasure as 
integration plans proceeded smoothly after one observer 
labeled those efforts "the biggest social change to hit the 
South since the abolition of slavery." Virginia Governor 
Lynwood Holton set an example of southern resolve not to 
disrupt schools when he escorted his thirteen year old 
daughter to a school where most of her classmates would be 
black, even though as governor he could have legally sent 
her to any school in the state. In an unusual tribute from 
a political foe, Virginia's Democratic Lt. Governor, J. 
Sargeant Reynolds issued a statement calling Governor 
Holton "a man of rare courage and deep dedication to do 
what is right for right's sake." The Washington Post 
described the mood over desegregation in Virginia as one of 
"passive resignation." Many southern state officials urged 
obedience to the court's edicts, even when challenging 
their validity in higher courts. In an article entitled
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"Making It Work," the Winston-Salem Journal, praised the 
local school board for dealing with desegregation orders 
with "dignity, decorum and common sense."19
The metamorphosis in southern white attitudes and the 
relatively successful desegregation of southern public 
schools did not escape the recognition of victims of past 
discriminations. African-Americans provide the most 
convincing evidence of a change in the South. John Shelton 
Reed and Merle Black, studied southern public opinion and 
discovered that black attitudes toward the South had 
improved. Using the SRC-CPS presidential election studies 
between 1964 and 1976, Reed and Black, evaluated a series 
of questions that asked respondents to rate several 
politically relevant groups on a "feeling thermometer."
The data showed a steady rise among southern blacks in 
their feelings toward southerners. "Southern blacks were 
as likely as Southern whites -- very likely -- to express 
warmth toward Southerners." Reed and Black attributed the 
rise to the social and political changes in the South since 
the mid-1960s. Historically blacks faced extensive 
discrimination, pervasive segregation and widespread 
exclusion from the political system, which led many blacks 
to cast negative aspersions on those values which seemed 
embedded in the traditional image of a southerner. Changes 
in the South, after the civil rights movement, enabled 
southern blacks to claim full citizenship in their native
31
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
region. Reed and Black suggested that the region's blacks 
responded, in the 1970s, by evaluating white southerners 
more favorably and "by laying claim to the label 
' Southerner.' "20
Although generally pessimistic about race relations in 
1970, Vernon Jordon, director of the United Negro College 
Fund, believed that "to the extent that there is a ray of 
hope, it doesn't come from Washington; it comes from the 
state capitols of the South." Jordon cited the recently 
elected "New South" governors' remarks made "not in the 
quiet before the election but from the inaugural platform .
. . Perhaps a new day is dawning. I hope." Dr. Norman C. 
Francis, President of Xavier, a predominantly black 
Catholic university in New Orleans, Louisiana, saw in the 
South "the emergence of a just reconstruction which the 
nation as a whole might well emulate."21
Many northern blacks began to see the South as an 
agreeable place to live. Now that segregation no longer 
prevented educated and skilled black workers from taking 
advantage of employment opportunities, many favored living 
in the South. After decades of black outmigration, a 
reverse migration from the North back to the South had 
commenced. Economic opportunities now existed for blacks 
which had previously been inpossible. Black movement in 
and out of the South now began to resemble migration 
patterns of the white population.22
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John Lewis, a veteran of civil rights struggles, and 
director of the Atlanta-based Voter Education Project, 
reported that his organization received fifteen to twenty- 
letters a month from young blacks wanting to move South. 
Northern cities no longer held their previous promise for 
southern blacks. Lewis spoke of employment opportunities 
for young, trained blacks which had opened up in the South 
during the 1960s. "Segregation barriers are gone. And, 
more than in any other area, there has been a tremendous 
amount of progress in the political arena. I think we will 
see a complete drop-off in the next few years of migration 
out of the South by black youths.1,23
Many black Americans yearned to return to the land 
they had deserted and believed that the South offered them 
"the best potential for a better life," according to the 
New York Times. A black activist from Charleston, South 
Carolina, said that southern blacks were preparing "a 
refuge" for northern blacks who had grown tired of "beating 
their heads against the integration wall." One recent 
transplant, a public relations executive who had moved from 
Detroit to Atlanta said: "The potential for success is 
simply so much greater here in the South where people, 
black and white are getting themselves together." Carol 
Hall, a Memphis television news reporter from New York, saw 
both economic and social changes in the South and 
attributed the improvements to more open communication
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between the races. After leaving Memphis when he was four 
years old, Larry Shaw, a vice president of Stax Record 
Company, characterized the region as "the promised land" 
upon his return. "I find that the things we blacks are 
anxious to have straightened out are more possible in the 
South. People are warmer no matter how caught up they are 
in their racial prejudices." Charles Scruggs, moved to 
Memphis from Cincinnati in 1970. "I think white people in 
the South are more decent. They haven't changed enough, 
and the changes they made were not because they wanted to - 
- they were forced to. But at least they're different from 
the average white in the North."24
Many of the blacks who returned seemed to share the 
belief that southern hospitality was no longer strictly for 
whites only. "Here, you go into a store, and people take 
time to say, 'How are you today?'" said Daniel Lane who 
moved South from Boston, "and when you leave they say,
'Come back, you hear?' In the North, they act like they're 
mad because you even walked into the store." The Rev. C.
T. Vivian, active in the civil rights movement throughout 
the South, moved to Chicago in the mid-1960s. He described 
blacks who migrated from the South to the North as being 
"homesick for just plain folk. There is more a sense of 
humanness in the South than in the North."25
James Meredith, the first black student to enter the 
University of Mississippi in 1962, left the South after he
34
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
was shot during a march across that state in 1966. Five 
years later Meredith called a press conference announcing 
that he and his family were moving from New York to 
Jackson, Mississippi. "On a person-to-person, day-to-day 
basis, the South is a more livable place for blacks than 
any other place in the nation." The Gallup poll repeated 
Meredith's comment and asked people if they agreed. Blacks 
agreed by a margin of forty-eight to thirty percent. These 
improved opinions did not mean that prejudices had 
disappeared. The South did not become the promised land 
for northern blacks. By the early 1970s, however, many 
blacks felt more comfortable in that region than in other 
parts of the United States.2*
By 1970 southerners, both black and white, had altered 
their perceptions and accommodations in regard to race 
relations. Several factors contributed to changes in the 
electorate. But what motivated the moderation in the 
politicians who sought to represent this changing 
electorate? The racial demographics of the electorate 
presented the most obvious drawback to the use of racial 
shibboleths. Although blacks controlled no state they did 
represent a powerful portion of the electorate since the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 dramatically increased the 
numbers of black voters in the South. Most southern 
politicians knew how to count, and the political numbers 
added up. Southern Regional Council figures showed that
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between 1968 and 1970 alone, black registration jumped by
212,000 to a regional total of 3,357,000. The increased 
numbers coupled with black voting solidarity compelled 
political candidates to take heed of their needs and 
desires.27
In the 1960s southern politics opened up in other ways 
as well. The abolition of the poll tax, court-ordered 
reapportionments and redistricting of state and federal 
legislatures all led to a more broad-based electorate.
More moderate groups of middle-class urban dwellers and the 
infusion of two-party competition upset the traditional 
mechanics of Democratic politics. New coalitions began to 
form. The metamorphosis of the electoral system in the 
South led to the rise of what some called the "new face 
syndrome" in gubernatorial politics. While having obtained 
enough political experience to prove their competence, 
candidates such as Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter had not 
drawn any negative publicity. They carried no stigmas of a 
segregationist past; they had not been scarred by the 
battles of civil rights resistance. An important part of 
their appeal lay in their relative anonymity. Most voters 
did not know them or associate them with a discredited 
political system.28
To secure a wining margin a candidate still needed to 
appeal to some white voters who remained hostile to 
integration. All southern voters did not welcome the
36
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
zephyr of change, but the politics of blatant racism proved 
unacceptable in the South of 1970. The new climate of 
moderation in the region made open appeals to racial 
prejudices unacceptable. The power of the black vote could 
not be ignored. The number of black elected officials in 
the region had increased dramatically. Some black 
candidates, such as Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young in 
Atlanta, had captured sizable segments of the white vote in 
their campaigns. This suggested that nonracial appeals to 
the economic interest of both low-income whites and blacks 
might achieve success at the polls. A politician in 
Louisiana described the Democratic Party in the South as 
"evolving into a coalition of low-income whites, labor 
elements, some intellectuals and blacks - - a  new type of 
constituency." And Bill Welsh, the national Democratic 
Party's chief southern strategist, saw a real chance for a 
natural black-white coalition in the South.29
In the early 1970s, candidates across the South began 
voicing appeals that transcended color lines and spoke to a 
pervasive alienation that permeated the electorate. Voters 
in the early 1970s displayed impatience, discontent and 
anger toward political candidates as well as the entire 
political system. Vocal and often violent minorities had 
dominated the turbulent sixties. Citizens across America 
belonging to what President Richard Nixon called the 
"silent majority" felt excluded and exhibited a sense of
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powerlessness. Candidates who gave voice to the problems 
of the average man increased their chances of success.
Many political observers attributed southern voter 
discontent solely to resentments concerning desegregation, 
but that assessment overstated and oversimplified a 
sentiment that ran deep and wide throughout America. In 
the South a sense of powerlessness formed into a pattern of 
populism that defended the little man and attacked the 
Establishment. Polls in several southern states 
demonstrated widespread alienation among both whites and 
blacks who strongly endorsed statements that the average 
man was neglected or abused by politicians or public 
officials. So while voter discontent may have included 
those who held racial antagonisms, it also contained many 
who simply found government distant and unresponsive to 
their needs.30
The South's new found economic progress made biracial 
coalitions more palatable for working-class whites. "In 
prosperity, you don't need scapegoats," Emory University 
political scientist James Clotfelter Jr. explained. "You 
don't have to blame or apologize for giving blacks jobs if 
you have enough jobs to go around." Clotfelter and William 
Hamilton attributed the success of moderate southern 
politicians to a new populism. They described how a 
politician might go about changing traditional campaign 
methods: "To meet his constituents' need for scapegoats, a
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nonracist candidate might identify new targets for attack .
. . to replace blacks. The most appropriate targets would 
be powerful economic groups . . . that embody sharply 
contrasting class styles."31
In Florida's 1970 gubernatorial campaign Reubin Askew 
focused on his plan to tax corporations in the state. In 
Georgia Jimmy Carter said the real issue of his campaign 
was "who will control the government -- the people or a 
small band of men?" And, Carter left no doubt about the 
kind of men in that small band when he characterized the 
former governor as a rich, citified dandy who could not 
understand the problems of common folk. Many political 
observers believed Carter had patterned his campaign on the 
populist appeals of George Wallace. Even though Wallace 
had used blacks as scapegoats, his campaigns also included 
a populist, anti-establishment rhetoric that lay at the 
core of his political appeal. Wallace's attacks on 
powerful economic groups such as the "big newspapers, banks 
and utilities," Stewart Alsop keenly observed in 1970, 
"account for that electric current in his shirt-sleeve 
crowds at least as much as the race issue." Southern 
politicians learned, in the words of historian David 
Goldfield, "that hollering 'class' was as effective as 
hollering 'nigger' once had been."32
Southern Democrats thereby practiced a new brand of 
politics that allowed a discreet appeal to blacks, while
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maintaining a large portion of the rural white vote, 
heretofore the mainstay of the party. Democratic 
candidates now tried to perch between two difficult and 
conflicting elements of the electorate. Candidates such as 
Bumpers, Askew, West, and Carter benefited from this new 
brand of politics. Blacks could not associate them with 
racist rhetoric or defiance of desegregation measures, and 
yet, as David Goldfield observed, their "populist rhetoric 
and modest background appealed to the traditional element 
of the party. This was a facile merger of class and race, 
and it became the standard of Southern Democratic strategy 
of the 1970s."33
Candidates in 1970 who sought to exploit resistance to 
desegregation, such as Orval Faubus in Arkansas, Albert 
Watson in South Carolina and Claude Kirk in Florida, found 
voters unsympathetic to their ploys. So it would seem that 
those candidates, no matter what their party affiliation, 
who caught the wave of reform rode it to electoral victory 
in the South. The willingness of white southerners to vote 
for moderate Democrats in 1970 contradicts the theory that 
most southerners did not change their hearts and minds but 
their partisan loyalties in the 1960s. The interpretation 
that a white backlash against Democratic support of civil 
rights created gains for the Republican Party in the South 
has come to enjoy widespread acceptance. For its 
adherents, the 1964 election marks the point at which
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southern Democratic loyalties began to wane. Before the 
early 1960s, the public did not see much difference between 
the two parties on race relations. The image presented by 
both parties reflected sufficiently ambiguous records to 
permit voters to come to whatever conclusion they chose. 
Supporters of segregation or integration had little trouble 
squaring their racial attitudes with party loyalties 
regardless of which party they supported. The Civil Rights 
Bill of 1964 and the subsequent presidential campaign 
changed that. A Democratic president proposed the bill, a 
Democratic Congress enacted it, and another Democratic 
president signed the bill into law. Whatever 
identification with civil rights Republicans in Congress 
may have achieved by their role in passing the legislation 
was quickly lost by the presidential nomination of Barry 
Goldwater, who made no secret of his intention to ignore 
the black vote in the South and go hunting "where the ducks 
are." The popular impressions of the two parties' civil 
rights positions changed dramatically. The Democrats 
assumed a liberal image on racial issues, and the 
Republicans a conservative one. Among southern whites who 
perceived any difference between the parties on these 
issues the percentage viewing the Democrats as the more 
liberal rose from thirty-five percent in the early 1960s to 
almost eighty percent by the end of the decade.34
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The differentiation in parties' perceived support for 
racial change, however, did not necessarily determine how 
people voted. "Greater voter awareness of party 
differences does not in itself create a mandating election 
system," cautioned Gerald Pomper in a study of party image. 
"It would also be necessary to show that votes are actually 
cast because of issue preferences." Common perceptions of 
the Democratic party as pro-integration, it has been widely 
assumed, caused widespread defections among a largely 
segregationist electorate. But, as Paul Beck points out, 
"aggregate relationships only imply individual ones, they 
do not prove them."35
Analysis of aggregate voting patterns through 1968 led 
Kevin Phillips, in his Emerging Republican Majority, to 
conclude that a white backlash had contributed 
substantially to Republican growth. Other more detailed 
analyses of survey data, however, suggest that civil rights 
had little to do with partisan change in the South. In a 
study of native white conservatives, Paul Beck found racial 
issue partisanship in the South surprisingly low. Beck saw 
the high number of Democratic loyalties as a major 
constraint. "That no more than one in ten," Beck said, 
"have brought their partisan loyalties into line with their 
racial attitudes and party images belies the popular image 
of whites motivated largely by their racial prejudices in 
establishing their long-term loyalties." While Beck
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conceded that a significant portion of the partisan change 
within the native white electorate may have deserted the 
Democratic party because of its racial policies, he argued 
that an even larger share could not be traced to the racial 
question which Beck saw "losing its position as an 
important issue to southern voters."36
Bruce Campbell saw the civil rights struggles, which 
so profoundly affected blacks, as having only a passing 
influence on white partisanship in 1964 and 1968.
Similarly, Raymond Wolfinger and Robert Arseneau, examining 
the SRC-CPS election year "likes and dislikes" questions 
concerning parties, found that few native white southerners 
ever mention civil rights or racial issues as reasons for 
liking either party. Racial matters became less important 
after 1968 and by 1970 almost disappeared as a component of 
either party's image. Democrats continued commanding the 
loyalty of native segregationists, and although Republican 
strength grew at the expense of Democratic declines, in the 
1970s racial issues faded in importance. One South 
Carolina political authority asserted in 1971 that the time 
when the Republican Party could expect large gains merely 
on a protest vote against the Democrats was over. "As a 
live issue, integration is fast losing its potency. 
Translated into politics, this means the momentum of the 
Republican Party is slowing down." 37
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When the partisan loyalties of the South are compared 
to the rest of the country, the supposition that a partisan 
shift in the South occurred because of the racial policies 
of political parties loses more of its persuasiveness. For 
many voters, the Democratic Party represented the turmoil, 
dissention, and pain suffered by the nation during the 
1960's. Wounded, the Democrats spilled blood not only in 
the South, but all over America. According to a Harris 
Survey in February 1970, the Democrats lost their position 
as the nation's majority political party for the first time 
in the m o d e m  political era. Among the national 
electorate, those who called themselves Democrats slipped 
to forty-eight percent, down from fifty-two percent in 
1968. The South, with sixty-four percent of the electorate 
calling themselves Democrats, remained the most loyal 
region in the nation. Even considering the strength of 
black Democratic partisanship in the South, continued 
Democratic strength in the region suggested that the 
indications of a national weakening of its strength more 
accurately explained Republican gains in the South than 
assumptions of a white backlash. Jimmy Carter saw the 
South as a reservoir of support for the Democratic Party.
A national Democratic candidate, Carter believed, no longer 
needed to devise a special appeal on the race question 
because the southern voter had become "just like the voters 
in the rest of the nation."38
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Since southerners no longer voted in accordance with 
segregationist tendencies, and the region's electorate had 
become more diversified and less provincial, southern 
politicians began thinking national thoughts. Charles 
Morgan, a southerner who led the American Civil Liberties 
Union in the South, saw positive changes in the country- 
originating in the South. He pointed to the "new South" 
rhetoric of the newly elected southern governors' stance on 
civil rights. Morgan believed these politicians harbored 
national ambitions, and that a southern governor who 
reflected a segregationist line did not stand a chance of 
being tapped for vice-president. Lawrence O'Brien, 
chairman of the national Democratic Party, said that the 
South had "finally resumed its place in the national 
Democratic Party."39
Southern politicians saw themselves playing to a 
national audience. They also viewed maintaining the 
improved status of southern race relations as an 
opportunity to offer leadership on the racial problems 
raging in the rest of the nation. Just as outside pressure 
on the South had helped cure their racial ills, perhaps an 
outsider to national politics could guide the North toward 
better racial relations. Ghetto riots had rocked urban 
centers across the North beginning with Watts in 1965 and 
erupting at frequent intervals throughout the rest of the 
decade. Perhaps a politician from the region long beset by
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racial difficulties who demonstrated success in dealing 
with racial turmoil might offer true leadership in a 
country that the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders concluded was "moving toward two societies, one 
black, one white -- separate and unequal."40
A southern politician who renounced the bad old days 
of segregation represented the prospect of a more viable 
practitioner of political equality than a glib northern 
liberal who had never dealt with the problems of 
integration. Having taken that most difficult step of 
publicly repudiating a social system that had been a part 
of a white southerners' upbringing, these politicians 
achieved a sort of redemption in the eyes of black 
southerners as well as the rest of the nation. After his 
election John West spoke candidly about the evolution of 
his attitudes: "I won't say that I'm completely free of any 
racial prejudice. Anybody raised in the South has been 
exposed to that and a certain amount is bound to rub off. 
But I've watched here in South Carolina some great 
leadership during this period of transition, and I've 
watched what happened in other states where governors 
defied federal court orders on desegregation. I've watched 
and I think I've learned a great deal."41
West was not the only politician who had grasped these 
lessons. Southern governors across the region attracted a 
national audience, and the South enticed a nation, racked
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by racial turmoil and violence, to look away toward Dixie. 
After years of ostracism and scorn, America embraced the 
South. The civil rights movement isolated the white South. 
To the rest of the nation the South seemed different, 
somehow "other." Most whites outside the South saw the 
practice of legal segregation as different from their 
racial attitudes, anathema to accepted norms of behavior in 
America. The brutal scenes played out in the national 
media of southern whites attacking peaceful black 
demonstrators, convinced many that white Southerners 
behaved not only differently, but unjustly. These actions 
reinforced and intensified the image of the South as 
outside the mainstream of American thought and behavior.
The South became a pariah.
By 1970 several factors came to bear on the racial 
attitudes of the nation as a whole. Most southerners had 
joined the majority of northerners in viewing legal 
segregation as unjust. Many Americans had deemed a 
repudiation of de jure segregation as necessary for the 
South to rejoin the Union. It had taken more than a 
century, but now the North welcomed the return of its 
prodigal son. The South was "in." America had "always 
loved the ideal of the South, even as it hated the region," 
according to historian David Goldfield. "Like an errant 
though beloved child, the South's periodic tantrums evoked 
national reproach; but after 1965, when Southerners had
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seemingly adjusted to new race relationships, and racial 
harmony and peace prevailed where everywhere else there 
existed only turmoil, the South could be taken to the 
nation's heart again."42
Literature of southern renascence writers such as 
William Faulkner, Tom Wolfe, and Robert Penn Warren had 
become required reading throughout the country. Modem 
southern writers such as William Styron, Flannery O'Connor, 
James Dickey, and Eudora Welty had become enormously 
popular outside their native region. The long-running 
television show the "Beverly Hillbillies" continued with 
ever increasing popularity. "Hee-Haw," a vaudevillian send 
up of southern culture, became the prime-time prize of 
Sunday night. "The Waltons" television show achieved 
enormous popularity attracting forty million viewers a 
week. Based on the novel Spencer's Mountain and set in the 
Blue Ridge mountains, the tales of this rural southern 
family reflected a southern sort of conservative stability 
that appealed to a country racked by the civil strife of 
the 1960s. Southern cooking also became the fad across 
America as the Kentucky Fried Chicken chain swept the 
country with astounding success.43
Country music, the music of the South, swept across 
America. The nation had gone "country-crazy," according to 
a New York Times Magazine feature story on country singer 
Johnny Cash. George Wallace made country music a part of
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his 1968 presidential campaign. President Nixon ordered 
his chief of staff to invite country music stars to perform 
at the White House. Country music seemed a welcome 
alternative to rock music that reeked of student protests 
and black music that reminded many of race riots. Country 
singers, Glen Campbell and Johnny Cash, hosted popular 
prime-time network television shows. By 1970 six-hundred- 
fifty "all country" radio stations spread across the United 
States and Canada appealing to northern whites who 
identified with the conservatism that characterized the 
southern value system. These forgotten Americans made up 
the core of Richard Nixon's "silent majority." These were 
the working-class Americans most directly affected by 
integrated schools and neighborhoods, who approved of Spiro 
Agnew's stinging criticism of the media, young protestors 
and race rioters who seemed to be shaking the moral 
foundation of America.44
So it would seem that the white non-South had 
embraced its other half. Statesman below the Mason-Dixon 
line must have welcomed the region's new found acceptance. 
Having seen the frightening images of southern demagogues 
displayed in the national media, those who sought 
leadership roles in the early seventies tempered their 
actions, lest they be portrayed in a similar fashion. 
Southern candidates could now aspire to a national 
political forum that had never been possible for their
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predecessors. Political actions, therefore, must be guided 
by what would play in Peoria as well as Podunk.
Despite all the evidence of change and acceptance of 
integration in the South, some within the electorate held 
fast to the segregation of the past and detested federal 
intervention in race relations. These beliefs and 
resentments were gaining adherents outside the region and 
the issue of busing made matters even worse. By 1970 most 
southerners had accepted integration in principle and in 
fact. But a decided ambivalence concerning race relations 
lingered in the South. Uncertainty resulted largely as a 
result of decisions by the federal judiciary. "The 
protests being heard throughout the Southland," wrote Hank 
Drake, political editor of Jacksonville's Florida Times 
Union. "come not from the arch-segregationists or the Klan 
element who in past years have violently opposed equal 
educational opportunities for blacks. They come instead 
from parents who are sympathetic or have resigned 
themselves to neighborhood integration of schools but not 
to integration by gerrymandering or a federal mathematical 
formula. "4S
What many deemed as federal interference seemed to go 
beyond affording all citizens equal opportunity and moved 
into social engineering. "Freedom of choice" plans, in the 
minds of most southerners, symbolized the notion of 
equality for all races and demonstrated southern acceptance
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of integrated schools. In 1968 the Supreme Court, however, 
concluded in Green v. School Board of New Kent County that 
"freedom of choice" plans did not result in significant 
school integration and rejected those plans as an 
acceptable remedy. Several southerners expressed 
consternation at the ruling. Until the Green decision 
state-segregated school systems satisfied the courts by 
removing legally imposed attendance assignments based on 
race. Previously even the NAACP had urged southern schools 
to follow "freedom of choice" plans. With Green. however, 
the federal courts required what Brown had condemned -- 
racially based pupil assignments.46
In August 1969 Georgia's Governor Lester Maddox hosted 
a conference to challenge federal guidelines on ending dual 
school systems in the region. Participants of the 
conference included the governor of Mississippi, five 
southern congressman and school authorities from nine 
southern states. Maddox called on the gathering to defend 
the South's "freedom of choice" in school desegregation.
The 120 delegates adopted a resolution by Mississippi 
Governor John Bell Williams urging President Nixon to 
substitute maximum individual freedom for bureaucratic 
directives. "47
Some parents, frustrated at the new tack taken by the 
Court, withdrew their children from public schools and 
placed them in private segregated academies springing up
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around the South. By August 1969 these schools contained
300,000 white students. As white flight increased, only 
busing could achieve Green's objective. Numan Bartley has 
argued that by the early 1970s the principle purpose of the 
state government of Georgia, and other southern states, had 
altered from safeguarding "white supremacy and social 
stability" to the "protection and promotion of economic and 
industrial progress." However, the advent of court-ordered 
busing for the purpose of desegregating schools adversely 
affected not only working class whites who had always borne 
the brunt of integration, but also suburban, middle-class 
whites who had led the movement toward racial 
accommodation. More than a few southerners saw busing as 
an issue that transcended race. Once the South accepted 
integration it seemed to many that the Court intended to 
force on the South a social system that did not exist in 
other parts of the nation. Busing represented a loss of 
parental control over the education of their children. In 
some areas parents feared for the safety of their children 
being bused into dangerous neighborhoods. In short, busing 
represented an issue that could potentially galvanize a 
coalition that cut across party and class lines. Southern 
politicians seeking to embrace the more moderate climate of 
the region also had to consider very strong feelings of 
voters who saw their children's lives disrupted by busing 
plans.48
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Although the large majority of white southerners 
disapproved of busing, some believed that the resistance to 
busing was merely an attempt to maintain the duplicity of 
segregated school systems. In January 1970 G. Holmes 
Braddock, chairman of the Dade County school board called 
his fellow southerners "hypocrites'' and criticized their 
complaints about cross-busing. "We cross-bused in Dade 
until three years ago," said Braddock, "and I never heard a 
white family complain, because we were busing to maintain 
segregated schools." People like Braddock remained a 
minority, however.49
Early in 1970 a dozen southern senators demanded a 
busing ban and attached an amendment to an education bill 
pending in the Senate that would prohibit busing to "alter 
racial composition." In January 1970 the chief executives 
of Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama and Florida promised to defy 
federally designed student busing plans in their home 
states. Louisiana governor John McKeithen vowed that his 
own children would not participate in busing to achieve 
racial balance. McKeithen described himself as a person 
standing firm and "drawing a line in the dust." Governor 
Albert Brewer declared that the Supreme Court did not have 
the constitutional authority to order busing in Alabama. 
Governor Claude Kirk said he would issue an executive order 
to Florida school boards to defy the Supreme Court even if 
it meant "going to jail." Governor Lester Maddox, called
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on the Georgia legislature to abolish the compulsory school 
attendance law in order to defy the federal busing 
mandates.50
Many southerners shared a deep indignation over what 
was being called "forced busing." Southerners must decide 
if they would cling to their new-found moderation or elect 
leaders who would return the region to defiance and 
resistance of federal pressures over integration. Could 
southern politicians resist taking advantage of the 
emotional furor associated with the busing issue? Would 
the issue of busing divert the swelling moderation of the 
region back toward racial intolerance in an altered form?
In order to answer these questions the next few 
chapters will take a closer look at the 1970 gubernatorial 
campaigns of Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia. 
The campaigns in these states represent various degrees of 
racial recidivism. Some candidates emulated demagogues of 
the past and sought to tap into the rancor associated with 
busing. Other new style candidates appealed to disparate 
segments of the electorate with campaign subtleties. These 
representative of the New South avoided overt racism that 
would insult the region's improved self-image, while at the 
same time they offered quiet assurances to those in the 
electorate who had not embraced the notion of total 
integration.
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The 1970 gubernatorial campaign in Arkansas presented 
the starkest contrast between the old and new style of 
politics in the South. Orval Faubus, a candidate out of 
the past, who attained notoriety with his defiance of 
desegregation, decided to attempt a political comeback in 
that election. The former governor believed he could 
employ the old politics of race he had mastered and 
capitalize on the resentment toward busing in the state.
The voters would have to decide if they would cling to the 
past or embrace the future.
In Florida Republican incumbent Claude Kirk, a man who 
was not even a native southerner, sought to fashion himself 
into a defiant demagogue of the past. Four years earlier 
Kirk had represented an alternative to the decaying, 
corrupt Democratic political machine. But in 1970 he 
sought to enhance his chances for reelection by defying 
federal authority. The governor revived the old and 
discredited notion of interposition and seized a school 
district to prevent irrqolementation of a desegregation plan 
that included busing. The Florida voters faced a choice 
similar to that confronted by Arkansans. Would they return 
to the grotesque specter of racial politics or trust an 
attractive candidate who appeared to represent the 
moderation of the New South?
In South Carolina Albert Watson, the Republican 
nominee in the gubernatorial campaign sought to test the
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limits of the southern strategy and reinstitute defiance in 
the home state of secession. His fiery anti-busing 
rhetoric contributed to mob action involving angry white 
parents who overturned a school bus that had carried black 
children. The South Carolina electorate chose John West, 
lieutenant governor in the previous administration that had 
signalled an end to defiance.
The political landscape of Georgia differed from the 
other southern states electing governors in 1970. Carl 
Sanders, the leading Democratic contender represented, not 
the defiant past but, one of the few southern governors of 
the previous decade who attempted to pull his state out of 
the mud of racism and onto the plateau of economic progress 
and social respectability. But Jimmy Carter, an unknown 
candidate succeeded in portraying the former governor as 
part of the corrupt and discredited political past. Carter 
seemed at first glance to have cut his campaign out of the 
pattern of the old time politics, but in reality he was 
fashioning a new strategy. He appealed to class 
resentments without making overt references to the racial 
animosities harbored by many of the "redneck" voters he 
identified with. He cast himself as a man the people could 
trust. A wide spectrum of the voting public believed him 
and allowed him to guide them into the future.
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CHAPTER 3 
ARKANSAS
The gubernatorial campaign of 1970 presented the 
Arkansas electorate with a unique assortment of candidates 
representing the past, present and future. Former governor 
Orval Faubus, attempting a political comeback, hoped that 
the rhetoric of the past would appeal to an electorate 
frightened by the uncertainties of the present. Winthrop 
Rockefeller, the Republican incumbent, after dragging 
Arkansas into the twentieth century, seemed incapable of 
escorting the state into the future. Dale Bumpers, a 
political novice, did not make promises or even say much 
about the issues, but sought to convince voters that an 
honest, principled approach to the problems of the day 
would serve to answer the difficulties of the morrow.
Three very different men brought diverse backgrounds and 
visions to the same campaign.
Winthrop Rockefeller single-handedly molded Arkansas 
Republicans into a viable opposition party and in 1966 won 
the governor's chair in the process. He achieved electoral 
success by incorporating Republicans, black voters and the 
growing body of disaffected moderate white Democrats into a 
winning coalition. Once in office he dispelled the legacy 
of the corrupt Faubus political machine, dedicated his 
administration to reform and equal opportunity, and brought 
business and industry into the state. Nevertheless, in
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1970 many believed that the Republican governor had 
political liabilities. Rockefeller's image, in the minds 
of many Arkansas voters, remained that of a rich yankee 
playboy. He drank too much, divorced his first wife, and 
seemed to spend more time flying around in his private 
planes or at his mountaintop ranch than he did in the 
governor's office. On top of all this, Rockefeller's 
inability to work with the Democratic legislature had 
stifled many of his reform measures.
Sensing Rockefeller's vulnerability, eight candidates 
sought to capture the Democratic nomination to challenge 
him. The field of Democratic challengers included Attorney 
General Joe Purcell, former House Speaker Hayes McClerkin - 
- both moderates -- and archconservative Bill G. Wells.
One candidate, however, led the field from the day he 
entered. Previously elected to six two-year terms, Orval 
Faubus, remained the longest serving governor in Arkansas 
history. After a self-imposed political exile, Faubus 
believed he could reclaim his political crown.
Faubus came from a desperately poor little place 
called Greasy Creek in the Ozark region of northwestern 
Arkansas. His father, Sam Faubus, scratched out a meager 
living as a hardscrabble farmer in order to support Orval 
and the six children that followed. He provided them with 
little more than a steady diet of political radicalism.
The elder Faubus went to jail during World War I for anti-
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war activities, resented Wall Street, and supported 
Socialist causes. Sam named his oldest son Orval Eugene 
Faubus, the middle name in honor of Eugene Debs, a 
political hero of Sam Faubus.1
After completing eight grades in a one-room school, 
Orval walked to Huntsville, Arkansas, where he passed the 
teachers' examination. He began teaching and completed his 
formal education by taking night courses. During summer 
breaks he worked as an itinerant fruit picker, saw-mill 
hand, farm laborer, and lumber jack traveling from the 
Ozarks, to the Midwest, to the Pacific Northwest. At 
twenty-one Faubus married a minister's daughter named Alta 
Haskins. Faubus joined the U.S. Army shortly after the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the ambitious Arkansan 
rose from private to the rank of major, serving with 
distinction in General George Patton's Third Army. During 
his time in the army he wrote a column for his hometown 
paper, the Madison County Record. When Faubus returned 
home he became the county postmaster and with his first six 
months salary bought the Record and soon turned it into the 
third largest weekly newspaper in the state. At the same 
time another World War II veteran, Sidney McMath, sought 
the governor's chair by calling for a reform-minded 
political revolt. Faubus was attracted by his moderate New 
South approach, and actively supported McMath in his 
newspaper. After McMath won he appointed Faubus to the
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Highway Commission, an agency Faubus went on to head. In 
1954 Faubus captured the governor's chair by promising to 
bring roads, schools and prosperity to rural Arkansas.2
During Faubus' bid for re-election in 1956, his 
opponent, Jim Johnson, accused Faubus of covertly 
supporting school integration by not resisting the federal 
government's assault on Arkansas' state rights. Johnson 
campaigned on a "mish-mash of distortions, half-truths, and 
deliberate lies," wrote the Arkansas Gazette, labeling the 
effort "demagogy, with the addition of racial overtones." 
The governor labeled his opponent a "purveyor of hate" and 
accused him of stirring up "strife and racial hatreds and 
tensions ... to the detriment of the state as a whole." 
Faubus pointed to the accomplishments of his first term and 
promised more progress if reelected.3
Faubus easily won another gubernatorial term in 1956, 
and soon decided he would seek an unprecedented third term. 
To break the Arkansas mold of no more than two-terms Faubus 
would need a compelling issue. School integration seemed 
an unlikely choice. The University of Arkansas admitted 
black students even before the Supreme Court's 1954 ruling, 
and by 1955 five of the six state-supported white colleges 
had admitted blacks as well. Faubus' predecessor, Governor 
Francis Cherry, promised compliance with court ordered 
integration and announced that Arkansas would "obey the 
law." In 1954 and 1955 ten school districts in the state
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began programs of gradual desegregation. Governor Faubus 
himself had given no indications in his first term or 
reelection campaign that he would employ the powers of his 
office to resist school integration. When the Little Rock 
school board, in cooperation with the federal district 
court, began limited integration of Central High School by 
enrolling nine black students for the fall, no one expected 
significant opposition.4
As the date approached, rumors of trouble threatened 
to disturb the peace. Only hours before the opening of 
school Governor Faubus announced that bloodshed and 
violence might result if "forcible integration" ensued. 
Faubus called out 270 Arkansas National Guardsmen to 
maintain order. Claiming he had information that 
"caravans" of unruly whites were speeding toward Little 
Rock, Faubus decided to preserve the peace by ordering the 
guardsmen to prevent the nine black students from attending 
Central High. Harry Ashmore, editor of the Arkansas 
Gazette, described the day school opened: "Little Rock 
arose to gaze upon the incredible spectacle of an empty 
high school surrounded by National Guard troops called out 
by Governor Faubus to protect life and property against a 
mob that never materialized." But in the days that 
followed white mobs did form to heckle the black students.5
Governor Faubus had set up a confrontation between 
state and federal authority in which he and Arkansas would
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certainly lose. Winthrop Rockefeller, heading up state 
industrial development efforts at the time, spent two and a 
half hours trying to dissuade the governor from intervening 
in a local affair that was none of his business. "I 
reasoned with him, argued with him, almost pled with him," 
Rockefeller recalled years later. But Faubus told 
Rockefeller that he was already committed. "I'm going to 
run for a third term, and if I don't do this, Jim Johnson 
and Bruce Bennett [two segregationist politicians] will 
tear me to shreds."6
Faubus met with President Eisenhower on September 13 
and seemed to acquiesce. "I have never expressed any 
personal opinion regarding the Supreme Court decision," 
Faubus announced after the meeting. "That decision is the 
law of the land and must be obeyed." But by then the 
confrontation had taken on a life of its own, and Faubus 
found he could not control the situation he had created. 
White mobs rioted in an orgy of defiance and anger. On 
September 23, President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas 
National Guard and ordered in paratroopers to disperse the 
mob and to protect the nine black students. The soldiers 
would remain for the remainder of the school year. In 
response Governor Faubus pushed through the legislature a 
bill that authorized him to close schools that he deemed 
had been integrated "by force." He then invoked it to 
close the Little Rock high schools during the 1958-9 school
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year. In June 1959 the federal district court ruled the 
school closing unconstitutional and the schools reopened. 
Faubus continued his defiance in an unsuccessful drive to 
add a "close the schools" amendment to the Arkansas 
Constitution.7
In the Little Rock crisis Faubus latched onto racial 
politics as a means to improve his political fortunes. He 
believed that a failure to take a stand against integration 
would make him vulnerable in the next election. In an 
interview the year before his death Faubus said of his 
actions in 1957: "It's true in politics as it is in life 
that survival is the first law." And he added: "One of my 
black friends came in during 1957 and said, 'Governor, if 
you hadn't done something, you'd have been a goner.' Voted 
out. "e
Faubus had grasped an issue that would gamer 
political favor in the state. He won a landslide victory 
in 1958 and three subsequent terms as well. The 
integration issue held great potential for political 
capital. Many white southerners believed that the federal 
government had overstepped its proper role, interfering 
with a social system deemed appropriate by the majority in 
the region. Further, a loss of local control over schools 
disturbed even moderate southerners. The act of defiance 
by a governor against federal authority touched most 
southerners. The governor's recalcitrance evoked state's
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rights rhetoric that permeated southern history and 
elicited the memory of southern defeat and subjugation.
Most southerners, regardless of their political beliefs, 
admired seeing the representative of the state fighting the 
intrusion of federal forces. But the governor's actions 
also carried consequences that many Arkansans would 
eventually come to regret. On the day Faubus died, 14 
December 1994, a Little Rock KTHV television news 
commentator, Robert McCord, summed up Faubus' legacy as 
having given Arkansas a "reputation of racism and 
lawlessness throughout the world." Many in the state did 
not like this reputation. A decided ambivalence lurked 
within white Arkansans; while overwhelmingly opposed to 
integrated schools, most whites nonetheless expressed a 
reluctant willingness to go along with court-ordered 
desegregation rather than see their schools closed and 
their reputations besmirched.
Faubus reaped tremendous immediate political benefits, 
and seemed politically invincible after the Central High 
incident, but he also came to symbolize racial demagoguery 
and abuse of political power. An opposition faction 
quickly formed within the state's electorate. The Arkansas 
Gazette led the way with critical editorials of Faubus' 
actions in the Central High affair that won it Pulitzer 
prizes. The Women's Emergency Committee of Little Rock 
fought the governor over school policies. Staunch
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segregation had a price that most Arkansans did not want to 
pay. The center of the political spectrum began to grow 
and move toward tolerance, if not total acceptance, of 
integration. The racial card that Faubus played so 
effectively in 1957 soon lost its political potency. 
According to a 1961 Arkansas poll, the public expected a 
candidate for governor to do the impossible: "do not mix 
the races, keep the schools open, but do not go so far as 
to disobey the law." Five years later a plurality of 
voters believed that Arkansas had improved in terms of 
racial integration, even though a great deal more of it 
existed. Only eighteen percent wanted the governor to 
contest federal desegregation guidelines. In 1966 two out 
of three Arkansas voters attached primary importance to 
maintaining racial peace. Even if white Arkansans did not 
enthusiastically support integration, they preferred it to 
racial turmoil.9
In 1966 Faubus decided not to run for governor. After 
twelve years of earning the governor's salary of $10,000 
per year, Faubus moved into a home valued at between 
$100,000 and $200,000. Faubus explained that his Scotch 
blood enabled him to marshal his resources wisely. He soon 
divorced his wife of thirty-seven years, and three weeks 
later, married a woman twenty-nine years his junior. After 
the divorce Faubus moved out of his luxurious home and into 
a trailer where he published a handful of weekly newspapers
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until he became president of "Dogpatch USA," an amusement 
park featuring A1 Capp's cartoon characters. All the 
while, Faubus longed to return to the political lime­
light.10
Winthrop Rockefeller presented a tempting target for 
Democrats, but Faubus seemed an unlikely candidate to 
unseat the sitting Republican governor. The Republican 
ascendancy in the statehouse had come about because of 
voter resentment to the entrenched political power Faubus 
represented. Nevertheless, Faubus believed his political 
acumen could overcome these odds. The Democratic primary 
season began gearing up in early May for a vote in late 
August, and the old master believed he had time to 
reassemble the most powerful state political machine ever 
built. He planned to call in political favors and carry 
the crowded Democratic primary with his old supporters 
while the other candidates cancelled out each other's 
support.
In early May Faubus purchased thirty minutes of 
television time to announce that he was ready to run for 
governor and asked for support. He began his speech by 
pointing out that most voters wanted Governor Rockefeller 
out of office, and the voters realized not just any 
candidate could do that. It would take a man of 
experience. "Thus," Faubus said, "many people have turned 
to me and urged that I again seek the governor's office."
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Faubus then presented what would become the central theme 
of his campaign. While not directly contesting racial 
integration, Faubus focused a great deal of attention on 
that controversial topic. He opposed the busing of school 
children to achieve racial balance. Faubus said his 
administration would encourage the establishment of private 
schools like the ones springing up around the South to 
avoid desegregation.11
Faubus pointed to the latest racial incident in 
Arkansas and sought to make political hay by associating 
Governor Rockefeller with troublesome blacks. Faubus 
claimed that state officials ordered state troopers to 
transport Lance "Sweet Willie Wine" Watson "and two of his 
girlfriends" from Little Rock to Memphis. Watson, a civil 
rights activist from Memphis, had led a march across east 
Arkansas to protest discrimination against blacks. Many 
saw Watson as an outside agitator who exacerbated an 
already tense racial situation in Forrest City, Arkansas. 
Faubus went on to point out that "Sweet Willie has a police 
record as long as your arm." Instead of catering to people 
like Watson, Faubus said, state officials should be 
concerned about "children of all races and creeds who need 
protection while getting an education," a thinly veiled 
reference to disturbances among students at several 
integrated schools. That point led Faubus into an embrace 
of the law and order theme that had garnered support in the
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1968 presidential campaign for both Wallace, who carried 
the state, and Nixon, who eventually won the election.
These concerns struck a resonate chord with voters. Even 
in a state where there had been very little campus unrest, 
sixty-eight percent of voters polled that year answered 
affirmatively when asked, "Do you feel there is a serious 
need for more law and order on Arkansas campuses?" Tapping 
into these concerns Faubus claimed lawlessness had reached 
an all time high and cited as an example a recent 
demonstration by black college students at the state 
Capitol. Faubus described the students "rudely" occupying 
the governor's office, burning holes in the carpet with 
cigarettes, taking over the House chamber, scattering 
files, swinging from the chandeliers, and shouting the 
"vilest obscenities." It mattered little to Faubus that 
his details of the behavior of the demonstrators 
embellished and contradicted those of newsmen who covered 
the event.12
Faubus' speech then reached a crescendo. Small lies 
amplified into bold, unsubstantiated, attacks of outright 
innuendo. Faubus knew Rockefeller's political weaknesses. 
According to an Oliver Quayle poll done for the Democratic 
Committee of Arkansas in 1968, the state's voters thought 
Rockefeller seemed "strange, alien, and foreign." Many 
believed he wanted too much power, that he drank too much, 
that he did not spend enough time in his office, and a
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majority believed that Rockefeller could not understand the 
real problems of common people.13
Faubus, the ultimate Arkansas insider, sought to cast 
himself in the role of outsider. In his first term, the 
former governor claimed, he had been invited to a meeting 
at "the mountain." Although providing no details 
concerning this vague location, everyone in Arkansas knew 
that Winthrop Rockefeller had a large mountaintop farm 
home. Faubus went on to say that powerful people there 
said they should make plans for the state because the 
people were too dumb to be trusted. Faubus said he 
objected to this "hidden government" and as a result had 
lost financial contributions and suffered thereafter from 
bad publicity in the press. "I did not become a puppet," 
Faubus said. "I rejected the role with all its 
implications of power, wealth and popularity." Faubus 
ended his speech by reminding voters of Rockefeller's great 
wealth and urging supporters to help raise campaign money. 
"We cannot hope to match the Rockefeller millions in a 
campaign but there must be enough money to pay proper 
expenses.1114
Faubus' television speech drew mixed reactions. One 
very negative response came from Faubus' former wife. "Oh, 
it's the same old story," said the woman Faubus divorced in 
1969. "Just a lot of promises. They don't mean a thing to 
me. He promised to love, honor, and obey me and he broke
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all those promises." Faubus' speech fared somewhat better 
among other viewers of the telecast. A spokesman for the 
television station said that about sixty people had called 
after the speech. Thirty-four callers said they did not 
want Faubus to run again and twenty-five said they 
supported the former governor. The negative phone calls 
did not bother Faubus, who did not take long to make up his 
mind; he entered into the Democratic primary race as the 
clear front runner. "I am not a perfect man nor the
perfect candidate," Faubus humbly noted. "I will be glad
to withdraw when one is found."15
The former political kingpin who had once controlled 
the Democratic organization in the state still had 
political friends in every county and meant to reclaim 
their loyalty. Faubus said he wanted to return to the 
governor's mansion in 1970 because he got tired of
"watching Arkansas go to hell in a handbasket." Only a
seasoned politician could defeat Rockefeller, Faubus told
those who asked why he should be the party's nominee, and
an experienced governor could quickly straighten out the 
state's affairs. The others would have to take time to
learn what it was all about, Faubus added.16
Faubus wanted to take advantage of rising resentment 
over crime and racial disturbances without alienating the 
growing body of moderates who now disdained racist 
posturing. While never making overt racial connections,
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Faubus expressed alarm about the rising crime rate in the 
state and peppered his speeches with accounts of recent 
criminal attacks that happened to have been committed by- 
blacks. Disorder in the schools became another favorite 
example of lawlessness. And with the now heavily 
integrated Central High School in Little Rock experiencing 
interracial student conflicts, Faubus even sought to 
capitalize on memories of his defiance of integration there 
in 1957.17
During the campaigning season leading up to the 
Democratic primary Faubus reserved most of his scorn for 
the Republican governor. Concentrating on the enormous 
wealth of Rockefeller, one of his campaign flyers asked the 
question: "Will you be bought or will you be free? Vote
Faubus." The former governor acted as though the
Democratic primary would serve as a mere formality. Faubus 
hesitated in attacking Democrats whose support he would 
need in the general election. Faubus held to this strategy 
until the week prior to the Democratic vote when one of his
opponents claimed an issue Faubus felt he could not
relinquish.18
In the last week of the primary Democratic candidate 
Bill Wells gave a speech in which he advocated standing in 
front of any bus used to achieve racial balance in schools. 
In response, Faubus delivered a state-wide televised 
address four days before the primary vote claiming he had
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staked out the anti-busing issue first. The people 
"pushing such an idiotic policy as busing," vowed the 
former governor, would "not be permitted to prevail." When 
he returned to the governor's chair, Faubus promised his 
audience, he would introduce legislation requiring written 
parental consent before children could be transported to 
school by bus. If the federal courts and agencies 
continued to "destroy public education, forcing citizens to 
start private schools," Faubus promised tax breaks for both 
the parents and the schools.19
As the Democratic primary vote neared, newspapers from 
around the state published their own opinions on the 
campaign. The Eagle Democrat of Warren, Arkansas, pointed 
out that everybody seemed "to be getting on one side for 
massive potshots at former Governor Faubus." The Paragould 
Daily Press described a Democratic rally in their town.
The crowd had obviously come to see Faubus "like a crowd 
waiting to see Jesse James." Faubus lived up to local 
expectations with "a rousing speech," concerning crime in 
Arkansas. The editorial pointed out that for a candidate 
so concerned about the rising crime in the state, Faubus 
had a poor record. "We all know how miserably he failed in 
carrying out the law of the land in 1957. It took the 
President of the United States plus the conscience of a 
nation to put Orval back on the straight and narrow path." 
The Jacksonville News wrote: "Faubus doesn't sound all that
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bad this year, it's just that we can't help thinking of the 
twelve dark years when the Huntsville king-maker was in the 
capitol. Those were the years when the state was 
embarrassed nationally and internationally over Central 
High School's integration.1,20
One of those Arkansans who had been embarrassed by 
Faubus was a forty-five year old Democrat named Dale 
Bumpers. The youngest of three children, Bumpers grew up 
in Charleston, Arkansas, a town with a population of less 
than 1,400 in the foothills of the Ouachita Mountains. 
Bumpers' father owned a hardware store and was active in 
the Methodist church and area politics. William Bumpers 
served in the state legislature for one year and passed on 
his love for politics to his youngest son. During the 
depression Dale worked as a field hand and as a butcher in 
a local grocery store. In 1943 Bumpers graduated from high 
school and joined the Marines. When he returned home in 
1946 he entered the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville 
and graduated two years later with a degree in political 
science. From there he went on to Northwestern University 
in Evanston, Illinois, where he received a law degree in 
1951. While he was away both his parents were killed in an 
automobile accident. Bumpers returned to Charleston with 
his new wife, a former Charleston classmate, Betty Lou 
Flanagen. He became the only attorney in Charleston and 
practiced law there for eighteen years, losing only three
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jury trials, and also took over the operation of his 
father's store. In 1966 he sold the hardware store and 
began operating a 350-acre Angus cattle ranch.21
While running the hardware store and practicing law, 
Bumpers became an important part of his community. He led 
the choir and taught Sunday school in the Methodist church. 
He served as city attorney as well as president of both the 
school board and the chamber of commerce. Bumpers' first 
entry into politics outside his hometown proved 
unsuccessful. In 1962 Bumpers ran for the office his 
father had once held in the state house of representative. 
Although he won ninety percent of the vote in Charleston, 
his opponent carried the other districts and won the 
election. Bumpers considered running for governor in 1968 
but decided to wait and prepare for the future. Bumpers 
criss-crossed the state speaking to youth groups, civic 
clubs, and local bar associations.22
Although Bumpers had already begun preparing himself 
for a gubernatorial campaign, Faubus' attempted political 
comeback finally convinced him to run. Bumpers entered the 
race saying that he could not look his children and 
grandchildren in the eye if he sat idly by while Faubus 
came back to power. Many voters recognized a voice of 
concern that echoed their own fears. Virtually anonymous 
outside his home-town of Charleston, Bumpers sought to 
capitalize on his political obscurity. He conceded the
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difficulty of overcoming so many old pros in the race, but 
also saw advantages to his situation. "I think the people 
are honestly looking for a new face," said the political 
novice. Bumpers downplayed campaign issues as difficult to 
define, focusing instead on several broad themes. The 
state faced "a crisis of confidence.” The people had lost 
trust and respect for their leaders. Arkansans yearned for 
a fresh new leader who "really cares." Bumpers sought to 
portray himself as a leader voters could trust, a word 
seldom associated with his main opponent. The young 
challenger traveled the state incessantly that summer 
talking with people. Bumpers told them all that he wanted 
to change the political climate of Arkansas.23
The zeal of the young candidate as well as the 
sophistication of his campaign were described in a memo to 
Faubus from one of his supporters in northeast Arkansas:
Bumpers was on our local television as well as 
Memphis stations almost constantly during the last 
week. He sent a computerized letter to every woman 
in our county seeking support. He attached a door 
knob card to every door in Jonesboro. He advertised 
heavily in our daily paper and had tapes on all three 
radio stations and he personally campaigned in 
Jonesboro, not one but on four different occasions.24
His energetic stumping of the state produced results.
Dale Bumpers had charisma, his personality served as his
greatest asset, "exposure to the voter was all it took,"
wrote Bill Lewis in the Arkansas Gazette. Bumpers did not
make personal attacks on his opponents, but emphasized the
stark contrast between himself and the politicians of the
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past. "I think the day of the screaming speech is over," 
Bumpers told voters familiar with the Faubus style of 
campaigning. "I'll tell you what sells better than 
anything else, and that's candor and sincerity." Bumpers 
sought to convey this emotional sense of trust through the 
relatively new political medium of television. "It was the 
first time television was used appropriately," said Deloss 
Walker, Bumpers' political advertising consultant in 1970, 
"by appropriately, I mean communicating emotion." And 
television could be utilized to convey that emotion dearest 
to politicians: trust. "Voters don't know how to solve 
issues," explained Walker years later. "They want to elect 
someone whose motivations they trust." Bumpers 
communicated this sincerity better than any of the other 
candidates. Ernie Dumas, reporter for the Arkansas Gazette 
and one of the most astute political observers in the 
state, recalled later that his mother had alerted him to 
the candidate's talent. Mrs. Dumas told her son that she 
was going to vote for "that Bumpers fellow" she had seen on 
television. Archie Schaffer, Bumpers nephew and campaign 
manager, believed the turning point in the campaign came on 
television about three weeks before the preferential 
primary election. The Little Rock NBC affiliate televised 
a forum for the eight Democratic candidates that featured a 
five minute statement by each. Bumpers spoke first and 
gave a sincere talk that the other candidates could not
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match. When the McGehee Times endorsed Bumpers during the 
run-off they wrote that the candidate came across on 
television "like a polished professional and leaves you 
feeling that he is absolutely right about everything he 
says." Arkansans began to see something special in this 
candidate and they began to listen to what he said.2S
Most of the $95,000 in Bumpers' campaign chest, raised 
in part by the sale of the candidate's cattle, went for a 
television blitz in the final two weeks of the contest. 
Articulate and appealing on screen, Bumpers left viewers 
with an impression of sincerity. No desk came between the 
candidate and the viewers; Bumpers sat on a stool, used no 
script, looked into the camera and spoke in a sincere and 
effective manner. One sixty-year-old man, after seeing 
Bumpers for the first time on television, remarked: "He 
just looks like he's a cut above the kind we usually have 
running for governor."26
Orval Faubus, who also depended heavily on that 
medium, realized that he could reach a great many more 
voters through television than by traveling around the 
state. But the former governor did not understand the 
essence of television nor could he adapt his stump-speech 
oratory to this new campaign tool. Faubus taped black and 
white programs sitting at a desk alternately reading, 
preaching, shouting from a script. Bumpers, by contrast, 
employed short color messages, talking quietly as if
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sitting in the viewer's living room discussing the problems 
of the state and suggesting common sense, moral solutions. 
"When a voter lets you into his home by watching your 
television broadcast, you don't scream at him when you get 
there," explained Bumpers, contrasting his own style with 
that of Faubus without ever mentioning the former governor. 
On the night before the election Bumpers held a live 
question and answer session that furthered the candidate's 
effort to portray himself as someone whose openness, 
sincerity and judgement voters could trust.27
Dale Bumpers did not vilify Faubus, or denigrate the 
other candidates, or malign busing, or even say much about 
the issues. He ran a positive campaign emphasizing that he 
was not running against anybody, but running for governor. 
Bumpers' refusal to engage in slander about other 
candidates not only deviated from the political norm, but 
actually cost the inexperienced challenger some powerful 
support.
Almost every moderate to liberal Democrat opposed 
Faubus' return to political power and feared that the 
former governor would somehow pull off another victory. 
After all Faubus had never lost an election in Arkansas.
The opposition therefore sought to marshall its forces 
against Faubus. Influential elements within the Democratic 
power structure, including the Pulaski County (Little Rock) 
Democratic Party head, assessed their party's contenders.
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This group of powerful Democrats decided that, with the 
proper guidance, Dale Bumpers just might win. Moderate, 
attractive and unencumbered by ties to the old political 
machine, Bumpers seemed the perfect beneficiary for their 
support. These politically savvy individuals reminded 
Bumpers that he stood little chance of success, indeed had 
almost no state-wide organization. Then they offered 
Bumpers a deal: in exchange for their powerful political 
backing, which would almost certainly guarantee at least a 
spot in the runoff, he would malign the record of the 
former governor. The Faubus record of corruption and 
political favors provided a great deal of ammunition for 
such attacks. When Bumpers replied that this was neither 
his style, nor the type of campaign he wanted to run, he 
received an admonition and ultimatum. Their support rested 
on these requirements, he should think it over and let them 
know the next day.58
Bumpers left the meeting and called Ted Boswell for 
advice. In the last governor's race, Boswell had, much 
like Bumpers, risen out of obscurity, come on strong, only 
to barely miss the run-off. Boswell had run against what 
remained of the Democratic political machine of the Faubus 
days in power. When Bumpers explained the situation and 
asked Boswell what he would do, Boswell told him no one 
would have had to ask him to attack Faubus; he would have 
been attacking him from the start. But, Boswell said that
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Bumpers would probably lose the election anyway and, 
afterwards, would have to live with himself. If Bumpers 
did not feel comfortable attacking Faubus, Boswell 
reasoned, then Bumpers should follow the positive path he 
had been traveling. When Bumpers informed his erstwhile 
supporters that he would not agree to their terms, their 
response strongly suggested that Bumpers possessed little 
intelligence. "Some people have advised me to really take 
the gloves off and get rough," Bumpers said publicly, "but 
I decided not to."29
Shortly thereafter he delivered a speech remarkable 
not only in its dissimilarity to the politics of the past, 
but extraordinary in its assessment of the moral malaise 
present in society and its appeal to the better angels of 
Arkansans' nature. Bumpers called on voters to look inward 
to find the root of their problems. Selfishness and a 
"complete disregard for others," according to Bumpers, had 
become the "predominant driving force" in society. "For 
the common good of mankind, we must rekindle the attitude 
of concern for our fellowman," Bumpers said. Radicals and 
conservatives hated each other. "The whites and blacks 
seem to be directing more ill-will toward one another than 
ever before. The energy squandered in hating could be put 
to "countless worthwhile uses," Bumpers asserted. "With 
the right spirit and leadership, we can get our state 
together." This candidate sought something very different
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from the electorate. Rather than exploiting emotional 
issues or pandering to polls, Bumpers called on voters to 
look within. The basis for this appeal was both risky and 
brilliant. If people would accept moral suasion as a basis 
for solving the dilemmas of the uncertain present, then 
perhaps the candidate who suggested it, who seemed sincere 
and trustworthy, could lead them into the future.30
On the Friday before the primary vote, the Arkansas 
Gazette highlighted four Democratic candidates whom they 
considered responsible and "capable of restoring principle 
and respect to the Democratic Party in Arkansas." Dale 
Bumpers made the short list; Orval Faubus did not. Bumpers 
was "probably the most articulate and polished candidate in 
the race," wrote the paper. The Democratic Party could 
"either turn backward into a discredited past or move 
forward with principled new leadership toward brighter 
horizons. "31
One political analyst commented on the eve of the 
election that the most remarkable aspect of the campaign 
had been Bumpers meteoric climb out of political obscurity. 
Indeed the obstacles overcome by the young challenger 
constituted nothing less than a political miracle. Fifty- 
five days before the election Bumpers could expect only one 
percent of the vote. A month later he hung well below ten 
percent. The next week only five percent of Democrats 
polled thought Bumpers would make it into a runoff, while
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only one percent of those Democrats believed he could win 
the party's nomination.32
But Bumpers took off in the last week. The last poll 
before the preferential primary, conducted by Area Market 
Research Associates, indicated that Attorney General Joe 
Purcell would capture a spot in the run-off with Faubus, 
who led in everyone's polls. The poll predicted that 
Purcell would g a m e r  twenty-three percent with Bumpers in 
third with a little over eighteen percent. On election 
day, Tuesday August 25, Faubus held to his front-runner 
status, leading all other candidates with thirty-six 
percent of the vote. During election night Bumpers and 
Purcell, moved back and forth between the second and third 
positions. The outcome remained in doubt until Saturday 
when Purcell conceded. Bumpers, with twenty percent of the 
vote, would face Faubus two weeks later in a two-man race 
to determine who would capture the Democratic nomination.33
When reporters asked the runoff candidate if he 
intended to begin attacking Faubus, Bumpers responded by 
saying that he was running for governor, emphasizing for. 
Bumpers expressed confidence that he would win the runoff, 
asserting that Faubus received "substantially less" than 
enough votes to assure a victory in the runoff. "We expect 
to get virtually all of the votes cast for all of the other 
candidates but Faubus," Bumpers said. Not everyone agreed. 
"Bumpers has plenty of ammunition if he chooses to use it,"
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wrote the Twin City Tribune at West Helena during the run­
off. "We doubt that he will -- he's conducted a clean 
campaign thus far and probably sees no reason to change his 
style.1,34
No one had to ask Orval Faubus his strategy. He 
opened the runoff by attacking his opponent, and revealed 
that he had selected busing as the major issue in the run­
off campaign. "I understand that Mr. Bumpers doesn't think 
it is an issue," Faubus said. When a reporter pointed out 
that Bumpers said that busing could not be an issue because 
all the candidates opposed it, Faubus responded that 
Bumpers was trying to "softpedal." Did Faubus mean that he 
was more against busing than Bumpers was? "I certainly 
do," he answered. When pressed Faubus conceded that the 
governor could do nothing about busing, but asserted that 
the governor must speak up for the victims of forced 
busing. As Faubus put it in a televised address on August 
30: "The governor is the representative of the people. He 
speaks for the people many times. Who would be the better 
person to stand up and tell Washington that the people of 
Arkansas are opposed to this busing?" If Bumpers won the 
governor's chair, Faubus declared "every bureaucrat in 
Washington and every federal judge is going to say, 'Why 
this busing is all right that we're pushing on the people 
because down there they have elected a man that says busing 
isn't an issue.'" The reaction by many to Faubus' attempt
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to make this the issue was reflected by an editorial 
cartoon in the Arkansas Gazette. It showed a banner that 
read: Faubus for Gov. Again and Again and Again and Again, 
ad infinitum. Under the banner the former governor spoke: 
"Busing is the only issue in this campaign although there's 
nothing a governor could do about it"35
Few in Arkansas could forget that Faubus had acted as 
the point man for resistance to federal pressure to 
integrate thirteen years earlier. Therefore, busing seemed 
the perfect issue for the former governor. While the 
changing climate of politics in the state militated against 
appeals to racism, the busing issue struck a chord of 
resentment among even the growing number of moderates in 
the electorate. Students from the Little Rock area would 
ride buses as part of a court-approved desegregation plan 
beginning September 8, the same day voters would choose the 
Democratic nominee. A letter to Faubus from a woman in 
Little Rock during that primary season reflected the 
attitude of many voters. "I would definitely like to see 
our schools remain segregated but that is impossible and we 
might as well accept it. The 'busing' for no other purpose 
except to mix races is another matter entirely." This 
reluctant acceptance of integration led Faubus to realize 
that the electorate had changed. While staking out the 
busing issue as his own, he also claimed his stand against 
busing had nothing to do with race. Busing constituted a
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burden for parents and children of both races and an 
unnecessary expense for taxpayers, declared Faubus. He 
even sought to distance himself from his own school closing 
in Little Rock during the 1958-9 school year. "I didn't 
close the schools," Faubus claimed. "The people voted to 
close them and I merely acted to carry out the law."
Faubus failed to mention that he had sponsored the bill 
that gave the governor the power to close integrated 
schools and pushed it through the legislature. Faubus 
realized that the current electorate would not stand for 
school closings even if those schools faced integration.36
Many saw through Faubus' charade and criticized his 
exploitation of the busing issue. The Times of North 
Little Rock ran an editorial cartoon of a man labeled 
"demagogue" whipping a school bus labeled "busing issue" as 
if riding a horse toward a sign pointing to "political 
goals." The caption under the cartoon read "Riding the Hot 
One." Bumpers refused to ride the hot one. He avoided the 
debate over who opposed busing more. "The people are in 
the mood for common sense," Bumpers said rejecting what he 
called "sensationalism." When asked what he considered 
Faubus' greatest weakness Bumpers pointed out that his 
opponent had been governor for twelve years. "He has 
nothing new to offer. His election would be a step 
backward.1,37
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Bill Wells did not think so. The fifth place 
candidate in the recent Democratic primary quickly endorsed 
Faubus because of what he called the "liberal tendencies" 
of Dale Bumpers. Even though Wells and Faubus had battled 
over possession of the busing issue during the primary 
campaign, they still shared the same ideological bed. When 
the Citizen Council of Arkansas circulated an eight 
question "Report of the Candidates" to all those running in 
the primaries, Faubus, Wells and Walter Caruth, running on 
the George Wallace inspired American Independent third 
party, had all responded favorably. These three candidates 
had checked boxes indicating that they favored states' 
rights and opposed federal control of public schools and 
busing. Bumpers and Governor Rockefeller refused to even 
reply to the questionnaire.38
With Wells' support for Faubus the right side of the 
political spectrum had solidified around Faubus. The left 
and the large center, however, moved toward Bumpers. Joe 
Purcell, the third place Democratic candidate, endorsed 
Bumpers saying that he more closely shared his own views. 
When the state AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education 
threw their support behind Bumpers, Faubus said he had 
confidential information that labor leaders from the North 
dictated the endorsement. Such antiquated antics though, 
no longer stirred the electorate. A man from Stuttgart, 
Arkansas, writing to the Arkansas Gazette, compared Dale
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Bumpers to "a fresh breeze on a hot summer night." The 
Stuttgart writer did not dislike Orval Faubus, and even 
admitted to voting for him in the past. "I could enjoy his 
showmanship if the times were not so fraught with 
danger. "39
Faubus called Bumpers a "country clubber" with no 
experience in government who had deserted the Democratic 
party in previous elections and reached the runoff as part 
of a plot directed by Rockefeller and the editor of the 
Arkansas Gazette. Faubus accused Bumpers of being linked 
to the "colossal Rockefeller machine which has fastened its 
hold upon the state." Faubus said that his run-off 
opponent had been stalled in fourth place until the 
Rockefeller people "moved for Bumpers." Faubus claimed 
they aimed to defeat him in the primary so Rockefeller 
would win the governor's chair again. The charges did not 
ring true. One elderly black man rejected these claims as 
he ate hot dogs at a Bumpers political rally. "I know 
Rockefeller didn't put you in the race," the man told 
Bumpers, "'cause he feeds better'n this." Faubus charged 
that Bumpers and Rockefeller appealed to the same type of 
voters. "Therefore," Faubus said, "if the choice is 
between two flaming liberal look-alikes, that vote will go 
to the flaming liberal with 500-million dollars." When 
Faubus claimed that a lot of Democrats for Rockefeller 
supported his runoff opponent, Bumpers agreed and responded
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that he had invited them back into the party. Bumpers 
noted that it took 220,000 crossover votes to elect 
Rockefeller to his first term. "These people left the 
party because of Faubus," Bumpers pointed out. "I want 
them to come back . . .  I say the only way we can win in 
November is for them to come back, and they are not going 
to come back if Faubus is our nominee."40
Perhaps sensing the veracity of Bumpers' statement, 
Faubus' political tactics became increasingly desperate and 
bizarre. Faubus even launched an attack when a news 
service quoted a member of Dale Bumpers' Sunday School 
class. The man said that Bumpers always made their class 
interesting and gave as an example speculations as to 
whether God parted the Red Sea when Moses led the 
Israelites out of Egypt or an earthquake might have caused 
it. Bumpers had read this out of a book to stimulate 
discussion, but Faubus saw grave danger in this questioning 
of biblical authority. "This kind of teaching by the bogus 
liberals," charged Faubus, "will destroy faith in the 
Bible." Faubus even took out newspaper advertisements 
asking: "What about the Bible, Mr. Bumpers? If the Bible 
isn't all true, can any of it be true?" Bumpers turned the 
incident around to portray Faubus as a political 
anachronism lacking the confidence to face the future. In 
a televised appearance Bumpers asserted that the strength 
of his religious faith allowed him to consider rationally
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new concepts without being shaken. "It is not men of 
faith," Bumpers insisted, "but men of secret doubts who are 
afraid of new ideas." The incident emphasized the 
different characters of the two candidates. Faubus seemed 
stuck in the past, while Bumpers embraced new ideas.
Faubus had given Bumpers an opportunity to affirm his 
religious faith for the many fundamentalists in Arkansas 
and made himself look foolish by attacking a man for the 
way he taught his Sunday school class.'41
In early September Faubus leveled new charges at his 
opponent. In a thirty-minute telecast carried on ten 
stations in the region, Faubus accused Bumpers of believing 
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren was "a 
great court." The Warren Court had earned a special 
disdain in the South because of its many liberal rulings, 
including the Brown decision which outlawed segregation in 
public schools. The charge was vintage Orval Faubus: focus 
on a point of voter discontent, link that complaint with 
your opponent, then exploit, challenge, accuse, and finally 
seem to prove the charge by innuendo. This must be 
Bumpers' view, the former governor reasoned in a typical 
Faubusian leap of logic, because the Arkansas Gazette would
not have supported Bumpers if he did not hold that opinion.
Bumpers calmly responded by pointing out that many other
newspapers not known for liberal leanings had also endorsed
him. These included the Blytheville Courier News, the
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Springdale News, the Marked Tree Tribune, and the Paragould 
Daily Press, the last of which had not supported any 
political candidate in twelve years.42
The Arkansas Gazette threw its support to Bumpers as 
did virtually every small town newspaper in the state. The 
McGehee Times, for example, depicted the candidates in 
stark contrast. Orval Faubus was "a face, a politician and 
a man of the past . . . his administration was pocked with 
scandal, riots and, in the end, a splintering of the 
Democratic Party from the dissatisfaction. Now he's asking 
the people of the state to give it all back to him." The 
paper characterized Bumpers as "a dynamic, energetic young 
lawyer from a small town who has literally exploded on the 
Democratic scene." The Springdale News called Bumpers "a 
man of dignity, integrity and ability." The Helena-West 
Helena World maintained that "the state needs some new 
political blood and that is what Bumpers will give u s ."
The Eaale Democrat at Warren asserted Bumpers offered . 
"every asset of the clean young unknown who catches the 
imagination of the electorate." The Times of North Little 
Rock believed Bumpers would breathe new life into Arkansas' 
sagging Democratic Party," while the nomination of Faubus 
"would guarantee a fall campaign based on innuendo and 
emotion . . . and place the Democratic Party back under the 
sway of the wheeler-dealers.1,43
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As journalistic support around the state grew in favor 
of his opponent, Faubus said that these newspapers wanted 
to set up in the general election "the same sort of gently- 
contested race you would find for king and queen of a 
charity ball at some country club -- Bumpers versus 
Rockefeller, battling it out, tux-to-tux, cocktail-to- 
cocktail, boyish-grin to boyish-grin. No hard feelings, 
it' s nothing serious. "**
The attempts by Faubus to link Bumpers to Rockefeller, 
to portray himself as a man of the people battling against 
great odds and wealth and power, had worked for him in the 
past. He had been raised in the traditions of populism and 
had used these appeals successfully in his many political 
campaigns. But times had changed and Faubus could no 
longer portray himself as tilting against entrenched power. 
The brand of populism that Faubus had employed had been 
replaced. This new populism favored outsiders who could 
convey trust and respectability over screaming demagogues 
who railed against a few basic issues held dear by rural 
farmers. No one understood the appeal of character more 
than the self-styled country lawyer from the small town of 
Charleston, Arkansas. Bumpers discounted conservative or 
liberal labels for himself or his future administration. 
"What the state of Arkansas, needs and deserves now as 
never before is a man of common sense, good judgment and a 
man who will be dignified and conduct the affairs of the
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state in a decent manner." Perhaps sensing that he had 
staked out a position too far on the right of the political 
spectrum, Faubus tried to remind people that he had cut his 
political teeth as an economic populist. Heretofore 
accusing Bumpers of being a "flaming liberal," Faubus now 
claimed credit for implementing liberal programs during his 
administrations instead of just talking about them.
Calling himself "the true liberal" in the race, the former 
governor said he had brought "social progress instead of 
just going out and talking about it in platitudes and 
generalities as Mr. Bumpers is doing and as Mr. Rockefeller 
has been doing." Faubus also told the Commercial Appeal in 
Memphis that he considered himself a liberal. When the 
reporter asked why he championed so many conservative 
views, Faubus responded that the first duty of a politician 
was to get elected, so that he could get things done. "I 
wish none of us had to say the things we have to say," 
Faubus lamented.45
Apparently most of Arkansas' voters agreed. They did 
not like the things the former governor said during the 
campaign either. As ballots came in during election night 
Bumpers took an early lead and watched it increase to 58.7 
percent of the vote. Faubus called his own showing 
"remarkable," considering the odds against him. He blamed 
his defeat on Senator Fulbright, the AFL-CIO, the Arkansas 
press, "and every other 'liberal' and 'pinko' force."46
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Rather than sinister forces out to get Faubus, the 
Democratic run-off demonstrated the political realities of 
1970. The campaign presented a stark contrast between the 
two figures contending for leadership of their party and 
state. The newly chosen Democratic nominee voiced 
motivations that may have explained his admirable campaign. 
"My father taught me that politics is a noble profession," 
Bumpers said, "and I wanted to prove it." The candidate, 
who had nothing to lose, gambled that a campaign of 
"visible honesty" might succeed. Bumpers got his message 
across by constant stumping of the state and by employing 
television in a manner that no other candidate in Arkansas 
could manage.47
When Faubus bellowed about busing, Bumpers spoke 
soothingly. All the candidates opposed busing and the 
Court had not yet made a definitive ruling so that was not 
really an issue. When Faubus admitted that a governor 
could not do anything about busing other than raise his 
voice, Bumpers seemed to benefit from the electorate's 
desire for quiet moderation. When Faubus attacked his 
opponent's religious beliefs, Bumpers' Sunday school 
teacher character stood in stark contrast to the former 
governor whose administrations held the taint of corruption 
and whose recent divorce and remarriage bothered many of 
the moral minded voters of Arkansas. Once the issue of 
trust became central to the campaign all the invective
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Faubus hurled at his opponent did not seem to matter. The 
unflappable Bumpers turned every assault to his advantage. 
Dealing with problems in a quiet, calm, rational manner 
Buxrpers further demonstrated the dissimilarities between 
himself and the former governor.
Several erstwhile supporters lamented Faubus' personal 
life. One woman from Hot Springs wrote to Faubus 
identifying herself as "a humble female public servant," 
and suggested that the former governor lost this race 
because he left his wife for his young secretary. "From 
principle I could not vote for you this time." The note 
had attached a picture of Faubus' new wife cut out with 
pinking shears. Another unsigned letter claimed:
"Arkansas lost the best governor she ever had because of a 
young ambitious girl who looked like an Indian squaw."
Other Faubus supporters contributed different assessments 
of the campaign. A Baptist preacher from Stuttgart, 
Arkansas, wrote Faubus that of all the candidates in the 
first primary he had feared Bumpers would be the most 
difficult for the former governor to defeat in a run-off. 
"He was 'new' and all the enemies of sixteen years jumped 
on his bandwagon," wrote the preacher. "He had no record 
and never really said what he would do about anything. 
Couple this with a nice set of dentures and you have a 
winner." Faubus' own later assessment characterized the 
election as inevitable. No one could have defeated Bumpers
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in 1970, Faubus reasoned, because "a man and the mood of 
the voters suddenly and inexplicably got in tune."48
State Republican chairman Odell Pollard, said that the 
Democratic primary reflected the electorate's appreciation 
of the two-party system that the GOP had brought to the 
state. The public now knew of "the evils of machine 
politics." In other words, the large vote for Bumpers 
essentially indicated a rejection of Faubus. "I distinctly 
think it is an anti-Faubus vote," said Governor 
Rockefeller. "Remember, you've got a predominance of 
Democrats in the state of Arkansas and I think they were so 
refreshed to have a fine, honest, attractive young man who 
might come in and give the Democratic Party that which it 
had been denied for 16 years." The governor's assessment 
of the primary also accurately portrayed his own precarious 
position. Thousands of moderate and liberal Democratic 
voters who had rejected the legacy of Faubus machine 
politics by supporting Rockefeller returned to their 
political home. John Harkey, a former insurance 
commissioner under Governor Rockefeller, returned to the 
Democratic fold to support Bumpers. "Yard signs are 
sprouting all over this town in front of homes of people 
who always voted for Rockefeller," Harkey said, "now we've 
got someone to vote for rather than having to vote against 
someone." State Democratic chairman Charles Matthews saw 
"tremendous appeal" in Bumpers' campaign, "a new face, new
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leadership, the themes of unifying the state and the 
Democratic Party."49
The rejection of Faubus signalled a new day for the 
state and the South. Arkansans felt proud of themselves, 
and observers near and far vindicated their self-esteem.
"If in Arkansas Orval Faubus has been beaten 
overwhelmingly, then there must be some message," wrote the 
Arkansas Gazette. "The message may be that segregation is 
fading as the overpowering issue in Southern politics."
Many agreed and commented further on the importance of the 
Faubus defeat. The Paragould Daily Press applauded 
Arkansas voters because they had "told the world that they 
are ready to look to the tomorrows -- rather than the 
yesterdays . . . They chose the high road . . . They 
chose a man as Democratic standard-bearer not identified 
with racial hatred and strife or demagoguery." National 
commentators also heralded the political demise of Faubus. 
"Old demagogues like old prizefighters keep coming back for 
more," the New York Times observed. When the former 
governor retired in 1966 "most Americans were more than 
content to see and hear the last of him, but there was no 
way of telling for certain whether his fellow Arkansans 
shared that view. On Tuesday evening he found out that 
they do. "50
With Orval Faubus dispatched, the general election 
could proceed without the specter of demagogic demons of
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the past. Bumpers would face a very different sort of man 
than his rival in the Democratic primary. Winthrop 
Rockefeller could only claim Arkansas as his adopted home, 
having moved there in 1953. Not surprisingly, the wealthy, 
liberal, cosmopolitan Rockefeller seemed oddly out of place 
in the Ozark state. He sprang from one of the richest 
families in America and benefitted from the education, 
cultural background and refinements that come with great 
wealth. Although not a typical Arkansan, Winthrop was not 
a typical Rockefeller either. At six feet four inches and 
240 pounds, Winthrop did not even look like the rest of his 
family, and he certainly did not act like a Rockefeller.
He dropped out of Yale and worked as a roughneck in the 
Texas oil fields. Then almost a year before the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor Winthrop enlisted in the United 
States Army as a private. He later attended Officer 
Candidate School and quickly rose to the rank of major. 
Rockefeller saw a great deal of combat in the Pacific. He 
fought in the battles of Guam and the Philippines and 
suffered wounds in the invasion of Okinawa during a 
kamikaze attack. By the end of the war he held the rank of 
lieutenant colonel and had received the Bronze Star with 
Oak Leaf Cluster as well as a Purple Heart. After the war 
Rockefeller returned home to New York where he worked a 
desk job and pursued the pleasures of bachelorhood. In 
1948 he married a model carrying his child, but divorced
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her a few months later. Winthrop needed a change; he 
called an army buddy in Little Rock who suggested he move 
to Arkansas. Rockefeller accepted the offer and bought 
50,000 acres atop Petit Jean Mountain seventy miles 
northwest of Little Rock. He called it Winrock Farms and 
began farming and ranching. The operation included 6,000 
head of Santa Gertrudis cattle, 17,000 acres devoted to 
rice, soybeans and grain. He built roads, silos, bams, an 
airfield, and a mansion.51
Although Winthrop may have been a maverick, he could 
not escape his family tradition of public service and 
Arkansas became the beneficiary of Rockefeller's 
philanthropy. Education, medicine, the arts, all received 
millions in contributions. Rockefeller also initiated an 
economic rebirth of the state as head of the Arkansas 
Industrial Development Corporation.52
A life-long Republican, Rockefeller by 1959 had seen 
enough of the Faubus political machine and decided that the 
state desperately needed a two-party political system. In 
a 1960 address, broadcast on both radio and television, he 
argued that a two-party system would create a "healthier 
condition in Arkansas politics." Rockefeller established a 
Committee for Two Parties, and funded the Arkansas Election 
Research Council to monitor electoral corruption. A year 
later, Rockefeller became the Arkansas Republican national 
committeeman presiding over a small, reticent party driven
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by patronage. No party organization existed. The GOP did 
not even have a list of potential supporters. Whatever 
voter information that might benefit the party resided in 
county courthouses controlled by Democrats. Rockefeller 
began collecting names in a haphazard manner. These early 
efforts would eventually lead Rockefeller to become the 
first politician in America to maintain and pay for his own 
private computer and experts, used strictly for political 
analysis. Rockefeller also ran public opinion polls. In 
late 1960 and early 1961 voters rated four well-known 
Arkansans including Faubus and Rockefeller. The results 
suggested that Rockefeller was "a potentially strong 
candidate for governor."53
In 1964 Rockefeller decided to challenge Faubus for 
the governor's chair, and began his campaign pointing to 
the corruption within the Faubus administration. Faubus 
emphasized his own seasoning in office compared to an 
"untried, inexperienced former New York playboy." Faubus 
had a field-day contrasting Rockefeller's lifestyle to that 
of most Arkansans. Faubus criticized the outsider's 
admission that he got his haircut in New York, that he 
served liquor to guests, and that he divorced his first 
wife. The Rockefeller fortune served as the perfect foil 
to play on the prejudices of an abundant underclass in the 
state. "This election will show if a poor boy can still 
beat a millionaire. . . . Why, his grandaddy was that oil
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magnate who raised the price of kerosene sold to the po' 
folks . . . if we owe the Rockefellers anything, we've been 
paying it a long time."54
Faubus often reminded voters that he, unlike his rich 
northern opponent, shared a common heritage of hardship 
with Arkansans. One day on the campaign trail, passing a 
wagon drawn by mules, Faubus remarked that he had driven 
such a wagon in his youth. His publicity man ordered the 
car to stop. Faubus got out and drove the wagon. The 
accompanying press entourage dutifully lapped up this 
homespun photo opportunity. When the pictures made the 
newspapers Rockefeller commented that Faubus would keep 
Arkansas in the mule-drawn wagon era while he wanted to 
move the state into the jet age. But the stunt portrayed 
Faubus as a man of the people, while Rockefeller remained a 
city-slicker who could not imagine the difficulties of 
poverty.55
Rockefeller failed in 1964, although the forty-three 
percent of the vote he received topped any Republican 
candidate since Reconstruction. Several factors 
contributed to the loss. The challenger's own post­
election polling showed that Faubus' personal attacks had 
found a receptive audience. Also the Republican challenger 
had failed to unite his own party. The presidential 
campaign of 1964 had increased divisions because 
Rockefeller supported the candidacy of his brother, Nelson
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over the eventual nominee Barry Goldwater. Winthrop 
conceded to the New York Times that his brother's campaign 
hurt his own bid for governor of Arkansas because "Nelson 
is branded throughout much of the South as a liberal."5*
In the South the word liberal almost always held 
racial connotations. And Rockefeller worked hard to 
overcome his liberal image as he laid out his beliefs 
cautiously. Integration should be solved on a local basis, 
he suggested, "with encouragement." While advocating 
better educational opportunities for blacks, he opposed the 
pending 1964 Civil Rights Act fearing the bill granted 
"certain police powers to the administrative, Executive 
branch of the government." Faubus accused Rockefeller of 
being an "ardent civil rights advocate" and suggested 
Rockefeller's moderate stance was an attempt "to change his 
spots on the racial issue." Rockefeller's caution went for 
naught in 1964 but his moderate approach to racial issues 
continued. After the election, John Ward, a Rockefeller 
aide, outlined an approach that reflected the changing 
temper of the times among southern voters. Rockefeller 
"should never become completely identified with either 
extreme. He should maintain an attitude that takes into 
account the feelings of both sides of the issue, offering 
guidelines for both leading to a solution both can accept." 
This advice fit well with Rockefeller's own views and
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feelings about race and served the candidate well in the 
next campaign.57
Although Rockefeller could not slay the race king in 
1964, he did begin to form a coalition that would destroy 
the efficacy of racial politics in the state. Along with 
the eight traditionally Republican counties in the 
northwestern part of the state, Rockefeller carried the 
four counties that contained Arkansas' largest cities.
More important for building a winning coalition in the 
future, Rockefeller had made inroads into the black vote. 
The poll tax had kept the number of registered black voters 
low in 1964 and the eighty-four percent of the black vote 
Faubus received in that election indicated that the 
Democratic political machine controlled those votes. On 
the same day that he made his concession speech,
Rockefeller announced he would run again in 1966. In the 
next two years Rockefeller traveled the state attacking the 
political abuses of the "Faubus Machine." The news that 
Faubus was building a palatial new home added credence to 
the Republican charges of corruption.58
In 1966 Faubus decided not to seek reelection. The 
Democratic primary eliminated the candidates that early 
polls suggested held the best chances of success. Jim 
Johnson, a staunch segregationist, captured the Democratic 
nomination. The nominee had founded the Arkansas White 
Citizens Council and his outspoken criticism of school
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integration in 1957 had prompted Faubus to resist the court 
ordered integration plan in Little Rock. On the campaign 
trail in 1966 Johnson refused to shake hands with black 
voters.59
But these tactics would no longer serve Arkansas 
politicians. The increased black vote could constitute a 
significant portion of a winning coalition. The poll tax 
ended in 1964, and the even though the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act did not require federal monitoring of elections in 
Arkansas it encouraged thousands of independent minded 
blacks to register. Jim Johnson was the last candidate 
that newly liberated black voters would choose in a 
governor's contest, particularly in a year in which no 
national campaign competed for party loyalties. 
Approximately ninety-five percent of the seventy-five 
thousand black votes cast went for Rockefeller and provided 
his margin of victory. The Republican candidate could make 
outright appeals to black voters without fearing a white 
backlash in this more moderate electorate; the strong 
segregationists stood solidly behind Johnson anyway. And 
the growing white moderates in the state had moved out of 
the shadow of ardent segregation. According to an August 
poll a plurality of voters believed racial integration had 
benefitted the state and that Rockefeller would handle the 
racial situation better than his Democratic opponent. In 
late September only eleven percent of voters polled wanted
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to see the next governor fight integration guidelines with 
"all forces at his command," while sixty-six percent wanted 
him to "keep things as orderly as possible." Arkansans 
wanted racial peace and they believed this would improve 
their national image. Fifty-nine percent believed 
Rockefeller would make their state look better in the eyes 
of the nation.60
On election day in 1966 Rockefeller garnered 54.4 
percent of the vote. In addition to capturing the black 
vote and the traditional Republican vote, Rockefeller won 
the support of industrialists seeking an improved business 
climate for the state as well as hundreds of thousands of 
disaffected Democrats. Most agreed the election had not 
reflected a desire for a two-party system. Republicans 
captured only three of the 135 seats in the state 
legislature. Even the newly elected governor saw the 
election as an anomaly. "In '66 the people were not 
necessarily voting for me," Rockefeller admitted.
"Certainly they weren't voting for a Republican. They were 
voting against a system they had wearied of." John Ward, a 
Rockefeller aide agreed, he believed that people voted for 
his boss because "they didn't think he would steal from 
them, and they liked his positive attitude, he was someone 
they could be proud of and they could feel good about his 
going off and representing the state."61
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As governor, Rockefeller seemed intent on reforming 
and modernizing the state. He pushed through the state's 
first minimum wage law, expanded state aid to public 
education, increased teacher and university faculty 
salaries, a Freedom of Information law requiring 
governmental bodies to allow public access to meetings, a 
code of ethics for government executives, some 
administrative reorganization, ending illegal gambling, 
legalizing liquor by the drink, rewriting the century old 
state constitution, major prison reforms, continued 
incentives for luring new industries to the state, and 
appointment of blacks to important government jobs.62
However, Rockefeller faced some real problems in his 
bid for reelection. Rather than his reform efforts and 
accomplishments in office the public focused on his 
personal flaws. One element of indignation concerned the 
governor's enjoyment of strong drink, which he never tried 
to hide. Many voters resented the fact that Rockefeller 
seemed to spend too much time out of his office, and out of 
the state. And when he was in the state he could never 
make it anywhere on time. To many Rockefeller also seemed 
ineffectual. Even one of the governor's chief aides called 
Rockefeller a "terrible" administrator. And, when the 
governor called a special session of the legislature that 
achieved nothing, people began to believe that a Democrat 
could accomplish more. In early September 1968 Eugene
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Newsom, the governor's pollster, reported that at that 
moment a Democratic challenger could win sixty percent to 
Rockefeller's forty percent.63
But the Democrats blundered when they nominated Marion 
Crank, a remnant from the Faubus political machine.
Sterling Cockrill, a long-time Democratic force in the 
state house of representatives said that the party 
leadership was handed to Crank "by the status-quo 
Democrats, the county politicians, the Court House group, 
the whatever machine there was left." If any doubt about 
Crank's connection with the corrupt political past existed 
it disappeared when information surfaced about, what 
Republicans called, the "Family Plan." While Crank had 
served in the legislature, his entire family, including his 
eight-year-old daughter, drew a state payroll check. The 
Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor, Bill Wells, a 
former legislator, had the same problem. The increasingly 
large group of moderate Democrats who had deserted their 
party's ranks in 1966 would not return to support an Old 
Guard politician and stayed within the Republican fold. 
Arkansas' two major newspapers, the Democrat and the 
Gazette endorsed Rockefeller over Crank. Rockefeller's 
pollster forecast a fifty-one to forty-nine percent victory 
for the incumbent. The projection proved nearly perfect. 
Rockefeller received 322,782 votes to Crank's 292,813.64
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Rockefeller's coalition had held firm. Rockefeller 
carried eleven of the twelve counties with black population 
majorities, including three that had gone for Hubert 
Humphrey for president. Once again Rockefeller won the 
Ozark and northern counties where GOP strength dominated. 
Metropolitan counties gave the incumbent fifty-nine percent 
of their vote and counties with at least one city of 10,000 
contributed fifty-five percent. Rockefeller did well among 
affluent voters, receiving fifty-nine percent of the vote 
of the highest category of per-capita income. And yet 
Arkansans did not embrace the GOP. Republican strength in 
the legislature increased from two to only five. All 
Republican candidates for statewide races lost with the 
exception of the GOP's candidate for Lieutenant Governor, 
who barely beat out the Wallace Democrat. Independent 
George Wallace carried the state in the presidential 
balloting with a plurality of thirty-eight percent ahead of 
the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon. And a liberal 
Democrat, J. William Fulbright, won reelection to the 
Senate. The 1968 election that produced Rockefeller's 
second victory did not demonstrate a rise of Republicanism 
in the state, but that a moderate on civil rights who 
emphasized good government and economic progress could 
sustain a majority even in a state holding an eighty-three 
percent Democratic majority.6*
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During Rockefeller's second term his difficulties in 
accomplishing his desired reform measures increased. The 
obstinate Democratic legislature turned downright hostile 
and Rockefeller did little to make it easier for the 
legislators. He refused to engage in the kind of quid pro 
quo that previous Arkansas governors had practiced. 
Rockefeller disdained politics as usual and described the 
legislators as "shortsighted, petty men" unwilling to face 
up to the state's real problems.66
Arkansas' real problem, in Rockefeller's mind, stemmed 
from a lack of revenue, so he began his second term in a 
determined effort to raise taxes. Upgraded services and 
new programs that would keep the state "in step with the 
rest of the nation" would require millions per year, 
Rockefeller told voters on television. If the legislature 
would pass his fiscal program it would contribute ninety 
million the first year in new revenues and $105 million the 
next with fifty percent going to education. His proposals 
to raise sales taxes, personal and corporate income taxes, 
cigarette, tobacco, and alcoholic beverage taxes would have 
amounted to an increase of about ninety percent in general 
taxes. Rockefeller called on citizens to sacrifice. He 
launched into a public relations campaign using the slogan 
"Arkansas is Worth Paying For." Although taxes never 
command a great deal of voter sympathy, Rockefeller's 
proposals garnered outright hostility. Most Arkansas
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voters found it difficult to accept the notion of sacrifice 
on their part when one of the richest men in America had 
made the suggestion. Critics of the tax increases began to 
turn the slogan around: "Is Rockefeller Worth Paying 
For?"67
Although the campaign to increase revenues did 
eventually sway the majority of voters to the inevitability 
of some tax increases, the huge increases that Rockefeller 
proposed found little support with the public or in the 
legislature. Lawmakers rejected the governor's tax 
proposals outright, passing their own modest revenue 
measures that produced less than a quarter of those 
proposed by Rockefeller. Even those voters who applauded 
the governor's reform efforts could not ignore the fact 
that this Republican governor could no longer accomplish 
much, if anything, when faced with a stubborn Democratic 
legislature.68
Rockefeller had promised back in his first campaign 
that he would only seek two terms, but the governor 
despaired of accomplishing his goals within his self- 
imposed deadline. In October 1969 some of his aides 
prepared a memo debating the pros and cons of another 
campaign. Recognizing the governor's political 
liabilities, such as drinking and marital problems, 
difficulties with the legislature and their candidate's 
tarnished reform image, it gauged the chances of success in
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1970 with "at best a cautious optimism." Nevertheless, the 
memorandum held that "the best interests of Arkansas and 
the Republican Party would be served," if Rockefeller 
sought a third term. An opposing group within the 
administration observed that support had dropped lower than 
"it had ever been in previous campaigns," and that the 
governor's chances of winning a third term seemed remote.69
Rockefeller chose to act on the more positive 
assessment. In April he wrote to the state's Republicans 
to warn them that he might break his two-term pledge. "It 
is painful to admit an error, and reverse oneself, but my 
commitment to the Republican Party and to my own 
convictions are more important than my one statement. . . . 
Yes, we have made great progress, but we have not yet 
dismantled the Old Guard!" It was the specter of the Old 
Guard that motivated the incumbent to run again. "To quit 
now," said Rockefeller in his formal announcement, "would 
impose on me a feeling of guilt all of the rest of my 
days." A large part of that guilt sprang from the fear 
that Orval Faubus, the leading Democratic contender, just 
might win. Rockefeller could not bear the thought of 
seeing his fledgling reforms trampled under Faubus' feet. 
"Well that's it," said Rockefeller when he learned that 
Faubus had entered the race. "I can't hand it back to 
him.1,70
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All of Rockefeller's research and polling had 
targeted Faubus. Ample evidence of corruption, an old 
guard political machine run by cronyism, and regressive 
policies provided potent ammunition to use against him.
But a candidate very different from Orval Faubus emerged 
with the Democratic nomination. Dale Bumpers had none of 
Faubus' liabilities. Rockefeller would have to try to tie 
Bumpers to the Democratic political machine and emphasize 
the need to prevent corruption by retaining a two-party 
system in the state. In addition, the incumbent governor 
would campaign on his administration's record. Rockefeller 
could point to his four years in office and boast of the 
creation of a new job every thirty-eight minutes, a new or 
expanded industry opening every one and a half days, 
teachers received three pay raises, the state passed its 
first general minimum wage law. Despite these achievements, 
the task of securing a third term against Bumpers seemed 
near impossible. A poll conducted after the Democratic 
run-off vote indicated that the challenger led the 
incumbent seventy percent to twenty percent with ten 
percent undecided.71
An intensely shy man who had never enjoyed 
campaigning,’ Rockefeller found it difficult to motivate 
himself against such overwhelming odds. Shortly after 
Bumpers secured the Democratic nomination, the governor 
publicly doubted if he could "muster the spontaneous
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enthusiasm" of his opponent. In 1966 and 1968 Democrats 
had deserted their party because they opposed "bigotry and 
machine politics," said Rockefeller. Now he conceded that 
he might lose that support to Bumpers. "I think many 
Democrats are happy that they do have a Democrat whom they 
can rally around -- an honest new personality." The major 
issue in the race, according to the governor, would be 
which candidate could do the most for the state. He had 
the advantage of a record to stand on. "I think it will be 
very interesting for Mr. Bumpers to come forward with a 
program to outdo the ongoing program of the present 
administration," Rockefeller said.72
Two weeks later in a poll conducted between the first 
and third of October Bumpers led sixty-one percent to 
Rockefeller's twenty-four percent with two percent favoring 
Walter Carruth, a candidate running on George Wallace's 
American Independent Party. In this same poll dozens of 
voters commented about the campaign. A sampling of their 
responses speaks volumes about the race. When asked for 
their candidate preference some Rockefeller supporters 
alluded to his strong points. "He 'sho' has helped us 
colored folks," said one respondent. "He likes to help the 
underprivileged," remarked another. A few voters saw the 
one glaring weakness of the Democratic nominee. "Bumpers 
hasn't got a program that I can see. He is just a fresh 
chicken." Those voters who preferred Bumpers seemed to
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define their support by the things they did not like about 
Rockefeller: "Mr. Rockefeller can't accomplish too much
with a Democratic legislature. Two terms are all he asked 
for. Bumpers will give the state a good image. He is his 
own man," answered one of those polled. "Just don't want 
Rockefeller in office again," said another. "Change horses 
once in awhile -- makes a better ride." Some voters liked 
the challenger enough to switch parties. "Bumpers - -He 
doesn't drink and is very good on TV. I'm a Republican, 
but when it comes to the Governor's race I'm voting for 
Bumpers. I think he's a good Christian man, an educated 
man, and a sincere man." The pollster summarized the range 
of comments on the two candidates. "Bumpers is the new, 
fresh face. He has said nothing of consequence. He 
probably will get better cooperation out of the 
legislature. But Rockefeller's sincerity comes through.
He says what he means and is not afraid to take a stand."73
Seemingly more interested in sparing their client from 
the harsh realities of the campaign than furnishing him 
with accurate predictions, Rockefeller's pollsters grasped 
at every straw of hope. After the early October poll 
positioned Bumpers thirty-seven percentage points ahead of 
the governor they predicted: "The guess on Bumpers' win is 
down to just about an even plurality." Two weeks later 
another poll indicated that Bumpers still held a commanding 
lead of sixty-three percent of the electorate, but that
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Rockefeller had increased his support by seven percentage 
points. The summary of the poll referred to a recent 
British election that had gone against projections. "I 
don't think this race is over by any means," wrote one of 
the pollsters. "Bumpers has played his cards well -- 
although I don't really think he has much of a hand to play 
with.1,74
Two weeks before the election Bumpers' support had 
dipped to fifty-one percent while Rockefeller's had climbed 
to thirty-five percent. Bumpers began to campaign in 
earnest with public appearances and addresses on radio and 
television. He also began to state his position on the 
issues. Rockefeller had criticized the challenger for his 
silence. Now Bumpers began to state his position on the 
issues in a calm and reasonable manner that once again 
instilled confidence in the voters without inciting 
controversy. Rockefeller, desperately trailing, went on 
the offensive with an advertising blitz and appearing 
around the state transported by jet helicopters. This 
obvious display of campaign spending carried consequences. 
Polls indicated that Bumpers' lead was growing while the 
governor's support had peaked.75
The polls showed just how difficult achieving a third 
term would be for the incumbent, and events conspired to 
stack the odds even more heavily in favor of the 
challenger. National leaders of Rockefeller's own party
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did irreparable damage to the governor's campaign. In 
September a reporter for Women's Wear Daily quoted Attorney 
General John Mitchell as saying that Rockefeller could 
defeat Bumpers by buying enough votes from "the far left or 
the hard right or the black vote." Although Mitchell 
denied the remark, the comment struck a raw nerve among 
many voters. The Fordyce News-Advocate believed that 
Mitchell's statement "pretty well put the finger on the 
situation in Arkansas." Although Rockefeller had a squeaky 
clean reputation without a hint of scandal, people could 
not help but suspect wrongdoing, or at least take offense 
at the large amounts spent on Rockefeller's campaign.76
Some spoke directly to the resentments many Arkansans 
held toward Rockefeller's great wealth. "We're not going 
to let our state be bought by any jitterbugging dilettante 
New York liberal with a bag full of money," said Bob Riley, 
the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor. Senator J. 
William Fulbright also spoke out about Rockefeller's 
campaign spending. "The use of his tremendous private 
fortune to subvert the democratic process is what offends 
me," Fulbright said. "If we are going to restrict 
candidates for governor to millionaires, how many 
candidates are we going to have?" The Democratic 
challenger conducting a low-key, low-cost campaign 
complained about his opponent's extravagant spending. "The 
expenditures of my opponent in this campaign -- the callous
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disregard for money and the amount of it that's being 
spent, so much of it wasteful--," said Bumpers, "lends 
credence to the idea in people's minds that money is spent 
lavishly in state government." The charges of excessive 
campaign spending rang true. When expenditures of the two 
gubernatorial candidates became public, the figures 
indicated that Rockefeller had outspent Bumpers by more 
than four to one.77
While Mitchell's statement still buzzed in voter's 
ears, Spiro Agnew came to town to show the Nixon 
administration's support for the state's Republican 
gubernatorial candidate. Divisions developed among the 
governor's staff over the wisdom of inviting the vice- 
president, and although Rockefeller decided in favor of the 
invitation he conceded that Agnew would probably cost him 
some votes. The problems for Rockefeller began as soon as 
the vice-president arrived. Agnew began by attacking 
Senator Fulbright. This did not sit well with many of 
Rockefeller's supporters who also voted for the senator.
The comments also offended many who saw no reason for the 
Vice-President to attack Arkansas' senior senator who was 
not even running in the election. Agnew compounded the 
damage by making a gratuitous and insulting attack on 
Rockefeller's opponent calling Bumpers a "grin and grunt" 
candidate. This did not ring true. "Anyone who has seen 
Dale Bumpers in action," wrote the Arkansas Gazette, "knows
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that he is one of the truly articulate on the Arkansas 
political scene." The visit had cost the governor votes, 
the paper believed, because "Agnew knows nothing about 
Bunqpers except what Rockefeller's speechwriters have told 
him. ”78
Perhaps most damaging, the Agnew visit associated the 
very vocal anti-desegregation rhetoric of the vice- 
president with the Republican governor who had proven that 
racial politics no longer guaranteed success in the state. 
Black voters, Rockefeller's most solid group of supporters, 
as well as the white moderate Democrats who had supported 
the governor in the past, had no stomach for the politics 
of racial divisiveness championed by Spiro Agnew. The 
Arkansas Gazette called the governor "bold (not to mention 
ambidextrous) to bring Spiro T. Agnew, the lion of 
Mississippi segregationists, for a GOP rally even as the 
Rockefeller organization banks once again on getting 90% of 
Negro votes." The paper also reminded blacks that "as they 
lined up with the party of Winthrop Rockefeller, that they 
were lining up with the party of John Mitchell and Spiro 
Agnew as well."79
Indeed party politics in Arkansas offered peculiar and 
incongruent enticements for black voters. While the party 
of Richard Nixon developed a strategy designed to appease 
southern whites unhappy with federal desegregation 
mandates, the Arkansas Republican party, under the
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leadership of Winthrop Rockefeller, included blacks in 
party politics as well as state government. Rockefeller 
had transformed the specter of racial politics by openly 
appealing for black votes. These appeals demonstrated the 
political sagacity of building an inclusive coalition. 
Rockefeller's past support included not only Arkansas 
Republicans and black voters but the large body of moderate 
whites weary of fiery racist rhetoric and corrupt 
Democratic machine politics.
The Rockefeller family tradition had long provided 
financial assistance to black colleges and Winthrop had 
been active in the National Urban League, but Rockefeller 
did not come to Arkansas for the purpose of changing race 
relations. Although Rockefeller believed that everyone 
deserved equal opportunities, he neither patronized blacks 
nor gave special privileges to those who served in his 
administration. Rockefeller represented a turning point in 
Arkansas race relations. The governor filled state jobs 
with qualified blacks and had special assistants to keep 
close tabs on the hiring of minorities. After the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., Governor 
Rockefeller became the only governor in the nation to call 
for and lead a memorial prayer service for the slain civil 
rights leader on the steps of the state capitol. When U.S. 
News and World Report reported that racial disturbances 
racked Arkansas in the wake of the assassination,
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Rockefeller telegraphed the editor calling the report 
"misleading and unjustified." The governor expressed pride 
in the conduct of Arkansans during this tense situation.
"In this spirit we are moving forward and hopefully will 
set a pattern for the nation, but such reporting . . . 
makes our job unjustifiably more difficult and may even be 
a disservice to those of us who are sincere."80
Although racial incidents did occur in Arkansas, 
Rockefeller exhibited his sincerity in trying to ameliorate 
racial tensions. In 1969 when racial disturbances racked 
Forest City, Arkansas, the governor worked diligently to 
avert a crisis. When black activists planned a "poor 
people's march" there Rockefeller met with blacks and 
whites to ease racial tensions. The governor opposed the 
march, but did not believe he should prevent a legal march. 
Instead he persuaded black leaders to postpone the march, 
allowing tempers to cool. In the next year Rockefeller 
tried in vain to prevent confrontation in Earle, Arkansas. 
Still many people appreciated the exertions of the governor 
in response to racial problems. "We in Earle were spared 
from what might have been a far worse situation," wrote one 
woman from that troubled town to the Arkansas Gazette, 
"above all, we needed and had the attention of a governor 
who remained in close touch all night, and in those days 
following, ready and anxious to help in bringing . . . 
peace in the most beneficial manner for both races." The
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Earle woman went on to place the actions of the governor in 
a wider context. "Arkansas has had less racial difficulty 
than any other state in the South," the woman reminded 
readers, "with more advancement in the field of human 
relations than any other southern state." The movement in 
this direction, she continued, "had to have strong 
leadership, and it received a dynamic push from one Win 
Rockefeller.1181
In April 1970 Rockefeller sought to ease the tension 
over school desegregation. Arkansas at the time was 
operating forty-nine dual system school districts in 
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The governor 
asked the Justice Department for a delay in order to give 
the districts involved time to comply voluntarily. But 
unlike southern governors of the past who sought to delay 
desegregation by any means available, Rockefeller seemed 
sincere in his desire to work toward an amicable solution. 
Two months later Rockefeller telegraphed President Nixon 
when the Administration backed off an earlier decision to 
force a desegregation deadline for the fall school term. 
Rockefeller inqplored the President not to "break faith with 
the black community" by slowing the pace of school 
desegregation. The relaxation of the deadline, the 
governor warned, would compromise "the position of those 
who have courageously gone ahead with objectivity and a
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sense of justice -- if not always with enthusiasm -- in the 
implementation of Federal desegregation guidelines."82
Yet Rockefeller wavered in his firm rejection of 
racial politics and succumbed to the politically popular 
position of opposing busing. Rockefeller did not believe 
that as governor he should interfere in local school 
districts with busing problems. He had supported the 
Southern Governor's Conference statement in 1969 calling 
for a "quality, nondiscriminatory education for every 
child" and urging "restraint and good judgement in the use 
of any busing to . . . achieve racial integration." In 
January 1970 Rockefeller said that busing should not be 
disregarded "in implementing the court orders, and the law 
working toward sound integration." Some praised the 
governor for his stand. The Arkansas Gazette, applauded it 
and called the southern cry against busing "hypocritical" 
considering that "whole generations of whites and blacks 
alike were bused all over kingdom come to keep the schools 
totally segregated." But the Gazette did not speak for the 
majority of Arkansans and Rockefeller knew it. In February 
Rockefeller backpedaled on the busing issue. "I have not 
recommended busing -- and am not recommending it now." In 
a futile attempt to g amer support from conservative 
elements, Rockefeller compromised his coalition. "If the 
governor's strategy was to antagonize those who have 
admired his courage and candor," observed the Pine Bluff
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Commercial after the Rockefeller statement on busing, "then 
he succeeded this weekend." In that same month previewing 
his role as chairman of the 1970 Southern Governor's 
Conference, Rockefeller called on the President to issue a 
"forthright statement we can understand" on busing school 
children to achieve integration. When Harry Dent, Nixon's 
southern strategy advisor, contacted Rockefeller, the 
governor agreed "to avoid this subject from a critical 
standpoint." Rockefeller also admitted to Dent that big 
delegations of blacks and whites taking opposite positions 
on busing caused him "to waffle his position by saying he 
wanted the President to clarify his stand." Dent added in 
his memo that "his position really is that he favors all 
kinds of busing." Dale Bumpers, the Democratic nominee for 
governor, had no such qualms about letting his real 
position be known. Once again he handled the politically 
explosive issue adroitly as he had during his primary 
contest against Faubus. The challenger maintained his 
opposition to busing, yet told voters that if the Supreme 
Court mandated busing to achieve racial balance in 
classrooms that the state would have to comply. "If they 
[the Court] declare busing mandatory, then, of course, that 
is the direction we will move," Bumpers said.83
Rockefeller had wavered from a brand of politics that 
he pioneered in the state, maintaining a moral position 
regardless of where the racial chips might fall.
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Ironically, Rockefeller's approach had by 1970 benefittea 
his political opponents. His inclusive coalition made it 
possible for a Democratic moderate to reclaim state 
leadership, as Dale Bumpers admitted after his election. 
Many others noticed the transformation as well. "The day 
Arkansas changed," observed Leroy Donald of the Arkansas 
Gazette. "was the day after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 
assassination when Rockefeller stood on the capitol steps 
singing, 'We Shall Overcome.'" Black and white Arkansans 
shared this opinion. "While Governor Rockefeller helped 
free the black man in Arkansas from the oppression of Jim 
Crow," said Sonny Walker, the African-American Rockefeller 
had nominated as director of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, "he also helped free the white man of our 
state from the prison of his prejudice." Some in the 
state, however, saw the black vote as a liability 
reflecting the ambivalence of many Arkansans. While the 
desire to move beyond the bad old days of racism pervaded 
the body politic, some resented a concentration of power 
derived from a minority voting as a bloc. The Helena-West 
Helena World urged voters to support Bumpers because 
"Rockefeller has a strong backing and a big block of voters 
who will be all out for him," wrote the paper referring to 
the overwhelming black support for the governor. "These 
people, will exert every effort to pool all their strength,
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while so many of the Tax Payers, the people who support the 
state government financially, will not take the trouble."3*
After Rockefeller's victories in 1956 and 1968 the 
state Democratic Party reorganized and reassessed political 
expediencies. The party had moved away from the corrupt 
political machine of the Faubus years and abandoned the old 
political ploy of espousing segregation and white supremacy 
at election time. After Rockefeller's winning example of 
appealing to the growing body of white liberal and moderate 
voters, open appeals for black votes no longer threatened 
Democratic candidates. Dale Bumpers could not be linked to 
the bad old days of racist, corrupt Democratic machine 
politics. Refusing to concede the black vote to his 
opponent, the Democratic nominee now sought to reclaim 
those votes residing in Republican ranks. After all, the 
national Democratic Party spoke much more directly to the 
needs and wishes of black voters in 1970 than did southern- 
strategy Nixon Republicans. In October Bumpers told a 
group of skeptical blacks that he wanted them involved in 
the Democratic Party and the state government. "I'm 
opposed to discrimination in every form," Bumpers 
maintained. He reminded the black group that he had 
campaigned all summer without appealing to emotions, an 
obvious reference to his calm response to Faubus' fiery 
rhetoric in the Democratic primary. A faculty member from 
a predominantly black college in the state asked Bumpers if
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his racial appeal might hurt him with other voters. "It 
might," Bumpers replied, but he added that he made the 
appeals because it was morally right.85
At almost every campaign stop voters asked Bumpers 
questions about race. A Rabbi asked the candidate how he 
felt about Rockefeller's appointment of a black leader to 
the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University.
Bumpers responded: "I would not hesitate to appoint black 
men to such positions if I knew them and had confidence in 
them." A student at the University of Arkansas asked him 
what he would do to make integration fact "rather than 
fantasy." Bumpers said he did not believe integration was 
a fantasy. He said that all Arkansas school districts had 
gone to a unitary school system and that he was sure that 
the federal government would enforce the law. When asked 
by another student why the only blacks seeking public 
office in Arkansas ran as Republicans, Bumpers pointed to 
his efforts to recruit blacks to return to his party. And 
he asserted that participation in the Democratic Party 
would best serve the interest of black people. Bumpers' 
attempts to lure black voters demonstrated a transformation 
of politics in the South. The challenger's lead in the 
polls suggested that he did not need to openly court the 
black vote that would largely support Rockefeller anyway. 
But the effort reflected the recognition of the changes in 
the South.85'
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Winthrop Rockefeller knew he could count on most of 
the black vote, but he had serious doubts about those 
disaffected Democrats who had deserted their party during 
the last two campaigns. Rockefeller ran commercials 
suggesting that the "same old crowd," would control the 
Bumpers administration. To support this allegation, 
Rockefeller pointed to the fact that Bumpers had not spoken 
to the issues but expected to take office by "looking 
pretty on TV and trying to win with a smile, a shoeshine 
and one speech." Bumpers resented the commercials, saying 
that if the old crowd was waiting in the wings they would 
never get out of there as long as he was governor. These 
attacks fell on deaf ears for the most part; Bumpers had no 
connection with the Democratic old guard and no record to 
attack. Rockefeller did sway some support by pointing to 
Bumpers reluctance to discuss the issues or engage the 
governor in a televised debate. "Whatever one thinks of 
Governor Rockefeller's program, it is clear that he has 
one," wrote the Pine Bluff Commercial. "While Mr. Bumpers 
as late as this week was still getting away with 
generalities like being in favor of both quality education 
for all and a conservative spending policy. He hasn't been 
very specific about how the state could achieve both." The 
De Queen Bee lamented the fact that twice the governor had 
challenged the Democratic nominee to debate the issues.
"And twice now . . . Bumpers has kept a tight lip before
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making any public pronouncement about said debate.” The 
Stone County Leader at Mountain View, Arkansas, summarized 
the two candidates positions as Rockefeller "dwelling on 
the inexperience and shallow platform of Bumpers, while 
Bumpers is picturing himself as being up against a Goliath- 
type financial machine." The paper believed that Bumpers 
should "dwell on the issues and problems, for although 
money still plays a big role in electing politicians, 
people are interested in his opinions and plans and most 
votes will be cast on those merits."87
Even this chink in Bumpers' armor proved impenetrable. 
Rockefeller's editorial endorsements from Arkansas 
newspapers declined dramatically in 1970; his political 
appeal could not match that of his young challenger.
Indeed Rockefeller seemed in an untenable position. The 
Arkansas Gazette, having supported Rockefeller's 
gubernatorial attempts in the past now applauded his reform 
proposals while at the same time backing Bumpers whom they 
believed would have more success guiding Rockefeller's 
reform measures through the Democratic legislature. This 
contention fit right in with Bumpers' general election 
campaign theme. Even if the two candidates agreed on every 
problem and every solution, Bumpers insisted, the 
overriding issue in the campaign remained: "Whose judgement 
do you best trust to deal with those problems, who do you 
think will work the hardest and who do you think will be
132
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
able to resolve the legislative stalemate and get our state 
moving?” When a student leader of a Young Republican 
organization at the University of Arkansas asked Bumpers a 
question concerning prison reforms proposed by Rockefeller 
but stalled in the legislature, the candidate responded:
"If you want those things, vote for me."86
The final predictions in the governor's race had 
Bumpers leading with over fifty percent of the vote. But 
on election day, pollsters, Rockefeller, Republicans and 
even Bumpers himself expressed astonishment at how strongly 
the challenger finished. Bumpers' vote margin of sixty-two 
percent exceeded that of any gubernatorial candidate in 
Arkansas history. Rockefeller had only thirty-two percent 
of the vote with Walter Carruth of the American Independent 
Party receiving six percent. While Rockefeller received 
his usual group of stalwart Republicans and dominated the 
black vote with eighty-eight percent the incumbent governor 
carried only two of seventy-five counties. Bumpers 
dominated northwest Arkansas where Rockefeller had always 
done well, and still carried the moderate and conservative 
Democratic areas of southern Arkansas.89
Jim Ranchino, a political scientist from Ouachita 
Baptist University active in Arkansas' political polling, 
thought that Rockefeller had fallen out of contention in 
the last week because of a backlash over excessive campaign 
spending. Representative John Paul Hammerschmidt, the
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state's only successful major Republican candidate in the 
general election, agreed. Newspapers around the state 
seemed to bear out this suspicion. The Arkansas Gazette 
ran an editorial entitled "The Arrogance of Spending" 
denouncing the "fantastic level of spending" in the 
Rockefeller campaign even employing "not one but two 
helicopters." Rockefeller had "saturated newspapers, radio 
stations, billboards and recently, placed a conglomeration 
of mail to the voters that would break any postmaster's 
back," the Marked Tree Tribune remarked. These lavish 
practices may have been acceptable in large states, said 
the paper, "but in Arkansas, the campaign staged by Mr. 
Rockefeller got to the point where it only negated his real 
accomplishments." The Dumas Clarion agreed that campaign 
expenditures had become so lavish that the state should 
implement some controls. Even though "the Republicans may 
well have spent six-fold as much as the Democrats," the 
paper asserted that Dale Bumpers proved that "an 
attractive, personable candidate can win a nomination even 
if he is underfinanced." The Times. in North Little Rock, 
marvelled at the fact that Bumpers had won without the 
Democratic Old Guard and states-rights factions. The 
Democrats who had deserted the party and independents 
"found Mr. Bumpers attractive not only because he was a new 
face in the Democratic Party unallied with any of the old 
factions or leaders but also because he eschewed narrow
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partisanship and made no promises other than to work on the 
state's problems as best he could." The Newport Daily- 
Independent agreed. "Although we supported Governor 
Rockefeller, there is no question that the Democrats this 
time came up with an able leader, one not identified with 
formerly powerful factions that the Rockefeller forces 
could link him with."90
One group of the electorate more than any other 
contributed to Bumpers's success; white moderates returned 
to the Democratic party in 1970. The great middle class of 
voters, that group responsible for Rockefeller's past 
electoral successes, observed Jim Ranchino, "had moved from 
a rather conservative, intolerant posture in 1960, toward a 
greater degree of tolerance and moderation in 1970." 
Ironically, Rockefeller, who had done more than any other 
politician in Arkansas to bring about this moderation, 
suffered defeat due to what he had wrought. The 
Republicans experienced an electoral disaster statewide. 
They ran candidates for thirty-six seats in the House, and 
ten in the Senate. None of the challengers made it and the 
party held on to only two seats in the House. According to 
Philip D. Carter, of the Washington Post. Bumpers election 
"proved that given a choice between a Democrat and a 
Republican saying the same things, Arkansas -- like the 
rest of the South -- will still usually choose a Democrat. 
And so the New South in Arkansas was b o m ." Indeed
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gubernatorial elections across the South in November 1970 
seemed to prove that the Republican southern strategy of 
catering to racial fears would no longer play to the 
majority of voters below the Mason-Dixon line.91
"The future I envision must be shared by all 
Arkansans -- old and young, black and white, rich and 
poor," declared Dale Bumpers in his inaugural address.
"This administration will be one of concern, compassion, 
and reality . . .  We must not waste the new awakening of 
our people." Perhaps a New South had indeed arrived.92
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CHAPTER 4  
FLORIDA
Racial turmoil had not occurred in Florida with the 
same frequency or intensity that other deep South states 
experienced following the Brown decision that struck down 
segregated public schools. Floridians exhibited much more 
interest in promoting growth and tourism than holding on to 
a system of racial segregation. During the 1950s, when 
other southern governors shouted for massive resistance, 
Governor Leroy Collins spoke quietly in favor of measures 
to ease racial accommodation in the state. In his 
inaugural address in 1957 Collins presented integration as 
inevitable and suggested that Floridians obey the law of 
the land. Collins pointed out that blacks did not enjoy 
equal opportunity and accordingly were "morally and legally 
entitled to progress more rapidly." In 1970, however, a 
different Florida governor would seek to enhance his 
political career by creating a furor over busing and 
challenging federal authority concerning desegregation more 
directly than Orval Faubus or Ross Barnett, or George 
Wallace ever had. Although not a native southerner, the 
governor seemed to pattern himself on southern demagogues 
of the past. His colorful speech and antics, 
confrontational style and defiance of federal authority 
combined to paint him in the colors of the past. The 
governor, however, had entered office four years earlier
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looking to the furture. The first Republican elected to 
the chief executive office since Reconstruction, he seemed 
to represent a vibrant and growing party that would replace 
the corrupt, decrepid and descredited Democratic politcal 
machine of the past.1
The 1970 gubernatorial campaign did not bode well for 
Florida Democrats. They faced an incumbent governor who 
led a growing Republican party. The GOP had captured one 
Senate seat in 1968 and when the Democrat who held the 
other one announced that he would not seek re-election, the 
prospects of a GOP sweep of the state's three top elective 
offices seemed very real indeed. Compounding the 
Democrats' problems, Attorney General Earl Faircloth, who 
seemed likely to gain the Democratic gubernatorial 
nomination, represented the discredited old order that had 
controlled Florida politics for decades. Claude Kirk, the 
Republican incumbent, could also take comfort in a poll of 
legislators, elected officials and lobbyists, conducted in 
January by the Sarasota Herald Tribune, that indicated that 
the majority of these savvy political insiders believed 
Kirk would easily win reelection.2
Claude Kirk had entered Florida politics in 1960 as 
the state chairman of "Democrats for Nixon," but shortly 
thereafter, switched parties. Two years after an 
unsuccessful run for the Senate in 1964, Kirk became the 
first Republican governor in Florida since Reconstruction.
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He seemed to offer a refreshing change from Democratic 
machine politics in which small-county representatives 
traditionally called the porkchop gang, had dominated state 
affairs. Under the gang's control, the legislature had 
neglected urban problems, divided up state-funded local 
work projects, and merely approved the Democratic 
governor's measures. Kirk described himself as a "tree- 
shaking son-of-a-bitch." In fact, he did seek to use his 
office as a bully pulpit; he would focus attention on some 
difficulty or politically popular issue and attack with 
little regard for compromise or real effort to solve the 
problem. His confrontational tactics seemed to gain 
support, at least for a while, from an electorate tired of 
politics as usual. Kirk set the tone of confrontation 
during his inauguration address when he unexpectedly called 
for a special session of the legislature to finish its work 
on a new constitution to replace the existing eighty-five 
year old document. The complex work of drafting a new 
constitution had been underway for some time, and the 
governor's speech denigrated the efforts of the 
legislators. Kirk's words seemed calculated to win public 
support at the expense of lawmakers and served notice that 
compromise would be replaced by confrontation.3
The new governor continued his battle with the 
legislature when he opposed a salary increase for that 
body. Early in Kirk's administration reapportionment broke
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the long-time legislative domination of the porkchop gang. 
Without the graft and corruption of the old system, 
lawmakers would be woefully underpaid and under-staffed. A 
bipartisan group supported higher salaries to attract 
better qualified representatives, and Governor Kirk had 
promised his support. When the pay-raise reached his desk, 
however, he refused to sign it. Kirk delivered his veto 
message before a joint session of the legislature seething 
with bipartisan anger. Kirk criticized the legislators for 
ignoring public feelings and voting themselves an 
"overwhelming” pay raise. "As Governor, I can have no 
alternative but to respond to the people when the people's 
cause is right and just." Kirk not only opposed the salary 
increase that he had promised to support, he publicly 
accused lawmakers of incompetence, irresponsibility, and 
even corruption. He did so the same year that a 
governmental audit revealed that the governor himself had 
used state money improperly for a honeymoon to Europe, 
flowers, cards, food, and travel associated with his bid to 
gain the 1968 vice-presidential nomination. Legislators of 
both parties wasted little time in overriding the veto.4
Kirk's vice-presidential ambitions isolated the 
governor from his own party, opened him up to criticism 
from Democrats, and led to financial problems that plagued 
his administration. Just months after Kirk took office, he 
hired a publicist for the state, William Safire, a speech
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writer for President Nixon, who received a $90,000 
contract. Opponents of Kirk quickly realized that Safire 
spent more time promoting Kirk than Florida, and they 
pointed to a secret memo from Safire to Kirk that said in 
part: "Is George Wallace planning an appearance in Florida 
soon? You ought to go and 'welcome' him as part of your 
'confrontation' politics." Safire advised Kirk to 
challenge Wallace and supplied the words for the meeting. 
"'You talk about crime in the streets, George. What about 
crime in Alabama?'" Kirk did not confront Wallace, but he 
did stump several Alabama courthouses telling listeners, "I 
know ole George and I like him, but he just can't win 
across the country."5
Kirk, on the other hand, believed that he had a 
realistic chance to capture the vice-presidential 
nomination. Richard Nixon had attended Kirk's inauguration 
in 1967 and told Kirk's former father-in-law that he 
intended to run for president with a young southern 
Republican in 1968. During the New Hampshire primary in 
March of that year, William Loeb, the conservative editor 
of the Manchester Union-Leader. urged a vice-presidential 
write-in campaign on behalf of Governor Kirk. Loeb 
reasoned that selecting Kirk would convince southern 
Democrats that the Republican party had its "foot in the 
door of the South" and intended to walk in. It would also 
show George Wallace that "there is a difference between
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states' rights and racism." Nixon, however, selected 
another running-mate. Never one to bow out gracefully,
Kirk then threw his support to the candidacy of Nelson 
Rockefeller, which angered many Florida Republicans who 
strongly supported Nixon.6
In addition to his very public squabbles, Kirk also 
engaged in private battles with fellow Republicans. Kirk 
had an enormous ego and wanted to control the GOP. Even 
before Kirk won the governor's chair he had initiated a 
feud with the most powerful Republican in the state, 
Congressman William Cramer. In 1954 Cramer had become the 
first Republican representative since Reconstruction 
elected in Florida and, until Kirk came along, had also 
served as the guiding force of the state party. In 1970 a 
senate seat opened and Cramer, with the urging of President 
Nixon, entered the race. The prospects of recapturing the 
governor's chair and an open senate seat made some sort of 
accommodation between Kirk and Cramer seem compelling, but 
the intense animosity between the two men coupled with 
Kirk's confrontational political style solidified opposing 
forces within the GOP and led to internecine warfare in the 
Republican primaries. Both men sought to run candidates 
against the other. Cramer found the perfect opponent for 
Kirk in drugstore millionaire Jack Eckerd. With little 
hope of gaining contributions in a race against an 
incumbent, Eckerd could spend large amounts of his own
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money. He also had the advantage of statewide name 
recognition and a powerful campaign team that included 
William Murfin, the former state party chairman, and Roger 
Ailes, a television adviser to President Nixon. Adding to 
Kirk's woes, a former ally and state senator, Skip Befalis, 
also challenged the governor in the GOP primary battle.
The resulting competition within his own party seemed to 
pose particular danger to the governor. Conventional 
thinking at the time, expressed in several newspapers and 
supported by a number of polls, suggested that Kirk could 
defeat any of the Democratic challengers, but that he faced 
real problems capturing his own party's nomination.7
While Cramer viewed Jack Eckerd's candidacy as 
detrimental to his adversary, Kirk saw an opportunity for 
revenge when the Senate rejected Judge Harold Carswell as 
President Nixon's nominee for the Supreme Court. Kirk 
convinced Carswell to challenge Cramer in the senate race. 
Kirk saw several positive benefits in a Carswell campaign. 
He believed that sympathy for the judge's rejection could 
be parlayed into votes. Carswell's candidacy would also 
embarrass many Florida Democrats who had offered profuse 
endorsements of Carswell when he had been a Supreme Court 
nominee. Most important, if Carswell won the nomination, 
it would solidify Kirk's hold on the party and strengthen 
Kirk's chances for reelection.8
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Many believed that the judge's leap into the senate 
race landed him well ahead of lesser known figures. "There 
ain't no way Carswell can be beat," said one GOP state 
senator. Carswell, who had dominated national headlines 
for weeks, possessed instant name recognition. And 
Carswell's rejection as the second southerner Nixon sought 
to place on the Supreme Court propelled him to a near 
political martyr status. Many also appreciated the irony 
of Carswell seeking to enter the very body that had 
rejected him. "The poetic justice of this is beautiful," 
remarked a Republican legislator from Clearwater.9
On April 20, 1970, with Kirk and Republican Senator 
Edward Gurney standing next to him, Judge G. Harold 
Carswell announced that he was relinquishing his seat on 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and entering the race 
for the Senate "to join President Nixon in his goals of 
restructuring our country and its government along 
constitutional, conservative lines." Kirk also sought to 
pin the presidential seal of approval on Carswell. "What a 
flagbearer for the strict constructionists," Kirk said of 
Carswell. "You have a leader here, a man singled out by 
the President to be one of nine on the Supreme Court." 
Senator Gurney called Carswell "a dream candidate," and 
claimed that Harry Dent, Nixon's advisor on southern 
political matters, and Rogers Morton, GOP National 
Chairman, agreed that Carswell's candidacy was a "once-in-
150
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
a-lifetime" opportunity. Gurney further asserted that Dent 
considered the Carswell candidacy "an ideal solution," and 
that Morton had urged Cramer to pull out of the race.10
Florida's House Speaker Fred Schultz said that he 
hoped Carswell was "not being used as an innocent pawn in a 
back-room power deal based on publicity he received."
Former governor Farris Bryant, who intended to enter the 
senate race himself and whom polls suggested could beat 
either Osborne or Cramer, commented that sympathy for 
Carswell should not win him the election. "I don't feel 
that a seat in the U.S. Senate . . . should be awarded to 
anyone to salve his wounded pride," Bryant said. "I don't 
think you can base a candidacy for the U.S. Senate on a 
rejection by that body."11
William Cramer, represented an important piece in this 
political board game. Although Kirk knew that he could not 
pressure Cramer to withdraw, he hoped the entry of Carswell 
would take the shine off Cramer's candidacy, and perhaps 
even dispatch Cramer from power. Cramer had no intention 
of pulling out for the sake of party unity, instead he 
sought to obstruct and frustrate the efforts of Kirk and 
Gurney. Cramer released a statement from his office in 
Washington. "President Nixon personally urged me to run 
for the U.S. Senate. This has not changed. He also urged 
Judge Carswell to remain on the bench, where strict 
constructionists of the Constitution are needed. I am
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heeding President Nixon's call and hope Judge Carswell 
would do likewise."12
Even before Carswell entered the race the 
administration had sought to distance itself from the 
internecine battles of the Florida GOP. "The President's 
name has been kicked around in the Florida primary battle," 
Harry Dent told Bob Haldeman in a memo dated March 5, 1970. 
"I have asked Ron Ziegler to get a question asked and 
answered saying that the President is not taking any part 
in the Florida primary." But the next month Dent 
unwittingly became the man in the middle of the feud. Kirk 
and Gurney misled Dent, whose endorsement of Carswell's 
candidacy carried with it the implication of the 
President's favor. The two Florida Republicans told Dent 
that Cramer had agreed to drop out of the race so that 
Carswell could capture the Republican nomination unopposed. 
In fact, Cramer had never been approached about withdrawing 
and told Dent after the story became public that he was in 
the race to stay. A few days after Carswell entered the 
campaign, national Republican leaders disavowed any part in 
the political machinations of Kirk and Gurney. Rogers 
Morton angrily denounced Kirk and Gurney for "shocking" 
behind-the-scenes tactics. Morton denied Gurney's claim 
that he had urged Representative Cramer to drop out of the 
race. "I'm not about to discourage any candidate to run on 
the Republican ticket. I'm in favor of open primaries."
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Morton criticized Kirk and Gurney for picking Carswell 
behind the back of Cramer who had announced his candidacy 
seven months earlier and then asking Cramer to withdraw. 
"It's unconscionable for this to have happened," Morton 
said. "If a few candidates are selected in some smoke- 
filled room, what's the use of having a primary?" Morton 
asked. The White House would remain neutral. One party 
spokesman said: "Kirk and company have put Nixon in one 
hell of an embarrassing position at best and infuriated him 
at worst."13
State GOP leaders also denounced the Carswell 
candidacy ploy. Gubernatorial candidate Skip Bafalis said 
the GOP state committee should replace Chairman Duke 
Crittenden if he was part of the "power play." Bafalis 
called Kirk and Gurney "kingmakers," trying to gain a 
"hammer lock" on the party by using Osborne and Carswell as 
"pawns." Crittenden denied any involvement saying that he 
was chairman of all the Republicans. Alyse O'Neill, a 
state GOP committeewoman and wife of a Nixon appointee, in 
an open letter to the press urged Carswell to remain on the 
bench. "I refuse to substitute the temporary whims, 
transitory caprices and shifting political ambitions of 
Claude Kirk for the permanent well being of the Republican 
party," O'Neill wrote. Carswell responded that the 
decision to run for the Senate was his own, that he had not 
consulted with the President before he entered the race,
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and that he was not running "in tandem" with any other 
Florida politicians. He would be his own man, he said, 
"beholden to nobody but the people."14
For all the hoopla and great expectations involved, 
the Carswell candidacy did little more than fracture the 
Florida GOP. At a time when Kirk, running for reelection 
himself, needed to lead a united Republican effort, he 
divided his own party. Whatever benefit Kirk hoped to 
gain backfired as GOP regulars throughout the state 
expressed resentment over Kirk's chicanery. "It's one 
thing to maneuver for power within the party," said one 
Republican of Kirk's ploy, "it is quite another to go off 
and divide the party. And I'm telling you the party is 
really divided." Carswell proved a poor candidate. He had 
not run for elective office since 1948 when he sought a 
Georgia congressional seat and declared his support for 
white supremacy, and that campaign had helped derail his 
Supreme Court nomination. Cramer would go on to defeat 
Carswell easily for the Republican nomination only to lose 
to Lawton Chiles, a young, little-known Democrat who would 
walk around the state to emphasize contact with the average 
citizen.15
The machinations of Kirk in the Senate race 
demonstrated the continuing turmoil the incumbent created 
within his own party at a time when he needed to marshall 
all the support he could muster. But Kirk knew that it
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would take more than Republican support to win re-election. 
Kirk believed that he could tap into the resentment over 
busing and achieve a power base that would cleave across 
party lines. The disruption of public education became a 
prime campaign issue in 1970. Many school boards and 
parents reacted with indignation at federally mandated 
desegregation plans that would move students and teachers 
that year. In Sarasota County the school board voted 5-0 
to defy a federal district court order to submit a new 
desegregation plan with a more balanced black-white ratio. 
Calls from irate parents inundated legislators, according 
to representative Lynwood Arnold, chairman of 
Jacksonville's Duval County legislative delegation. "It 
seems to be the only subject people are interested in . . . 
most of them seem to realize there isn't much the 
Legislature can do. But they still want to talk about it. 
And a lot of the calls are from Negro parents who are just 
as upset," Arnold said. State senator Mallory H o m e  
reported a similar bi-racial indignation in Tallahassee's 
Leon County. The rancor had nothing to do with race he 
explained, complaints were coming in from "colored as well 
as white communities." In his fourteen years as an elected 
official, the senator claimed, he had never witnessed "more 
resentment, more fear and more bewilderment" from parents 
who expressed frustration with their children being "tossed 
about like a feather in a reckless wind." Their
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frustration led the senator to entertain the notion of 
defiance. Mallory considered direct resistance, but 
believed that the only hope for posterity lie in the 
"capacity to use the avenues of constitutional protest open 
to us under the law." One woman, whose husband worked for 
the HEW, had no such qualms. "If my children are forced 
out of their present classroom in February, then I will not 
send them back. Period!" she threatened in a letter to the 
Tallahassee Democrat, "as far as I am concerned the 
government can go to hell. "1S
The uproar over busing did not escape the attention of 
Governor Kirk. Prior to 1970 Claude Kirk's position on 
civil rights differed markedly from that of most southern 
governors. "I'm not one of those red-necked Governors like 
Lester Maddox," Kirk told the Saturday Evening Post in 
1967, "I'm the only good guy in the South." When Alabama 
Governor Lurleen Wallace invited him to attend a conference 
in Montgomery to discuss stopping school integration, Kirk 
replied: "We here in Florida who are pursuing a war on 
crime cannot join in attempts to subvert or delay the law 
of the land as interpreted by the Supreme Court." Also in 
1967 Kirk defused a potentially volatile meeting led by the 
black militant H. Rap Brown. Kirk won the crowd over by 
urging a peaceful gathering even as he warmly welcomed 
Brown. As governor, he had also launched an "Operation 
Concern" to deal with problems of the ghetto. The
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governor's apparent lack of personal prejudice and past 
record of civil rights support could have served the state 
well in easing the final stages of school integration. In 
1970, however, Kirk decided that the political advantages 
of defiance could not be ignored in an election year. The 
black constituency of the state accounted for only ten 
percent of the electorate and voted solidly Democratic.
Kirk believed that electoral success rested in appealing to 
those alienated Democrats who most objected to 
desegregation pressures.17
The Fifth Circuit Court had ruled that the public 
schools within their jurisdiction, including Florida's, 
must be desegregated by February l, 1970. In mid-January 
Kirk petitioned the Supreme Court to delay that school 
desegregation deadline until the governor could plead the 
case himself. Kirk seemed convinced in this and later 
confrontations with the courts that only the Supreme Court 
had sufficient stature to deal with him. Kirk told the 
Court that the immediate desegregation order would wreck 
the state's budget. Claiming he had brought "racial 
harmony" to Florida, Kirk maintained that desegregation 
could be accomplished in an orderly fashion in September 
but that the February deadline would lead to "havoc." The 
Supreme Court wasted little time in rejecting Kirk's 
petition; it ruled the same day that public schools 
attended by about 300,000 students in five southern states,
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including Florida, desegregate by the ordered deadline.
"The courts apparently don't care about the education of 
children," Kirk claimed, only about the "social 
mechanics.1,18
Governor Kirk's last minute appeal to the Supreme 
Court may have struck a resonant chord with some, but his 
actions did not impress everyone. An editorial in the 
Tallahassee Democrat contended that intervention by the 
state came much too late. Many school board members from 
the capital county of Leon, after agonizing for weeks over 
the threatened desegregation plan, resented the governor's 
political grandstanding. "Big deal," said one school board 
member of Kirk's actions. Another, criticizing both the 
governor and the Commissioner of Education, Floyd 
Christian, claimed that: "Neither Kirk nor Christian has 
ever gone to the press and said, look folks, the schools 
are in a bad situation. We have been left dangling without 
any advice or help on an overall plan."19
Others criticized the governor's actions for different 
reasons. Two of the state's top black leaders tore into 
Kirk for asking for the delay. Reverend C. K. Steele, of 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, characterized 
the governor's actions as a "ridiculous" stand against 
defenseless black children. Steele also called Kirk a 
political opportunist who thought he could get some 
political mileage out of the controversy. The Reverend
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Joel Atkins, president of the Florida NAACP, in a flurry of 
mixed metaphors, accused Kirk of "shouldering up to the 
segregationists. He's changing colors like a lizard, . . . 
playing political football with the rights of black 
people." Atkins admitted that busing students was a great 
expense for the state but reminded Floridians that the dual 
segregated system that had operated in the state for years 
had also been expensive. "Governor Kirk is trying to pull 
a farce over on the court when he says that this instant 
desegregation will break Florida," concluded Atkins. "Here 
we are nearly sixteen years after the Supreme Court's 
original ruling on desegregation . . . and it seems to me 
mighty absurd that he should be asking for more time to do 
it."20
Those directly involved with the implementation of 
desegregation expressed opinions ranging from resigned 
acceptance to adamant disapproval. "The fact is that we 
must either accept it or see our schools collapse," said 
the education commissioner. The legislature considered 
calling a special session in order to allocate funds to 
cover the immediate reassignment of students and teachers 
to meet the deadline. The Leon County School Board 
unanimously passed a strongly worded resolution protesting 
the court ordered deadline and sent it as an urgent message 
to Congress. The resolution called the court's action 
"arbitrary, unreasonable and unrealistic" contending that
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the mandate would "have disastrous consequences to the 
public school system . . .  in uprooting students, faculty 
and equipment. "21
Students and teachers also had mixed opinions about 
the moves. Many expressed concern about integration's 
effect on student councils, clubs, sports, and friends. "I 
think it stinks," said one ninth grader. "My girlfriend 
will have to stay here and I'll be moved." Another student 
chimed in that sports were "going to be goofed up." One 
girl worried about moving students into the varying quality 
of curriculums at different schools. "They're doing it so 
Negroes can learn as much as we are," responded one eighth 
grade girl. Another eighth grade girl from an all black 
school wanted white students to come to her school. "If we 
can go to all white schools then they can come here," she 
reasoned. But a boy from the same school did not like it. 
"If white boys come here, they're going to want to 
participate in sports. It's going to mess things up." The 
principal of the same black school seemed more optimistic. 
"I think we can do it," he said, "the attitude here seems 
to be that whatever the School Board comes up with, we'll 
do our best to make it work." Another teacher from 
Tallahassee contended that the school system could handle 
almost any situation. "I wish that we had accepted 
complete integration years ago, and had not waited to be
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forced to do so. If we were integrating under our own 
steam we wouldn't feel so bad about it."22
The immediate desegregation controversy seemed bound 
to occupy the center of the political arena in an election 
year. Hank Drake, political editor of Jacksonville's 
Florida Times Union, believed that interference with 
neighborhood schools coupled with the "fact that people 
don't like to be shoved around is why the desegregation 
decision may shape the course of politics in 1970 more than 
any other issue," wrote Drake. "Any politician who doubts 
it is a major issue is far out of touch with reality."23
Claude Kirk had a firm grip on political realities.
He believed that the desegregation issue offered him a real 
opportunity; even after his appeal to the Supreme Court 
failed, he continued to press the issue. After all, Kirk 
excelled at confrontation and here was a chance to take on 
the federal government. On January 19, Kirk threatened to 
suspend county school officials who followed the orders of 
the Supreme Court and implemented desegregation plans 
during the 1969-70 school year. While maintaining that he 
was not defying the court or "standing in the schoolhouse 
door," Kirk again asked the court to reconsider its 
February l desegregation deadline order. Unlike the other 
four southern states included in the Supreme Court 
decision, Kirk argued, Florida had led the South in 
integration and racial progress. He urged the Court to
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give the state extra time to continue its orderly 
desegregation. "We are not defiant in Florida," Kirk said. 
"We are accomplishing integration, desegregation. The 
reason I am here today is to show that I am sincere." The 
state cabinet joined in the governor's defiance and passed 
a resolution that prohibited busing to achieve racial 
balance in schools ordered to desegregate. The general 
counsel for the state board of education maintained that 
there was no requirement in the Supreme Court order that 
pupils must be bused to achieve racial balance in the 
schools. The governor agreed wholeheartedly. "We can have 
complete resistance to forced busing and still be in 
compliance with the law of the land," Kirk reasoned.24
The education commissioner, however, disagreed. "I 
am strongly and unalterably opposed," declared Christian, 
"to any action that would place Florida and Florida's 
school personnel in violation of legal federal court 
orders." Christian accused Kirk of holding out "false 
hope" while "looking for votes." He was not the only one 
who objected to Kirk's actions. Marvin Davies, the state 
NAACP field secretary, wanted to put the governor in jail. 
David Cook, the associate editor of the Tallahassee 
Democrat. characterized the governor's actions as "a 
needless exercise in futility." Cook believed that Kirk 
might reap a political bonanza from the situation but that 
he had set himself up for a conflict with the court that he
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was sure to lose. "The court will prevail, no matter how 
wrong it is," Cook wrote. "It would be a shame, however, 
if [Kirk] has raised any false hopes of avoiding complete 
desegregation. That can't be stopped -- even by the master 
conf ronter of them all. "2S
Many Floridians not involved in politics also debated 
the desegregation deadline in letters written to the 
state's newspapers. One black parent wrote the Tallahassee 
Democrat that she had difficulty in regarding "the shouts 
of woe for the suddenly imposed deadline as anything but 
another 'last ditch' attempt at gathering public sentiment, 
so the 'delay' may persist as usual." A white woman 
contended that their duty as citizens required implementing 
integration plans ordered by the courts. "There is no 
looking back, there are no peaceful alternatives," she 
wrote. Another woman disagreed and urged parents to put 
pressure on their legislators to repeal state compulsory 
school attendance laws. "Then those parents (very few 
percentagewise) who actually want their children to attend 
racially mixed schools will have the privilege if such it 
can be called, of keeping right on with it." Some black 
parents advocated neighborhood schools as strongly as white 
parents. A black woman in Panama City expressed outrage at 
the massive reassignment of students. "We have rights too 
and they are being violated," she said. "We don't want our 
kids removed from schools close to home." Another letter
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writer seemed genuinely ambivalent about the controversy 
and wondered if "our government officials are really doing 
the will of any of the people in their efforts to bring 
about total integration." She pointed out that many black 
parents had protested the loudest when black schools were 
closed in order to integrate. One black parent believed 
that the current furor had been raised mostly by 
opportunistic politicians and racist parents. She 
empathized with the emotions of white parents who worried 
about the welfare of their children. "We black parents 
understand only too well . . . but until the Supreme Court 
began to listen to our pleas, we just suffered, hoped, and 
prayed. "26
As citizens debated, Governor Kirk dug in his heels. 
He again threatened to suspend county officials who 
implemented court ordered desegregation plans. The Leon 
County school board attorney, Graham Carothers, pointed to 
the difficult position in which Kirk's order put a school 
board. If the governor went through with his threat, he 
would "place the board in the position of having to choose 
between the risk of being in contempt of court . . .  or 
being subject to removal by the governor," Carothers said. 
State senator Frederick Karl of Daytona Beach also worried 
about the school board's predicament. Karl, chairman of 
the committee that acted on all gubernatorial suspensions,
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said that school officials would be placed in an "untenable 
position" should the Kirk order be implemented.27
Kirk maintained that the effect of his threatened 
suspension of school board members would put him "in 
between the Supreme Court and the boards." A few days 
later the governor said that he would be willing to go to 
jail to prevent "forced busing" in Florida schools. Kirk 
asserted that such a jailing would be "for a philosophical 
cause, just as our prisoners in Vietnam are in jail for a 
philosophical cause." The governor's legal aide, Gerald 
Mager, blasted the Leon County school board for "abdicating 
its responsibilities to the children" by "throwing in the 
towel" on the February integration order. Mager said he 
was "shocked and surprised" that the board had not gone 
back to the court to appeal the present order. The Leon 
County school board attorney answered Mager's attack: "I
am frankly appalled at the irrational statement attributed 
to the Governor's legal aide." The attorney labeled the 
free legal advice as "obviously politically inspired" and 
"repugnant to an orderly solution of legal problems."28
One week before the February 1, deadline, Kirk filed 
another suit requesting that the Supreme Court establish a 
national standard for a unitary school system and direct 
HEW secretary Robert Finch to apply these uniform 
guidelines in funding for education. "We are going to be 
in compliance by September 1," said Kirk. "We don't want
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to see our tax dollars shipped off to other states which 
are not in compliance." Kirk also blamed Education 
Commissioner Floyd Christian for his inactivity, labeling 
him "about as useful as hip pockets on a hog." Kirk 
reasoned that Christian "implied support of forced busing 
by doing nothing." Christian responded to Kirk's statement 
by contending that the governor had decided to cash in 
politically on the emotions generated by the recent Supreme 
Court decision.29 Others believed the governor's anti­
busing stand coupled with his promises to go to jail rather 
than succumb to pressure from the courts had made him 
unbeatable in his bid for reelection. "It's got him 
elected," declared one Democrat. Another political 
observer wrote in the Florida Times Union that people out 
in the hinterlands believed that at least the governor 
tried to do something. "That is what they will be reminded 
of and remember in the fall when most of the court ordered 
mixing plans take effect and the election campaigns are 
under way."30 It seemed obvious that Kirk sought to
steer his ship of state into the channel of public opinion. 
One political observer writing in the St. Petersburg Times 
contended that Kirk had solidified his position among the 
racists of the state. "And yet, in furtherance of his 
attempt to be all things to all men as election time creeps 
near," wrote Martin Dyckman, "the governor insists he is no 
segregationist." The whole crisis, Dyckman believed,
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seemed designed to bolster Kirk's chances for reelection. 
Kirk had little chance of going to jail, but the mere 
threat of martyrdom would bolster his chances in November. 
Two counties had already gained delays from district courts 
and only two other counties were directly under court order 
to desegregate in February. The chances, therefore, seemed 
favorable that some sort of delay would occur and allow the 
governor to claim his tactics had succeeded.31
A need to court conservatives undoubtedly motivated 
Kirk's attempt to defy federal orders to desegregate. Drug 
store chain millionaire Jack Eckerd, who had banned girlie 
magazines from his stores, sought to capture the Republican 
nomination by branding Kirk a liberal. "This anti-busing 
gives [Kirk] a handle to latch onto conservatism," one 
official at the Capitol said. "He can go into those 
counties Eckerd may have run strong in and they'll remember 
busing, not pornography, in September." Kirk's actions 
also helped propel him ahead of his leading Democratic 
challenger. Attorney General Faircloth failed to fight the 
desegregation deadline through the courts, while the 
governor twice flew to Washington to present petitions 
aimed at delay. Asked if the attorney general should have 
filed those suits, Kirk replied: "If you have an attorney 
general, yes." Even Reubin Askew agreed that Kirk had 
assumed the role that the state's chief legal officer had 
defaulted.32
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Opinion varied as to the governor's political 
motivations and actions. One legislator called Kirk a 
"white-collar Wallace," while another denied that the 
governor was a racist. "He's a political opportunist . . . 
earning himself a lot of credits with people who don't read 
below the third or fourth paragraph of a news story."
Lloyd Hagaman, one of Kirk's top aides, believed that the 
electorate approved of the governor's willingness to take 
action. "We may not be popular with the politicians," 
Hagaman asserted, "but we are with the people." Not all 
the people agreed. Spicer Gordon, a black activist in 
Tallahassee, objected to Kirk's suggestion that black 
parents did not want their children bused because he was 
"for it 101 per cent." What galled Gordon about Kirk was 
that he talked "on one side of his mouth about law and 
order and out of the other about defying the court. There 
ain't gonna be many black folks voting for him."33
Kirk's efforts to sway the court and gain more time 
for the desegregation plan failed. In a unanimous 
decision, the Court denied Kirk's plea for a rehearing.
"The governor saw this as an opportunity to capitalize on 
an emotional situation for his own political advantage," 
said Floyd Christian, "and it has backfired." Indeed, 
Kirk's failure came as no surprise. An editorial in the 
Tallahassee Democrat admitted that the Supreme Court had 
done some strange things in the past, "but considering
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appeals for rehearing by people who weren't party to the 
litigation would be a little too much for it."34
Kirk's exercise in futility continued when he issued 
the executive order he had been threatening in Volusia and 
Manatee Counties. The order barred student transfers and 
busing to accomplish school desegregation. The main issue 
was busing according to Gerald Mager, Kirk's legal advisor. 
"The issue in Volusia, the issue in Manatee, the issue 
everywhere we've been involved has been busing." Some 
critics countered that the issue involved the governor's 
reelection. "He has preferred to publicly fight with 
teachers, with the commissioner of education, and now with 
school boards and superintendents, in order to perpetuate 
himself in office," said Wally Johnson, executive secretary 
of the Florida Education Association. Ray Dunne, Volusia 
county school superintendent, ordered by a federal district 
judge to transfer 2,800 students and 145 teachers to 
accomplish school desegregation, faced contempt charges if 
he did not comply and firing from the governor if he did. 
"I'm caught between the proverbial rock and hard place." 
Attorney General Faircloth informed school officials that 
federal orders outranked Kirk's executive orders and 
advised them to obey the court. "Those direct orders may 
not be agreeable to us," wrote Faircloth, "but they are of 
superior rank in our system of jurisprudence -- under our 
government of laws."35
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Kirk faltered in carrying out his threat to fire the 
school board members, and criticism poured in from all 
sides. Democratic Representative Jerome Pratt castigated 
the governor for playing politics with the school issue. 
Pratt called Kirk's failure to call the legislature into a 
special session to deal with the matter and his refusal to 
meet with other southern governors protesting forced busing 
"unexcusable." Although Pratt had previously promised to 
support Kirk for reelection, he now accused Kirk of 
"backing water" because he did not carry out his threat to 
suspend school board officials who went through with court- 
ordered busing. Pratt said that he had "no alternative" 
but to believe that Kirk acted to gain votes and not to 
solve the problems. Even Kirk's pastor admonished the 
governor. The busing issue that the governor played upon 
was "a phony issue," the rector of St. John's Episcopal 
church told his congregation. "It ought to be known that 
we've been busing for years. It's our racism that is the 
problem. . . . Everybody in town, the politicians, the 
newspapers and everyone, would have us think that is not 
the problem, but it is." After the service the minister 
pointed out that the governor's mansion was only a few 
blocks from a predominantly black public school, but that 
Kirk's daughter attended another school. The Florida field 
director of the NAACP labeled Kirk's stand against busing 
as that of a bigot and blamed the violence that accompanied
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the desegregation process in several schools on the state's 
"stinking leadership."36
Kirk had experienced the hazards of playing politics 
with the volatile busing issue, but he had not yet learned 
his lesson. In April the culmination of Kirk's stand 
against busing came in Manatee County. After the Volusia 
county warm-up, some feared that Kirk would do something 
drastic. U.S. District Judge Benjamin Krentzman had 
ordered an integration plan in Manatee that would have 
reorganized its busing patterns so as to eliminate token 
integration and provide the same 80-20 white-black ratio in 
its schools as prevailed among students in the county. On 
April 2, Education Commissioner Floyd Christian wrote to 
Kirk: "I believe when we have exhausted all our legal 
remedies and although we are not happy with the Court 
decision, we are left no other choices but to obey the law.
. . . I trust that in the exercise of your executive power, 
you will not take any precipitous action in attempting to 
remove the School Board members and Superintendent for 
their compliance with the Federal Court Order." Christian 
had good reason for concern. Over the next week not only 
Florida, but the entire nation watched the governor 
challenge the federal judiciary. The New York Times 
carried the story on page one for seven days, while the 
national television news reported it among their top 
stories for most of the week.37
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On April 6, after the Supreme Court had denied a 
delay, Kirk suspended the Manatee County school board and 
placed the school system "under the trusteeship and 
custodial supervision of the Governor of the State of 
Florida." Calling the school officials "valiant, 
courageous and eminently qualified," Kirk maintained that 
the takeover would relieve officials from a position that 
would force them to implement an "educationally unsound and 
illegal" order. In his new role as superintendent, Kirk 
told a meeting of principals that he would stand between 
them and the courts "tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow." 
Manatee County school board Superintendent Jack Davidson 
challenged the suspension, saying that the sudden shift in 
plans would produce mass confusion in the schools. "It's 
about time everyone took their hands off our school system, 
Judge Krentzman, Governor Kirk and everyone, and let us get 
on with the business of educating our children."38
The next day Judge Krentzman ordered Kirk to step down 
immediately as head of the school board and to appear in 
court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. 
Calling the order "a horrible illegal act of forced 
busing," Kirk claimed that he had acted not in defiance of 
the court, but on behalf of the school children of Manatee 
County. "The only man who in any way is in defiance of the 
system of justice is Judge Ben Krentzman," Kirk said. "Do
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not confuse a lawful contest of sovereign authority with 
defiance of the courts," the governor told legislators.39
Many in Manatee County applauded Kirk's actions.
Crowds gathered at the school administration building that 
Kirk and his aides had commandeered. Some of them carried 
signs proclaiming: "Manatee County Loves Governor Kirk," "I 
Am Proud of my Governor," and "God Bless Governor Kirk." 
Comments from area residents also demonstrated support.
"It is very refreshing to find someone as high in 
government," one radio caller said of Kirk, "who has enough 
guts to take a stand and hold to it." Manatee County 
Commission Chairman L.H. "Bud" Fortson declared: "People 
all over the country should start standing up to the 
courts. This numbers game is ridiculous and is unfair to 
the taxpayers, the children and everyone." One of the 
suspended school board members resigned and published a 
letter supporting the governor and criticizing the federal 
courts; another member came to the administration building 
to join in the demonstration of local support. The mayor 
of Brandenton, Manatee's county seat, also backed the 
governor's actions. "I certainly don't favor forced busing 
and I think the man (Kirk) is acting in the best way he 
can," declared the mayor. One telling comment came from a 
resident who provided this bit of hyperbole: "If Claude 
Kirk tells the voters of Manatee County he is running for 
God, he would get 95 percent of the vote." One mother who
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sought out newsmen to express her opinion, put the issue 
simply: "Should little kids be bused eight to twelve miles
to school or should they go to school in their own 
neighborhoods?" A group of women from local PTA groups 
agreed. "The majority of the people are not against 
integration of the schools," said Mrs. Robert Jones. "But 
we are against forced busing."40
The national and local press did not join in the 
praise offered by many of the Manatee County residents. 
Newsweek reminded readers of Orval Faubus, Ross Barnett, 
George Wallace and other southern segregationist governors 
of the past who had sought to capitalize on the emotional 
issue of integration. Defiance had never succeeded in 
stopping integration nor had it ever failed to make a hero 
of the governor. Even so, Newsweek contended, the tactic 
had never been "trotted out with such heedless opportunism 
as it was in Manatee County, Florida." Even Manatee's 
local paper, the Brandenton Herald criticized the 
governor's actions. The St. Petersburg Times. called 
Kirk's actions "totally reprehensible." In a withering 
attack on Kirk, the paper claimed that previous defiant 
southern governors had at least believed in their cause. 
"When Kirk, who is not a racist, defies the court out of 
personal political ambition, both the governor's office and 
Florida's tradition for moderation are disgraced." The 
Tallahassee Democrat, conceding that Kirk's stand might win
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him some votes in November, worried about "some alarming 
points of power that go beyond popularity." The paper 
editorialized that tyranny usually began with good 
intentions but that they must "hew to the Constitution and 
law. Anything else leads to anarchy, which eventually 
requires dictatorship."41
Attorney General Paircloth labeled the suspensions 
"ineffective," declaring that Kirk's actions had "opened a 
legal barrel of snakes." Reubin Askew called the 
suspension order "legally insufficient" and "sheer 
demagoguery." Kirk, he said, "has once again made himself 
part of the problem rather than seeking to be part of the 
solution." Stanley Tait, a Democratic candidate for 
secretary of state, labeled Governor Kirk a white panther. 
"He is displaying the same contempt for the courts as Rap 
Brown, SDS, the Chicago eight and other radicals who 
espouse the philosophy that if you don't like a certain law 
you don't have to obey it," Tait said. Although Tait 
admitted he agreed that the court order protested by Kirk 
was "stupid," he also maintained that Kirk's actions only 
further disrupted the school system. And Rev. Joel Atkins, 
state NAACP president, relished the possibility of having 
the governor jailed. "It looks like he has gone a little 
too far this time."42
Kirk went even farther. Judge Krentzman ordered local 
officials to take back control of the Manatee County school
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board and ignore any orders to the contrary by the 
governor. Kirk maintained that he had interceded in 
Manatee County in order to bring the issue of busing before 
the Supreme Court. The governor criticized newsmen and 
"political pantywaists," who accused him of defiance of 
court ordered desegregation. "Thwarting the courts?" Kirk 
asked rhetorically. "I find myself staring in wide-eyed 
disbelief at so ludicrous a charge. If I am guilty of any 
sort of defiance, it comes only in the nature of defiance 
of a vicious and illegal concept which, stripped of all its 
liberal camouflage, is nothing more than a form of cruel 
and unusual punishment heaped upon innocent children."
Kirk went on to say that the state could not "run for 
cover" every time there was a confrontation with the 
federal government on the question of sovereignty.'*3
The executive branch weighed in with its opinion on 
the question. The Justice Department said that they would 
cooperate with the federal court in enforcing the 
desegregation order. But the governor's actions placed the 
President in a precarious position. In developing its so- 
called southern strategy, the Nixon administration had 
sought to encumber the judiciary with the onus of 
desegregation. Nixon had publicly opposed school 
desegregation that required busing at the expense of 
neighborhood schools; Kirk's defiance placed the president 
in the position of sending in federal marshals to enforce
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just such an order. And yet, Nixon faced severe criticism 
for hypocrisy if he ignored Kirk's actions. Representative 
Abner Mikva of Illinois reminded the House that during the 
1968 presidential campaign Richard Nixon delivered 
impassioned speeches on how his administration would 
provide vigorous law enforcement. "Where is the President 
now when a governor of his own political party openly and 
shamelessly flouts the orders of a federal court," Mikva 
asked. The St. Petersburg Times pointed to the same 
contradiction in an editorial saying that Kirk's actions 
had "exposed the danger which the Nixon Administration's 
'southern strategy' poses for the law of the land. The 
President's silence before such open defiance by a governor 
hardly discourages rebellion by others."44 The national 
press continued to chide the governor and those who would 
resist desegregation. "The extent of the mischief created 
by the architects of the Administration's 'Southern 
strategy," wrote the New York Times, "can well be gauged 
from the outrageous ouster of the Manatee County school 
authorities by Governor Kirk of Florida." The Wall Street 
Journal also blamed the administration's lack of commitment 
for encouraging Governor Kirk's actions. "Southern 
segregationist leaders say Washington's slackening of past 
efforts to integrate schools has heartened them greatly," 
the paper wrote. "They see new hope in reasserting old 
attitudes of fervent resistance, attitudes that in the past
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couple of years had been abandoned as futile." Time 
magazine noted the Nixon administration's failure to speak 
with one voice. Noting that the Department of Justice had 
filed a friend of court brief in the Charlotte - 
Mecklenburg County desegregation case suggesting that a 
federal judge had committed "an abuse of discretion" in 
ordering busing to achieve desegregation. "This kind of 
undercutting of the federal courts could make it open 
season for would-be tree shakers all over the South," wrote 
Time.45
On Wednesday Kirk repeated his defiance of the federal 
district judge by again ousting the Manatee school board 
reinstated the day before by the judge. The governor said 
that he was suspending the school board for "malfeasance 
and misfeasance" since they had agreed to accept an 
"illegal" integration plan that would require forced 
busing.46
Kirk ordered aides and sheriff's deputies to take 
control of the school board offices. Judge Krentzman 
ordered federal marshals to arrest them. The governor 
threatened that marshals would be fired upon if they 
attempted to take control of the schools. When the 
marshals arrived they found the Manatee County sheriff, 
several deputies, and about a dozen state troopers in riot 
gear forming a barricade outside the superintendent's 
office, where the governor's aides had locked themselves in
178
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
and refused to come out. The sheriff told the marshals 
that the governor had ordered his men to use force to 
prevent them from taking anyone from the building. The 
marshals served arrest warrants, but took no prisoners, 
saying they considered the aides, the sheriff and his 
deputies under arrest even though they were not actually in 
custody. U.S. Attorney John Briggs promised that the 
federal government would take control of the Manatee County 
schools even if force were required. Late that afternoon 
Governor Kirk, surrounded by about seventy policemen, 
arrived at the school administration building promising 
newsmen: "Ain't nobody going to lay a hand on Claude Jr. 
Anybody who lays a glove on a sovereign is committing an 
illegal act. There is nobody who can bodily force the head 
of a sovereign state into court."47
Several high level administration officials tried to 
reason with the governor. Attorney General John Mitchell 
as well as the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
repeatedly implored Kirk to stop his defiance. But Kirk 
remained unmoved. "We will resist force with force, effort 
with effort." Kirk's special attorney, former governor 
Millard Caldwell, hinted that Kirk might refuse to appear 
before Judge Krenzman as ordered. Caldwell said that Kirk 
might say that a dispute between a governor and a federal 
court could only be heard by the Supreme Court. And Kirk 
himself challenged Judge Krentzman's authority to order the
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head of a sovereign state to appear personally. "Whoever 
wants to arrest the governor must rassle the governor," 
warned Kirk. "One Marine can beat 100 others -- even an old 
Marine like me."48
On Friday Kirk warned of a "grave danger of loss of 
life," among both federal and state officials involved in 
the Manatee confrontation. In an interview in the school 
superintendent's office the governor said that he did not 
intend to release control of the school system until the 
Supreme Court ruled on the legality of forced busing and 
that he would use force if necessary. "I am a peaceful 
man," he said, "but we propose to stand firm." Shortly 
thereafter Kirk allowed federal marshals past his eighty 
guards to serve subpoenas on nine of his aides. "If this 
is the way to get to the Supreme Court, I'll give them 
every member of my staff. I'll give them everything." 
Meanwhile during a hearing before Judge Krentzman, Lloyd 
Hagaman, Kirk's senior assistant, broke into tears and sobs 
as he reaffirmed his intention to obey the governor rather 
than the court. "I don't want to disobey the court order, 
but I have to stand by my governor."49
It would be tough to stand by Governor Kirk. The next 
day Judge Krentzman, finding Kirk guilty of contempt, 
ordered the governor to stop disobeying his school 
desegregation orders or pay a fine of $10,000 a day. 
Krentzman rejected Kirk's contention that there had been a
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violation of the principle of separation of powers. The 
judge ruled that the conflict was between the judiciary of 
the federal government and the executive branch of a state 
government, and the precedents were clear that the "state 
government must yield." The judge also pointed out that 
the contempt order placed Kirk in the company of earlier 
southern governors who had defied the courts concerning 
desegregation. All of whom eventually yielded to federal 
authority.50
"The fun and games is over," said C.A. Butler, chief 
of field operations for the U.S. Marshal Service. On 
Sunday evening Kirk promised to return control of the 
schools to the Manatee County school board and direct its 
officials to put the court-ordered integration plan into 
effect. "Basically, Florida and the Department of Justice 
are in agreement," said Kirk. "We agree the solutions to 
our problems must lie in the duly constituted courts." 
However, Kirk said that he had received a promise from the 
Department of Justice that it would join with the governor 
in an appeal of the Manatee school plan. "Disobeying a 
District Court and paying a $10,000-a-day fine is not going 
to solve anything," the governor said. "If I thought that 
or going to jail would do so, I would be in that jail."51
Although Kirk did not say who in the Justice 
Department had given him promises concerning the Manatee 
case, some in the department clearly had not been party to
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those assurances. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold charged 
in a memorandum filed with the Supreme Court that "any 
confrontation between the Governor and the United States 
would be entirely of his own making." Griswold opposed 
Governor Kirk's effort to remove the Manatee County school 
case immediately to the Supreme Court, without going 
through the normal appellate steps. "It is far from clear 
that the Governor speaks authentically for the state" 
Griswold said of Kirk's efforts to block enforcement of the 
lower court's order. Griswold concluded that the governor 
was "in a poor posture" to invoke the Supreme Court's 
discretion to speed up its consideration of the case. "It 
is inadmissible that any officer -- high or low -- should 
assume the stance that he will not obey the order of any 
court but this Court," Griswold wrote.52
Florida newspapers weighed in with their opinions.
The Miami Herald called for Kirk's impeachment.
"Megalomania has no place in a state house," the paper 
contended. Kirk was "no longer a joke," but "a dangerous 
and intolerable public nuisance." The Tampa Tribune 
believed the court order unreasonable, but excoriated the 
governor for his defiance. "He has recklessly scattered 
coals of emotion in a community already dry and brittle 
from the hot winds of racial controversy," the paper said. 
"A court order must be respected whether it be directed 
against a Governor or a Black Panther. Otherwise,
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government falters and no man's rights are secure." The 
Orlando Sentinel assessed Kirk's actions more favorably.
The courts and the Congress had treated the South unfairly, 
according to the Orlando paper, and Kirk asked only for 
equality in integration practices for the South. The 
Tallahassee Democrat seemed more ambivalent. The paper 
contended that the nation needed a ruling on the forced 
busing issue and conceded that if the governor's action 
secured one he would be performing a service for schools 
all over the country. "However, we must question his 
method for the excesses of state constitutional authority 
it seems he has indulged. We can't help but believe that 
the issue of forced busing was moving toward resolution in 
the courts and federal administrative agencies without the 
approach of a bull in a china shop." The St. Petersburg 
Times. in an editorial entitled "Tragedy for Florida," said 
that the "defiant and erratic conduct" of the governor had 
"brought embarrassment and danger" to the state. "Across 
the nation have gone reports of Florida's governor defying 
law, threatening to 'resist force with force,' and creating 
turmoil in the school system." The Florida Times Union 
believed the governor and federal government should settle 
their differences in a courtroom rather than the 
schoolroom. "The only certainty at the moment is that true 
justice in this difficult situation can only be hoped for 
by bringing the controversy out of the discredited
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interposition-cum-confrontation procedure and letting the 
slow-turning wheels of justice grind."53
Citizens near and far also reacted to Kirk's defiance. 
In a Republican poll taken in areas of the state expected 
to provide seventy-five percent of the Republican vote in 
the upcoming primary, reaction was evenly split between 
those who approved of the governor's recent actions and 
those who either disapproved or had mixed reactions. In 
Kirk's gubernatorial papers boxes of incoming letters 
concerning the governor's busing stand reflect 
overwhelmingly favorable reactions, but the large majority 
of these letters came from outside the state; most of the 
letters from Floridians expressed disapproval of Kirk's 
actions. One woman from Key West wrote that even though 
she was a Republican and opposed forced busing she was 
ashamed of the governor and believed him to be an 
egomaniac, "a red-neck racist, and a grandstanding show- 
off." Eight school teachers from Lake Worth let the 
governor know that his actions disturbed them as did eight 
students from Brandenton in Manatee County. One 
Tallahassee woman wrote that it was inexcusable for a 
governor to defy a federal court order. She expressed 
concern about law and order in America and believed that 
Kirk set a bad example. One man from Eustis believed that 
Kirk should not only be put in jail but itrpeached. "Your 
need for political gain has made thoughtful citizens lose
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respect for you and has made us ashamed of our state," he 
wrote. "You may have gained the vote of die-hard 
segregationists who do not recognize the winds of change 
but you have certainly lost my vote -- and I hope the vote 
of many others who believe in responsible leadership." One 
out-of-stater warned the governor that if he carried out 
his defiance of the court that "citizens of your state will 
only obey the laws they find agreeable." One Floridian 
writing to the Tallahassee Democrat even wondered about the 
governor's sanity. "Has our Governor gone mad? In twice 
defying a federal court order, and allowing his agents to 
make threats of armed violence against marshals, Kirk has 
taken a giant step towards destroying the rule of law in 
this country."54
Kirk remained unrepentant. In assessing why he 
yielded to the contempt citation, Kirk maintained that he 
knew from the beginning that he "could only go so far" in 
attempting to block the court-ordered desegregation plan in 
Manatee County. He knew he could "go up to the point of 
force, but not beyond." Kirk called the students and 
parents of Manatee the "front line soldiers." If they 
"stick with it," he asserted, "and if we do our job in the 
courts, forced busing will fade away and die."55
Kirk's actions alienated many Floridians who believed 
that an effort to g a m e r  political favor had inspired his 
defiance, and his lack of resolve destroyed whatever
185
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electoral support he may have built among die-hard 
segregationists during the school takeover in Manatee.
"Our Governor Kirk has bent his knee and made peace with 
the federal judiciary without reaching his stated goal," 
wrote the Tallahassee Democrat. "His futile foray into 
Manatee county could be his undoing as Governor." Kirk's 
opponent for the Republican gubernatorial nomination, Jack 
Eckerd, charged that Kirk "deserted the parents and the 
children of Manatee County after bolstering their hopes 
with cynical, false promises and flamboyant political 
grandstanding." Another GOP challenger, Skip Bafalis, who 
had sought to initiate a constitutional amendment 
preventing forced busing, also criticized Kirk's tactics.
"I don't think Governor Kirk has done anything positive at 
all," he said. "I think he was grandstanding. He stood in 
the door of the Supreme Court and shook his fist." Manatee 
representative, Jerome Pratt, who had been cheering Kirk's 
action before the governor bowed to the federal court 
order, now called Kirk a "political hack" who had "just 
chickened out." Kirk's actions were "the most colossal, 
stupendous political hypocrisy I have ever seen displayed 
by a political personage, " Pratt declared.56
On Tuesday, April 14, the day after Kirk had abandoned 
his position as school board superintendent, Manatee 
County's desegregation plan went into effect. Buses rolled 
on double shifts to accommodate the additional student
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load. Eleven white women marched outside the school board 
building carrying signs that read: "Who runs Florida -- 
Kirk or Krentzman," and "Don't Bus, Join Us." About a 
dozen black parents also gathered at a bus stop to 
demonstrate their objections to the busing plan. But by 
all accounts the school opening went smoothly with 
absenteeism only slightly higher than normal. Reinstated 
superintendent Jack Davidson, speaking from his office as 
workers removed a battery of telephones Kirk had installed 
the week before, characterized the transition as "really 
going very smoothly. . . .  We still have a handful of 
mothers who show up every afternoon," Davidson said of 
those protesting the busing. "The people still don't like 
forced busing," he admitted. "I don't like it either, but 
the great majority of our people agree that the place to 
settle the question is in the courts, not the streets."57
The superintendent's assessment aptly characterized 
the feelings of most Floridians. Governor Kirk's defiance 
seemed steeped in political opportunism and reaffirmed the 
main criticism of his administration: confrontation without 
recourse to remedy. Kirk believed he could ride the 
irresistible force of public resentment over busing, but he 
met the immovable object of federally court ordered 
desegregation. Kirk played out the old politics of race in 
April, before the campaign really began. This allowed the 
other candidates to scand back and see if defiance could
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translate into votes without participating in the political 
melee of school integration. They could criticize Kirk's 
continuing confrontational tactics without taking a firm 
stance on busing. Kirk's actions proved the futility of 
defiance. Not only did he fail in his avowed purpose of 
preventing court-ordered busing, he did not gain 
significant support from voters who overwhelmingly 
disapproved of busing.
The political efficacy of the busing issue had died at 
Manatee, but Kirk attempted to revive it and place it at 
the center of his bid for re-election. Florida school 
children were being bused around "like pawns in an insane 
numbers game played by a handful of irrational federal 
judges," Kirk charged. To reinforce his point, Kirk sought 
and received the backing of Vice-President Spiro Agnew. In 
a campaign swing through Florida Agnew labelled Kirk an 
"action-oriented . . . stand-up governor." The vice- 
president praised Kirk's defiance in the Manatee school 
desegregation incident, saying that Kirk "did a good job 
and served a very useful purpose in bringing the situation 
to the attention of the people and prodding court action." 
Kirk agreed. In a televised discussion on the issues, Kirk 
blamed a "permissive liberal philosophy" for implementation 
of compulsory busing of school children to achieve racial 
balance. Every week Kirk reminded voters that he had not 
given up in his defiance of court ordered desegregation.
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When the Internal Revenue Service announced that they would 
do away with the tax exempt status for private schools,
Kirk said he would be the number one defender of those 
schools, many of which had been established to avoid racial 
integration. And Kirk sought to link tax exemption of 
private schools with his favorite topic, busing. Kirk 
claimed victory in his Manatee County public school 
desegregation fight and said he would not let private 
schools be picked off by federal agencies. "We have 
stopped busing in its tracks, and we are winning in Manatee 
whether you read about it or not." Kirk said he would call 
a seminar for the heads of private schools throughout the 
state to devise a course of action. Kirk also promised 
that Florida would join any school district in suits 
fighting what Kirk called "forced busing." Kirk's leading 
Republican opponent, Jack Eckerd accused the governor of 
plotting "the most desperate, most reckless, most dangerous 
confrontation of his show biz career." Everyone was 
against forced busing, Eckerd contended. "Do we solve it 
or do we exploit it?"50
No matter how hard Kirk tried to focus the campaign on 
an issue of his own choosing, the other GOP candidates 
aimed their criticism at Kirk himself. Eckerd said he 
would use Kirk's record, his promises compared to his 
performance, to bring down the governor. Kirk was a liar 
and a desperate man who was "stooping to lies and vicious
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character assassinations in an attempt to save his own 
political hide," Eckerd charged. Skip Bafalis believed 
that Florida had become the laughing stock of the country- 
under Kirk and charged that re-nominating the incumbent 
would guarantee a victory for the Democrats in November 
because the governor had "unified the Democrats on a single 
issue: Kirk himself." His adversaries not only made public 
statements criticizing the governor, they also financed a 
political biography meant to embarrass him. Published in 
the midst of the primary campaign, the 124 page paperback 
hatchet job entitled Claude Kirk. Man and Myth contended 
that Kirk was a "bush-league Huey Long" whose lifestyle was 
always "one jump ahead of his income." Concerning Kirk's 
political intrigues in Manatee County and in the Carswell 
senate candidacy, the book stated: "In one instance he had 
played politics with human life, playing the school bully 
and then chickened out. In the second, he had used a man's 
reputation in an attempt to pull his own political 
chestnuts out of the fire."*9
Whether he liked it or not, Kirk, rather than his 
opponents or the issue of busing, had become the focal 
point of the campaign. Two weeks before the first primary 
most voters appeared apathetic and undecided about 
gubernatorial candidates with the major exception of Kirk. 
One voter said the governor was "too much of a showman. I 
voted for him last time but never again." Another said he
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liked Kirk's frankness and boldness.” Even bumper stickers 
reflected the electorate's opinions of the governor. One 
stated: "Kirk for Governor," while another proclaimed: 
"Happiness is a New Governor." One group calling itself 
the "Conservative Citizens Committee" mounted a crusade to 
defeat the governor because he was too liberal. Major 
Holbrook Scott, a longtime GOP activist and chair of 
"Veterans for Kirk" in 1966, headed the group. Scott 
called Kirk "the most extravagant, wasteful spendthrift of 
any governor in the history of Florida." And Scott 
believed the incumbent had "been completely disloyal to the 
Republican party and the independent Democrats who elected 
him." The group's avowed purpose was to advise the voters 
which candidates were truly conservative and which were 
liberal, but Scott readily conceded that what he was really 
interested in was "defeating Claude Kirk." Thomas Whol, a 
banker, builder and Kirk appointee to a county planning 
board announced he would head the Eckerd campaign in his 
county. "I'm disappointed in Governor Kirk," Whol said. 
"Its nice to have a flamboyant Governor, but there comes a 
time for responsible leadership."60
While Kirk suffered at the hands of his own party, 
Democrats began to gear up for their challenge of the 
Republican incumbent. While several well established 
political leaders sought to secure their party's 
nomination, one obscure Democrat challenged Kirk directly
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and ignored the Democratic frontrunners. Reubin O'Donovan 
Askew believed there was an urgent need for responsible 
leadership in Florida. Kirk had gained the chief 
executive's office in 1966 because many Democrats had hoped 
to find new leadership but instead got government by 
impulse and antics, Askew told people. "I think the people 
are ready for a new leadership, keyed to results rather 
than who gets the credit." Although admitting that he did 
not have all the answers to the problems facing the state, 
Askew promised to work hard and apply all of his "training, 
experience and ability to develop a meaningful partnership 
with the people in an earnest attempt to find solutions." 
Askew had already earned a reputation as a hard-working 
legislator who shunned political expediency in favor of 
doing what he believed right. Even though Askew's remarks 
did not differ markedly from that of other politicians 
running for office, he delivered them with an air of 
believability. His ability to project sincerity, 
particularly over television, would serve him well in the 
1970 campaign.61
Askew was b o m  in Muscogee, Oklahoma, the last of six 
children. His father, an itinerant carpenter with a sixth 
grade education, left the family when Reubin was bom. At 
the age of eight his mother moved with the children to 
Pensacola, Florida, where she had been raised, and took a 
job as a hotel maid. Reubin's first job was going door-to-
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door taking orders for pies and cakes his mother baked at
night. "Mother taught us to hold our heads high and work."
And Reubin's mother said of her youngest son that "he was 
the most determined boy I've ever seen, anything he did, he 
had to do perfectly, even if it was just cleaning the 
yard." Askew attended Florida State University, where he 
received a degree in public administration, and the 
University of Florida, where he earned a law degree. He 
served as a paratrooper in World War II and as an Air Force 
officer during the Korean conflict. Elected to the Florida 
Legislature in 1958 and again in 1960, he moved over to the 
senate in 1962 for the first of three terms, eventually
rising to become president pro tern of that body. He won
numerous legislative awards, was named one of the 
outstanding young men by the state Jaycees, and worked 
extensively on behalf of underprivileged and retarded 
children.62
Askew had also demonstrated that he belonged to a new 
breed of southern politician that shunned racial bigotry.
In 1951 while Askew served as student body president at 
Florida State, the university prevented an integrated 
student delegation from colleges around the state from 
holding a meeting on that segregated campus. Askew led a 
protest and prepared a resolution that called upon the 
legislature to integrate all state graduate schools. Seven 
years later, during his first campaign for the legislature,
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a man called him a "niggerlover." Askew responded that yes 
that was true. "The difference between you and me is that 
I'm trying to overcome my prejudices and you're not." Even 
though his position seemed out of step with that of his 
constituents, he won election and reelection. "01' Rube 
[Askew's nickname] got some funny notions 'bout the 
colored, but you can't help respecting a man for saying 
what he thinks," remarked an old man from Pensacola. First 
elected to the legislature only four years after the Brown 
decision, Askew resisted efforts to close public schools 
rather than succumb to integration. "I guess because I was 
from Pensacola people just naturally expected I'd be part 
of the conservative bloc, but I took the position from the 
beginning that I'd never do anything to shut down schools," 
Askew said. "Without public education I never would have 
had any opportunities."63
In 1970 Askew decided to run for governor against very 
long odds. After losing their hold on power, Florida 
Democrats seemed unusually united behind the clear front- 
runner, Attorney General Earl Faircloth. In late April a 
poll in the Tampa - St. Petersburg area suggested Faircloth 
would win easily. Only four percent of those polled 
believed Askew could win the Democratic nomination. Askew, 
however, did not caitpaign as if Faircloth would capture the 
Democratic nomination. On the first of August Askew 
contended that the Democratic primary was wide open and
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that he could pose the greatest threat to the incumbent in 
the general election. "Democrats who want a change are 
going to vote for the man who has the best chance to beat 
Kirk," said Askew. Everyone did not agree with Askew's 
assessment. Even Askew's hometown newspaper, the Pensacola 
News-Journal. endorsed another Democrat. In am editorial 
the paper said senate president John Mathews was better 
qualified and more likely to capture the nomination than 
Askew. Most voters in North Florida, according to one 
paper there, believed Faircloth or Mathews would be in the 
Democratic runoff. But the paper noted that even though 
Reubin Askew was not well known, several voters commented 
that they were leaning toward him.64
Although few voters outside the Pensacola area knew of 
Askew, several political observers soon began to appreciate 
the potential of this young, attractive candidate. In a 
report on the Florida gubernatorial race dated 18 June 
1970, Harry Dent wrote that Kirk would likely win the 
Republican nomination and defeat any prospective Democratic 
challenger, but state representative Reubin Askew concerned 
him. Askew, Dent wrote, "seems to be the front-running 
conservative Democrat as Attorney General Faircloth has 
faltered." Oddly enough, the incumbent realized this 
before almost anyone else. When Askew resigned from the 
state senate to enter the gubernatorial race Kirk told him: 
"I hope the Democrats don't have sense enough to nominate
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you, you're the only one who can beat me." Indeed Kirk had 
hoped to run against almost any other Democratic 
candidate.65
Askew presented a sharp contrast to the incumbent 
governor. A self-described "non-smoking teetotaler and a 
Presbyterian elder," Askew's personality could not be 
described as flamboyant nor his rhetoric dramatic, but his 
honesty and sincerity came through. "I'm just glad to see 
a candidate have the guts to say what he thinks," one 
public official said. Askew's campaign differed from the 
norm. He sought to run a campaign steeped in optimism. 
Askew contended that he had broken all the political rules 
in his rise to a spot in the Democratic primary runoff.
"Its a new day, for the poorest and the wealthiest, for the 
black and the white. We've got to start talking about the 
things on which we agree, not our disagreements."66
Askew criticized the incumbent's record. Kirk let 
down all kinds of Floridians from citrus farmers to senior 
citizens, Askew charged; he failed to protect the 
environment or reduce crime. Askew emphasized the need for 
new leadership and financial responsibility. When 
Democratic candidates agreed on the inevitability of new 
taxes, Askew attacked them all. John Mathews, who proposed 
a grocery tax, became "Food Tax Jack." To accept Mathews 
plan was "just another way of saying that we're going to 
load more taxes on the middle and low income people and
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leave the special interests alone," said Askew. "When 
someone calls for a tax on groceries which feed our 
families, it is unfair and unthinkable." Askew railed 
against another candidate that favored a personal income 
tax and charged that the leading Democratic candidate's 
proposed increase in the capital stock tax would endanger 
small business. Instead of listening to consumers, Askew 
said, these politicians "are listening to and obeying the 
special interests which put money into their fat campaign 
treasuries -- and escape their fair share of the cost of 
government." A tax on corporate profits, Askew argued, 
would eliminate the need to increase the sales tax on 
groceries, medicine and utilities. The corporate tax would 
also eliminate the capital stock tax that Askew called 
unfair to business, and help fight the burgeoning problem 
of pollution in the state. This issue would serve Askew 
well. In recommending Askew for the Democratic nomination 
the St. Petersburg Times contended that "when many others 
were catering to prejudices, Askew was talking about tax 
reform. He has kept himself free of the entangling 
commitments that entwine Kirk."67
In the first Republican primary, held September 8,
Kirk led the field with 172,888 votes, but Skip Bafalis' 
48,378 votes denied Kirk a majority and forced him into a 
run-off with Eckerd who polled 137,731 votes. Kirk's 
forty-eight percent fell far short of his predicted sixty
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percent victory. The incumbent had suffered serious damage 
from these two challengers, indicating a lack of strength 
within his own party.68
On the Democratic side, Earl Faircloth led the 
polling, while Reubin Askew ascended to a second place 
runoff spot in the closing days of the campaign. Political 
observers had from the begining of the campaign season 
predicted that Faircloth would become the Democratic choice 
for governor, but Askew's upset surge into the runoff 
convinced many, including the Kirk camp, that Askew would 
capture the nomination. Faircloth's support had faded 
during the busing controversy. Some voters believed that 
Faircloth had shirked his duty as attorney general when 
Governor Kirk challenged busing plans in the courts. While 
many did not support all of Kirk's tactics, they did 
believe that Faircloth's weak me-too reaction to Kirk's 
resistance did not bode well for a gubernatorial candidate. 
Kirk believed he had weakened Faircloth's political appeal 
and wanted to face him in the general election. In fact, 
Kirk wanted anybody, but Askew. Some Republicans saw 
Askew's rising star as the eclipse of their own. "The 
Democrats have no finer man in Tallahassee than Reubin 
Askew," said a top-ranking Kirk aide. "It's not Jack Eckerd 
we have to worry about."69
In 1966 Kirk had been the forlorn Republican running 
against entrenched Democratic control, but in 1970 he had
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to answer for his actions while wielding power over the 
last four years. Kirk became the center of attention and 
the target of attack for the entire field of candidates 
from both parties. Jack Eckerd said that if Kirk were 
renominated he would drag down GOP candidates all over the 
state and erase gains the party had taken a hundred years 
to achieve. The primary, Eckerd's campaign manager noted, 
"proved that even a majority of Kirk's own party doesn't 
want him." William Cramer who won the Republican 
nomination for the senate worked against Kirk because he 
believed that the governor had stabbed him in the back by 
pushing Judge Carswell to run against him. And state 
Democratic chairman Anne Cramer worried that the GOP 
infighting might spoil their chance to run against Kirk. 
"We've been waiting four years for a crack at him, and we 
know we can beat him."70
Several newspapers agreed that the elimination of Kirk 
would benefit the state. Two Tampa Bay area newspapers 
endorsed Eckerd and Askew for their party's nominations. 
"Four more years of Kirk would be bad business for 
Florida," according to the Tampa Times. The St. Petersburg 
Evening Independent wrote that Askew was "known to his 
colleagues for his integrity, a welcome virtue for a 
governor of Florida." The Miami Herald, citing the 
incumbent governor as the major issue in state politics, 
also backed Eckerd and Askew. Nominating these two would
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"restore sound, honest, dignified government to Florida 
after four nightmarish years of buffoonery and turmoil," 
the paper contended.71
But those who hoped to see Kirk eliminated from 
Florida politics would have to wait. Jack Eckerd, Kirk's 
Republican challenger who had forced a runoff primary, 
proved unequal to the task of driving the incumbent from 
office. On September 29, Kirk won 56.8 percent in the 
Republican runoff. Kirk would face the Democratic nominee 
in the general election.72
On the Democratic side, in a move that surprised many, 
Secretary of State Tom Adams, who had turned down offers 
from two other Democratic contenders, accepted an offer to 
be Askew's running mate. Adams brought with him perhaps 
more ability and experience than any other Democrat in the 
state, not to mention a well established political 
organization. Besides governmental experience the Askew- 
Adams team could point to grass roots financing. Askew had 
been running on a shoe-string budget and Adams had gone 
broke in politics. Askew praised Adams as the only 
political figure who admitted a campaign deficit. Adams 
said he accepted the offer to run for the number two 
position because Askew refused "to take a dime unless the 
person who gives it wants it reported. This just ain't so 
with other candidates in the election."73
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Although Faircloth led the first primary, his 
lackluster campaign could not contend with the refreshing 
candidacy of Askew nor the organization of Adams. Askew 
captured the Democratic nomination with a 119,000 vote 
margin of victory. Askew's 400,000 vote total exceeded by 
50,000 votes the total Republican vote cast for Kirk and 
Eckerd in their runoff. Kirk had invigorated the 
Democratic party by providing competition from the GOP for 
the first time since Reconstruction. It seemed the 
Democrats had shaken off the image of the discredited old 
order with new faces and new ideas.74
Askew reflected this freshness by calling for a "new 
tone” in the governor's office that was "both responsible 
and responsive and conducive to finding solutions to the 
problems facing Florida." Calling his run-off win a 
"victory for the people," Askew said his fair share tax 
reform campaign would be financed solely by the people.
The Democratic nominee expected special interests to extend 
offers of assistance now that he had the nomination, but he 
promised he would not take any funds with any strings 
attached. "We are going to continue in raising our money 
in the same way we've done in the past and that is on an 
individual basis. "7S
Askew proved appealing to a wide array of voters. In 
the 1968 presidential campaign George Wallace and Eugene 
McCarthy represented the extreme ends of the political
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spectrum. The Florida campaign chairmen for each of these 
two 1968 presidential candidates threw their support to 
Askew in the 1970 general election. The former Wallace 
campaign director saw Askew as simply the best man for the 
job, while the McCarthy chairman compared Askew's appeal to 
the old populist political coalition. "I'd hate to put a 
tag on Mr. Askew as far as conservative or liberal," said 
the Wallace supporter. "He's more of a middle of the 
roader." The McCarthy man agreed and pointed to qualities 
in the candidate that seemed to reach across ideology,
"he's a very sincere guy that is not owned by the 
traditional special interests in Florida. He's a pretty 
free man, really." These sentiments foreshadowed trouble 
for the incumbent who won in 1966 with the help of 
thousands of Democrats who came to believe, with Kirk's 
help, that their party's candidate, Robert King High, was 
too liberal. Kirk had emphasized High's open endorsement 
of integration and the public accommodation section of the 
1964 civil rights bill and his tenure as mayor of Miami 
when race riots racked that city. Kirk had also exploited 
the widespread frustration of many Floridians with 
President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" by linking High 
with national Democrats who many associated with the 
excesses of liberalism that plagued the 1960s. But in 1970 
Kirk would have a much more difficult task in trying to 
label Askew as an extreme liberal. While High hailed from
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Miami, a city that many considered a liberal Sodom and 
Gomorrah, Askew grew up in the most conservative part of 
the state. And it was impossible for Kirk to link Askew 
with the political problems of the recent past when a 
Republican president and Kirk himself had been presiding 
over the nation and state.76
These difficulties did not stop Kirk from attempting 
to re-implement his earlier strategy. Kirk claimed that 
the New York Times had labeled Askew a liberal. "And you 
can't hardly beat the New York Times for picking out 
liberals -- flaming liberals," said Kirk. "I want all the 
permissive liberals to vote for Askew. I want all the 
discerning Democrats and wise Republicans to vote for m e ." 
Kirk also attacked Askew's ability to be governor. Kirk 
called him "Goody Two-Shoes, . . .  a nice, sweet-looking 
fellow," Kirk said, but being governor was "a tough job and 
just being a momma's boy won't get the job done." But 
Askew had earned a reputation for taking on tough jobs. In 
the Senate, Askew had often drawn the tedious non-headline 
assignments because of his record of accomplishment. He 
had served as chairman of both the Appropriations and 
Constitutional Amendments committees and was credited with 
doing most of the work on the complicated revision of the 
trial court system.77
Kirk seemed unable to sit back and rest on the laurels 
of his administration, even though he had accomplished a
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great deal. He had opened up Florida politics to public 
scrutiny, led the fight for governmental reform and 
constitutional revision, sought educational improvements, 
took measures to protect the environment, and formed the 
first state law enforcement agency. But Kirk's brand of 
confrontational politics dictated that he attack his 
opponent. In the past slinging the mud of racial 
liberalism had served southern politicians well. By 1970, 
however, diverting attention away from the issues by 
political invective proved ineffective. Coupled with the 
diminution of the race issue was the fact that Kirk's 
adversary in 1970 remained impervious to the incumbent's 
attacks of excessive liberalism, corruption or 
incompetence. Askew's earnestness and wholesome image 
seemed, to many voters, more suited to governance than the 
confrontation and dissension created by the incumbent.
That Askew had entered the race as an unknown in most of 
the state enhanced his fresh-face appeal among an 
electorate disgusted with politics as usual. Kirk sought 
to counter this appeal. "Askew is not a new face at all," 
Kirk charged. "He's been around for twelve years. The 
reason the people knew nothing about him is that he never 
did anything."78
If Kirk did not understand the dynamics of this 
particular campaign, Askew's campaign manager, Elmer 
Rounds, did. Before the candidates even began running,
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Rounds traveled to sixty counties in the state. "I 
discovered the public was in a foul mood. They were angry 
at government and politics," Rounds said. "I could see
Reubin would have a good chance because he was unknown. It 
was the same advantage Kirk enjoyed in 1966."79
Askew deftly sidestepped Kirk's criticisms by 
reminding voters of the incumbent's antics while in office. 
"I think the people are tired of government by crisis," 
Askew said. "We can't have government by personality. We 
must have government by law, by diligence and by 
commitment." Askew turned Kirk's accusations that he was a 
liberal into a joke. "Kirk's definition of an ultraliberal 
is anybody who runs against him," said the Democratic 
nominee. Askew pointed out that Kirk had supported the 
1968 presidential bid of Nelson Rockefeller, whom many saw 
as representative of the extreme liberal faction of the 
GOP. And Askew produced a 1967 New York Times stOj»y j.n 
which Kirk called George Wallace a "flaming liberal."
Askew rejected being positioned on the political spectrum. 
He said that labels were not important. "I have never been 
fearful to take a stand on any issue. Look instead at the 
men you are putting into office. The governor's record is 
one of inefficiency." After the election even GOP Senator 
Edward Gurney conceded that Republican efforts to label 
Democratic candidates as liberal had not succeeded. "There 
was no clear-cut liberal-conservative battle," Gurney said.
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"The candidates tried to make it that way but it didn't 
work out. "80
The Kirk campaign even sought to link Askew's tax 
reforms to liberalism. Kirk's campaign manager, Robert 
Lee, charged that Askew had "surrounded himself with the 
most wild-eyed liberal elements in Florida." Lee claimed 
that Askew and a Miami state senator were "co-architects of 
the new pork chop liberalism," that was "just a new 
disguise for the old liberal Democrat tax and spend, 
philosophy." Lee charged that Askew's "alleged tax reform 
package" would increase taxes and spending. Governor Kirk 
also accused Askew of favoring big spending. While in the 
legislature the Democratic nominee "never failed to vote 
for more spending," Kirk claimed. "Big spending doesn't 
solve anything. When he talks about tax reform, I don't 
know whether to laugh or cry." The governor saw dangers in 
Askew's proposed corporate income tax. "I enjoy this game 
that we're involved in -- free enterprise and democracy," 
said Kirk. "My adversary is trying to kick around the 
corporations. Ain't nobody going to kick around the 
corporations. "81
Askew supporters had warned him from the beginning 
that his campaign should not advocate a corporate income 
tax. "Any kind of tax proposal, my friends assured me, was 
political suicide," the candidate admitted. Many political 
observers had predicted that after his primary victory
206
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Askew would downplay his corporate income tax since it 
would open him up to Republican charges of being anti­
business, but the Democratic nominee continued to 
emphasize, and even clarify his plans for tax reform. Kirk 
renamed his opponent "Reubin Taxyou," contending that 
Askew's reforms would cost each household in the state at 
least $150 per year. "The working man is realizing, 
finally, that this is not a tax on corporations; it is a 
tax on him. If 'Taxyou' is elected," Kirk told a breakfast 
audience, "all of these eggs and grits and gravy and 
biscuits will carry a tax." Askew struck back at Kirk's 
criticism of his tax program by labeling the incumbent as 
"Tax-Fraud Claude." Askew reminded a gathering in Miami 
that in 1966 Kirk had been totally opposed to any advance 
or increase in the sales or gasoline tax. "But two years 
later he proposed the largest single increase in taxes in 
history - - a  five percent sales tax." Askew also reminded 
his audience that Kirk still advocated a one-cent increase 
in gasoline taxes after the legislature had rejected it in 
a special session. Askew denied that his proposed 
corporate tax was anti-business, as Kirk had charged, and 
contended that it would merely require corporations to pay 
a fair share of the tax load. "Florida ranks forty-sixth 
in the nation in the amount of taxes corporation pay, but 
we've got one of the highest consumer taxes in the 
nation. "82
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As the election neared Florida newspapers made 
endorsements. Jacksonville's Florida Times Union supported 
Kirk whom the paper characterized as "controversial, 
colorful and sometimes downright cantankerous." The paper 
contended that the incumbent had been good for the state. 
"He didn't cave in under every pressure that was brought to 
bear on state government. That's not his way. . . .  He won 
some and he lost some. He backed away from none. . . .  He 
got the people more involved." Most of the state's 
newspapers, however, did not like what the governor got the 
people involved in. Calling the Kirk administration "four 
years of divisive and destructive buffoonery," the St. 
Petersburg Times endorsed Askew for governor. "Governor 
Kirk's tenure has been a lark for the governor but an 
albatross for the state," said the editorial. "The Askew 
record on the other hand portrays quiet, responsible, 
progressive leadership." The Tampa Tribune said that 
Florida was "too important a state and too proud a state to 
have to endure four more years of a governor who turned 
this high office into a traveling circus." The paper 
praised Askew for conducting himself honorably and for his 
stand on the corporate income tax. The Miami Herald also 
supported Askew. "It is time in Florida . . . for a new 
generation of leadership," said the paper. Askew is "a 
breath of fresh air in Florida politics . . .  he has 
captured the imagination of a state which plainly desires
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new leadership." According to Kirk it only made sense that 
the state's newspapers supported his opponent. Askew was a 
tool of Florida's "foreign-controlled, permissive-liberal 
press," Kirk charged.83
Voters weighed in with their own opinions. At a 
defense plant one employee believed that Kirk had "stood up 
against many obstacles. He didn't accomplish much but he 
tried." A black employee said that Kirk was "an extremist 
on the right." State senator Verle Pope of St. Augustine 
considered Askew a man of great ability and courage. "We 
are starting with a product we know is good," Pope said.
"He can lead the state out of the wilderness we have been 
in for the past four years."84
In the final days of the campaign Kirk used pollution 
as a metaphor for all the ills he claimed Askew 
represented. While campaigning in Askew's home county of 
Escambia, Kirk pointed to an executive order that he had 
issued to clean up Escambia Bay. Kirk claimed that if he 
remained in the governor's office there would be no more 
fish kills. If his opponent won the election, however, the 
contamination would return because Askew was a "patsy of 
the polluters." Kirk then launched into a wide-ranging 
litany of charges against Askew. "He wants to pollute your 
homes with forced housing. He wants to pollute education 
with forced busing. He wants to pollute your minds with 
pornography. He favors those who pollute your bays."
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Askew responded to Kirk's charges by reminding voters that 
the two men were running for the state's highest office. 
"You would think he is running against me for state 
senator, rather than me running against him for governor," 
the Democratic nominee said. "From the way he is talking, 
everything wrong in Florida is my fault." One older man at 
a campaign rally agreed telling the Democratic challenger 
that he was going to win because he refused to indulge in 
the same type of politics as the governor. "The state's 
tired of that type of politics." Rather than hurling 
insults back at the governor, Askew labelled Kirk's charges 
"the politics of a desperate man who knows he's fixing to 
lose.1,85
Polls seemed to bear out Askew's assessment. In a 
Miami Herald poll of 600 registered voters statewide taken 
in late October, Askew led with sixty-two percent to Kirk's 
thirty-five percent. Kirk scoffed at the poll. "I bet my 
last buck a third of the voters out there haven't made up 
their minds," Kirk said. But the incumbent also admitted 
that winning reelection would not be easy. "It's an uphill 
fight," Kirk said. "But I have confidence. It's been 
uphill every day I have been in Tallahassee." And the 
governor's campaign efforts gave no indication that he was 
engaged in a losing effort. He pursued a relentless 
campaign schedule, while maintaining his enthusiasm and 
optimism. Typically his campaign DC-3 took off close to
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dawn with bleary eyed campaign workers and journalists 
stumbling aboard to find the candidate for reelection 
fresh, immaculately dressed and upbeat. Kirk would criss­
cross the state attacking his opponent as a liberal in 
sixteen to twenty hour days, while conducting the affairs 
of the state with occasional stops at the capital.86
All of Kirk's campaigning, however, failed to sway 
nearly enough voters to give him four more years in office. 
On election day voters sent a resounding message to their 
confrontational governor. Askew won fifty-seven percent of 
the vote, a landslide margin of 291,083 votes.87
When the primary season began most political observers 
considered the incumbent unbeatable, but after four years 
of confrontation the electorate opted for a less colorful 
candidate and a more cooperative government. Askew had 
stressed his desire to work with the popularly elected 
cabinet, that his predecessor had sought to abolish, and 
the legislature, that the governor had battled with during 
nine special sessions he called during his tenure. Kirk's 
confrontational tactics had solidified opposition against 
him. One of the few successful GOP candidates in the 
election called Kirk a "unifying force for the Democrats." 
Many blamed Kirk for not only uniting the Democrats, but 
for dividing the GOP during a four-year battle to establish 
personal control of the party. "He's tried to set up his 
own party," one Republican leader complained.88
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Kirk's defiance of court-ordered desegregation that 
required busing also contributed to his political demise. 
After the election Kirk conceded that the racial emphasis 
of his campaign probably cost him the election. The 
governor sought to place himself between the federal 
government and the school systems attempting to implement 
court orders. Kirk's challenge harkened back to the old 
southern notion of interposition; the states had created 
the constitution by compact, so when the federal government 
overstepped its authority, the states had the right and the 
duty to interpose themselves between the offending action 
and its execution. Southern governors had attempted to 
justify their resistance to federal mandates in the past 
with interposition and failed. Although polls showed that 
nearly ninety percent of Florida's voters disapproved of 
busing, very few had any illusions that they could 
successfully resist federal court orders. That Kirk's 
motivations seemed transparently political further reduced 
the popularity of his stand. Furthermore the tumultuous 
decade of the 1960s illustrated the social upheaval that 
resulted from defiance of the law and strained the 
willingness of most southerners to mimic the protestors and 
rioters they had so roundly castigated. Indeed much of the 
criticism of Kirk's actions pointed to militants of the 
recent past who broke the law in testing aspects of society 
they considered unjust. Kirk had fallen out of step with
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the mood of the electorate. His philosophy of governance 
did not reflect the feelings of the voters.89
Reubin Askew, on the other hand, mirrored the concerns 
of Floridians. Askew opposed busing. He was not against 
integration, but believed the issue was too divisive and 
disruptive. Askew had not been forced to take a strong 
stand for or against busing as Kirk's showdown at Manatee 
occurred before Askew became a serious candidate. While 
avoiding disruptive racial issues, Askew's reliance on 
populist issues served him well in 1970. Askew ran on a 
shoestring budget, provided full disclosure of his 
contributions and refused special interest money. Running 
a campaign financed solely by the people added credibility 
to his main campaign theme of taxing the corporations in 
the state in order to reduce personal income taxes. When 
Kirk tried to portray Askew as a tax-and-spend liberal 
Democrat, the charges did not ring true. Askew had 
established a conservative fiscal record during his years 
in the legislature even voting against the legislative pay 
raise that Governor Kirk had made such a fuss over early in 
his administration. Kirk also had public problems with his 
personal, and campaign finances and his proposals to raise 
gas and sales taxes did not fare well with the electorate. 
The personal contrast between the two candidates also 
contributed the electoral success of Askew. Kirk showed up 
at his own inaugural with an attractive woman he would only
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refer to as Madame X, the governor had a reputation as a 
hard drinker, his language could be coarse, and his 
appetite for confrontation was legendary. Askew on the 
other had was a self-described non-smoking teetotaler and 
Presbyterian elder who had married his high school 
sweetheart and most important, he had a convincing air of 
honesty and sincerity that he communicated to the public.
Askew seemed to speak for a New South. In his 
inaugural he spoke of the need to do more than "give pious 
lip service to the justifiably urgent needs of our black 
citizens." After the election he expressed hope that a New 
South might lead the country into a new era of racial 
accommodation. "The rest of the nation has tried to teach 
us justice in the South by mandate and court order," Reubin 
Askew would later tell his constituents. "Now perhaps it 
is up to us to try to teach them in a much more effective 
way -- by example."90
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CHAPTER 5 
SOUTH CAROLINA
In his classic work of 1949, Southern Politics in 
State and Nation. V.O. Key contended that the preoccupation 
with race in South Carolina supplanted political conflict. 
"In part, issues are deliberately repressed, for, at least 
in the long run, concern with genuine issues would bring an 
end to the consensus by which the Negro is kept out of 
politics. One crowd or another would be tempted to seek 
his vote." By 1970 the consensus concerning black 
involvement in politics had ended. As Key had predicted, 
only one crowd sought the black vote while the other sought 
to mobilize the fears of the majority of white voters 
concerning federal pressures to achieve racial balances in 
schools and the perception that blacks could exercise undue 
influence by voting as a "bloc."1
Five years after the publication of Key's book the 
Supreme Court ruled that segregated schools must end.
South Carolina, like other southern states, fought 
desegregation through the courts, but unlike some of them, 
when it came, South Carolina acquiesced, if not 
enthusiastically at least with a modicum of decorum. Not 
without irony integration began at Clemson University, 
built on the cotton plantation of John C. Calhoun the 
antebellum South's leading spokesman for slavery and 
states' rights.
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In 1963 as his tenure in office drew to an end, rather 
than leaving his successor to deal with the problems that 
integration posed, outgoing governor Ernest Hollings set 
the tone for the transition by telling the legislature: "As 
we meet, South Carolina is running out of courts. If and 
when every legal remedy has been exhausted, this General 
Assembly must make clear South Carolina's choice, a 
government of laws rather than a government of men. As 
determined as we are, we of today must realize the lesson 
of 100 years ago, and move on for the good of South 
Carolina and our United States. It must be done with law 
and order." The incoming governor, Donald Russell, 
continued these efforts at easing the transition by opening 
up the inaugural barbecue to black citizens for the first 
time.2
At the same time that South Carolina struggled to 
accept these changes, other southern states determined to 
resist them. Alabama's new governor in 1963, George 
Wallace, courted confrontation in his inaugural address 
promising "segregation today, segregation tomorrow, 
segregation forever." And Wallace sought to prevent 
integration of higher education in his state when he stood 
in the doorway of the University of Alabama. At the 
University of Mississippi when integration threatened, full 
scale rioting ensued requiring federal troops to restore 
order. These incidents generated unfavorable publicity for
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the South focusing national and international attention on 
a region that was struggling desperately to emerge from 
decades of social stigma and economic difficulties.
In 1968 South Carolina sent its first integrated 
delegation to the National Democratic Convention. It was 
the only Deep South delegation that went unchallenged. In 
1970 as part of the three-hundredth birthday of South 
Carolina "Porgy and Bess" was performed in Charleston, the 
first performance of native son, Dubose Heyward's musical 
play in the city in which it was set. A decade earlier 
city officials had barred even the movie version. Also in 
1970, when four southern governors pledged to defy federal 
desegregation plans that included student busing 
arrangements in their home states, Governor Robert McNair 
promised South Carolina would obey the law. The 58,000 
pupil Greenville County school system faced a mid-year 
desegregation order that involved extensive busing. The 
governor received over 15,000 telegrams. "Everybody wants 
the governor to do something," an aide said, "but nobody 
has any suggestions for what he could do that would be 
legal." McNair told his constituents in a statewide 
telecast: "We've run out of courts, and we've run out of 
time, and we must adjust to new circumstances." The 
governor said he would oppose any attempts to close schools 
or abolish compulsory school attendance laws. "We've seen 
what defiance will lead to," McNair said. "I don't think
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the people of this state would want to defy the order of 
the court after we've run the course legally. We don't 
want federal troops in South Carolina. We've built a 
reputation for obedience to the law."3
The example set by the chief executive facilitated 
community leaders in accomplishing complete integration 
with "grace and dignity," as one national wire service 
characterized it. Even though McNair saw his popularity 
decline as a result of the conciliatory speech, most South 
Carolinians had moved into the ranks of moderation. "The 
people down here know they've lost the battle," observed 
one Democrat. "They'd like to continue fighting, but they 
realize they can't win. So they don't want trouble stirred 
up." This seemed to sum up the attitude of white 
moderation in the state. Resistance had proven disruptive 
and most whites seemed willing to live with integration in 
exchange for tranquility.4
By 1970, then, South Carolina seemed poised to accept 
integration, even in that most jealously defended bastion 
of southern segregation, schools. "White folks feel 
they're becoming more moderate," explained M. Hayes Mizell, 
a white civil rights activist who scored an upset victory 
in a 1970 Columbia school board election. "They are doing 
things they didn't do a few years ago, like sitting down 
with Negroes at lunch counters, participating at meetings 
where Negroes are present, their kids are going to school
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with at least some Negroes. With all this peace, and 
tranquility, they think everything is OK, that they're more 
liberal." More than 50,000 white children in 1970 were 
attending formerly all-black schools in the state.
Although the movement to establish new private schools to 
circumvent integration reached its peak in 1970, public 
school enrollment declined by only two percent that year. 
The University of South Carolina included 400 black 
undergraduates in the fall of 1970.5
In anticipation of the upcoming election of 1970 two 
South Carolina college students sought, by employing census 
figures, to find the county most representative of the 
state and survey one hundred random voters. The search 
indicated that Laurens county with a population of 47,609 
was the average county in the state. Laurens county lies 
in the northwestern quadrant of the state midway between 
Greenville and Columbia. The county contained a seventy-- 
thirty percent racial split, and a sixty--forty percent 
urban to rural ratio. Politically the county had followed 
the state pattern in its choice for presidential candidates 
in the past three national elections, supporting Kennedy, 
Goldwater and Nixon. Of the one hundred voters employed 
for the survey eighty were white and twenty black. The 
party affiliation of the white respondents included thirty- 
eight independents, fourteen Republicans and twenty-eight 
Democrats. All the blacks participating in the survey with
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the exception of one independent and one Republican 
indicated a preference for the Democratic Party. Of the 
total number of respondents eighty-three considered 
themselves members of the "Silent Majority" that Richard 
Nixon had appealed to. Eighty-eight read a newspaper and 
eighty-four watched television news. Forty-nine said that 
the news media influenced their political thinking more 
than family, friends or fellow employees. Fifty-eight 
viewed public officials as "basically honest and 
effective," while sixty-seven believed the situation in the 
state was hopeful. The one hundred random respondents in 
this most average county in South Carolina designated two 
problems that most concerned them on the national and state 
level. Of national issues, thirty-one worried about crime, 
twenty-nine Vietnam, and twenty-seven race relations. Of 
state issues sixty-eight expressed concern over education, 
twenty-six taxes, and twenty-one crime. The authors of the 
study noted that the overwhelming response to education was 
because of race-mixing and student busing associated with a 
recent desegregation court order of "intense concern to 
respondents" in neighboring Greenville county. The study 
concluded by pointing to the possibility of Republican 
gains in South Carolina because of two popular Republicans 
-- Albert Watson and Richard Nixon.6
A Republican had not sat in the governor's chair in 
South Carolina since Reconstruction, but 1970 seemed to
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hold great promise for the Grand Old Party. While token 
school desegregation had proceeded smoothly under freedom 
of choice plans, new and drastic changes threatened the 
state. Several South Carolina school districts faced 
termination of federal funding due to failure to 
desegregate, and the 58,000 student Greenville County 
school district struggled in January 1970 with a mid-year 
desegregation order that included extensive busing. Some 
Republicans sought to exploit what they considered drastic 
and intrusive federal desegregation orders. These 
Republicans, led by Congressman Albert Watson and Senator 
Strom Thurmond, believed that the McNair administration's 
moderate approach to integration exhibited weakness that 
had encouraged more stringent federal desegregation 
measures. Closely associated with the McNair policies, 
lieutenant governor, John West, appeared certain to capture 
the Democratic nomination. Many Republicans saw West as a 
vulnerable candidate. They believed he could be attacked 
as more liberal than the electorate, and they saw him 
lacking the personal charisma of popular Republican 
congressman, Albert Watson.
Albert Watson had begun his political career as a 
Democrat serving in the South Carolina House before moving 
up to the U.S. Congress in 1962. In 1960 Watson headed up 
Democrats for Nixon and in 1964 supported Senator Barry 
Goldwater, the Republican nominee for President. As a
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result of his support for Goldwater, Democrats in the House 
of Representatives stripped him of his seniority, Watson 
resigned his seat and entered a special election as a 
Republican. Watson re-captured the seat with seventy 
percent of the vote and still held on to it in 1970. This 
led many Republicans to see Watson as the strongest 
potential Republican candidate in the state and they urged 
him to run. Republican Senator Strom Thurmond, who had 
also left the Democratic party after supporting Goldwater 
in 1964, saw Watson as a kindred spirit. He introduced 
Watson at a November 1969 Republican gathering of 900 party 
contributors addressed by Senator Barry Goldwater as the 
"future Governor of South Carolina."7
Many hoped that Watson could combine the strong 
Republican support spearheaded by Senator Thurmond with an 
appeal to those voters who had voted for Wallace in 1968. 
Richard Nixon had carried the state in 1968 with thirty- 
nine percent of the vote, largely through the efforts of 
Senator Thurmond, while Wallace had received thirty-two 
percent. Distress over desegregation measures that 
included busing seemed to permeate the state, and Watson 
looked like the perfect candidate to take advantage of the 
issue. Watson had once campaigned for congress wearing a 
white tie that he privately admitted was a symbol of his 
support. Watson accused Governor McNair of "surrender" for 
advising compliance with court ordered desegregation and
228
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
described himself as "an ardent fighter for the rights of 
the majority against the vocal, violent minority."8
But Watson did not speak for all Republicans. Arthur 
Ravenel, Jr., a racial moderate from Charleston seeking his 
party's nomination in 1970, thought a different approach 
could win the governor's chair. Senator Thurmond's 
endorsement of Watson left Ravenel "very disappointed." In 
December 1969 Ravenel, responding to the touting of Watson 
as the Republican nominee for the upcoming governor's race, 
said that the South Carolina GOP was "racist oriented" and 
on the "unrealistic or ridiculous right" and should follow 
him to a position closer to the center of the political 
spectrum.9
Ravenel believed that the Republican party had to 
reach out to black voters in order to have any hope of 
success in statewide races. "How can we win elections by 
appealing to only sixty-five percent of the voters?"
Ravenel asked. "I believe you've got to openly appeal to 
the black voters. . . . I'm going to do it openly, not 
sneaking around in alleys." Ravenel had been advocating 
this approach of racial accommodation for some time. In 
1968 serving as the GOP district chairman in Charleston, he 
had promised' that as long as he held that position "this 
will not be a racist party." The Greenville News took 
notice. Under an article entitled "GOP Should Take 
Ravenel's Cue," the paper pointed to Ravenel's open door
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approach as the only way to "break the Democratic party's 
virtual monopoly on the growing Negro vote."10
Ravenel could point to two southern Republicans, 
Lynwood Holton in Virginia and Winthrop Rockefeller in 
Arkansas, who had gained the governor's chair because of 
black support. "And all Black people want," wrote Ravenel 
to one Republican activist in the state, "is the same thing 
White people want. And what's wrong with that?" It all 
seemed so simple to Ravenel that the direction of his own 
party in 1970 confounded and upset him. Ravenel believed 
that "polarization forces" were pushing Watson into the 
gubernatorial race. Ravenel contended that this "bunch" 
included "reactionaries" whose cause was hopeless. "Not 
being able to get any Black or moderate support, they're 
going to have to push harder for the seg and racist 
vote.1,11
Those close to Ravenel shared his alarm at the 
possibility of a Watson nomination. James Duffy, who 
became Ravenel's campaign manager in 1970, after hearing 
Watson suggest that parents keep their children from 
attending court-ordered desegregated schools, in spite of 
the state compulsory education law, asked an associate 
incrdulously: "A governor who will not uphold the law?"
And in reaction to Watson's tactics of urging resistance, 
Duffy expressed his candidate's attitude regarding the 
latest round of court-ordered desegregation in South
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Carolina. "It is an issue that might have some political 
appeal," wrote Duffy to a supporter, "but has no room for 
legitimate problem solving because it has all been tried 
since 1954.1,12
And the Ravenel camp was not alone. A moderate group 
of Republicans had emerged who objected to the racial 
message Watson would send to the state and nation. Like 
Ravenel and Duffy, James Henderson, the GOP candidate for 
lieutenant governor, advocated a very different approach 
from that of his party's top candidate. "If I have 
anything to do with it, we're going to pay attention to all 
the races," Henderson promised. "No party can hold public 
office without recognizing that one-third of South 
Carolina's population is black."13
Some young people in South Carolina, who had no doubt 
been affected by the civil rights movement, saw Watson as a 
political menace. In the February 20th issue of Clemson 
University's student newspaper, the Tiger, an editorial 
proclaimed Watson's election would be a political disaster. 
"His slick rhetoric and reactionary non-thought," wrote the 
paper, would confuse the uninformed voter, "and the key to 
his campaign is a raucous, negative attack on the forces of 
progress in our state government." Although the state had 
not suffered the disgrace of electing a George Wallace or a 
Lester Maddox, the editorial contended, Watson had "the 
charisma, oratorical expertise and Thurmondesque to capture
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the votes of masses of South Carolinians. Watson . . . 
preys off the fears and frustrations of people caught up in 
America's social revolution."1*
Even Republicans who could barely vote saw the need 
for black support. "As a concerned Republican," the 
president of the Clemson Young Republicans wrote, "you are 
no doubt aware of the acute need for our party to gain a 
part of the Negro vote in this state." In January 1970 the 
group organized a meeting and invited several prominent 
political figures including blacks, GOP members, and 
Ravenel's campaign manager. The forum focused on the 
"future of the Negro in the South Carolina Republican 
Party.1,15
An issue of even more immediate concern to Ravenel 
than reaching out to black voters concerned how the party 
should choose their candidate. A small but determined 
cadre advocated an open primary rather than the customary 
convention in which the candidate would be chosen by the 
party leadership. Those who supported Arthur Ravenel 
believed that their candidate could win the nomination if 
allowed to compete in an open primary. But the powers that 
controlled the state GOP, led by Thurmond, party chairman 
Ray Harris, and Republican national committeeman Drake 
Edens, believed that Watson had a good chance to capture 
the executive office and did not want to diminish 
Republican strength in primary battles. In correspondence
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the party faithful often referred to what they called the 
eleventh commandment: "Thou shalt not criticize thy fellow 
Republican. ”16
One South Carolinian in the Nixon administration was 
keeping close tabs on the political situation in his home 
state. Harry Dent, counsel to President Nixon for southern 
political affairs, was a former state GOP chairman and an 
aide to Senator Thurmond who maintained an active 
correspondence with Republican leaders in the state. In 
January Ravenel offered Dent his assessment of the state's 
upcoming elections. "Polarization forces" according to 
Ravenel, were pushing Watson into the race. "The Democrats 
are licking their chops at the prospect of eating him up in 
the fall. He can get absolutely no Black vote and very 
little support from the White moderates whose numbers are 
rapidly increasing." And if Watson ran for governor, 
Ravenel feared, the Republicans had no one who could hold 
the congressional seat that Watson would vacate. Ravenel 
argued that the party, not to mention his own chances for 
the nomination, would be better served by selecting the 
Republican candidate by means of a primary rather than a 
"controlled convention." Ravenel knew that if Senator 
Thurmond gave his approval the state GOP chairman would set 
the mechanics for a primary in motion. Ravenel believed 
that he could win the Republican nomination in a "free and 
open primary" and that having accomplished this his chances
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would be "excellent of winning in the fall as we believe we 
can get with honor and without any deals as much as 40% of 
the Black vote and most of the moderates."11
The GOP moderates, however, would not gain the 
sympathy of South Carolina's senior senator in this 
election. In 1970 Strom Thurmond abandoned his tradition 
of remaining neutral in state elections and threw the full 
force of his considerable influence behind Albert Watson. 
James Duffy had participated in Republican politics long 
enough to see which way the wind was blowing. He wrote to 
Ravenel with the news that Thurmond had released one of his 
assistants to run the Watson campaign. "So we now [sic] 
how that works. The Thurmond people and our official Party 
leaders are about the land getting the convention firmed 
up." Thurmond's support seemed obvious to most political 
observers. "Thurmond ran harder for Albert than Albert 
did," said John West years later. Thurmond's papers prove 
the accuracy of this assessment, revealing that he 
solicited dozens of his own supporters to get behind 
Watson. In dozens of phone calls and letters he asked for 
contributions to "Citizens for Watson," and thank you notes 
from the senator acknowledged thousands of dollars worth of 
contributions. Thurmond appealed to multi-millionaire H.
L. Hunt in Texas for financial assistance to Watson, and he 
asked the actor John Wayne, a Republican activist, to sign
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a letter that would be sent to potential Watson 
contributors.18
In February lieutenant governor, John West, as 
expected, entered the gubernatorial race. Facing no 
serious Democratic opposition, West began his campaign 
running against Watson without having to worry about a 
primary adversary. West' s style and background contrasted 
sharply from Watson. While Watson employed fiery rhetoric, 
West spoke in moderated tones. In interviews Watson gave 
short answers designed to grab headlines, West gave 
detailed, candid, at times rambling replies.
The background of the two men also differed. Watson 
had abandoned his party and gravitated to those elements of 
the Republican party in the South that sought to resist 
federal pressures to desegregate. John West, on the other 
hand, had been among those southern politicians who led the 
way toward a slow adjustment to the changing racial 
situation. West had been elected to the state senate in 
1954 shortly after the Brown decision and continued to 
serve for twelve years in that body. West would look back 
years later and remember that the legislature in those 
years had measured every action against the effect on 
schools and segregation. Nevertheless, West fought against 
the Ku Klux Klan and in 1961 cast one of only two votes 
against a measure that would require the closure of any 
college or university that was forced to integrate. West
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also stood almost alone against repeal of the compulsory 
school attendance law designed to assist parents opposed to 
integration. Elected lieutenant governor in 1966, West did 
something no white politician in South Carolina had ever 
done. In 1969 he attended and spoke at a South Carolina 
dinner in honor of NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins. 
West's political career had sought inclusion of all South 
Carolina's citizens, but 1970 would test those notions of 
acceptance.19
After having ruled that "freedom of choice" 
desegregation plans would not satisfy federal requirements, 
federal courts began to demand immediate massive school 
desegregation throughout the South in the middle of the 
school year. These court orders would test the growing 
body of white moderates in the state. Although token 
desegregation had gone smoothly in South Carolina, many 
whites wanted these changes to proceed slowly, thereby 
allowing time to adjust. The prospect of trouble bothered 
most moderates more than moral qualms about equal 
educational opportunities. The black student who 
integrated Clemson University in 1963, Harvey Gantt, 
accurately characterized the core of moderation in his 
state when he said that "if you can't appeal to the morals 
of a South Carolinian, you can appeal to his manners." The 
mid-year desegregation orders tested even their manners.
To many these seemed unreasonable. They argued that the
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integrate "at once" orders forced an unusual strain on both 
schools and the children that attended them. And to make 
matters worse many of the plans included busing to achieve 
racial balances. Busing inspired overwhelming opposition 
combining a wide spectrum of friends and foes of 
integration. Those whites who did not want integration at 
all naturally oppossed busing, but more moderate whites 
also saw these plans as disruptive of the neighborhood 
school concept and local control of education. Little 
wonder that some believed that resistance to desegregation 
would yield political dividends. John West who had built a 
career of counseling patience seemed at times to back away 
from his past, advocating, if not outright resistance, at 
least reluctance to obey federal desegregation orders.20
West announced his candidacy before an all-white 
audience. He drew his only applause when he declared 
"freedom of choice is the best possible plan to save our 
schools, and I promise you that I will continue to do 
everything I can to see that we get it." West, while 
supporting freedom of choice, refused to be pulled into a 
tug of war over desegregation. He called Watson's remarks 
"emotional rhetoric" that sought to derive "political 
capital out of a difficult situation, but does nothing to 
solve it. I shall leave that path to others. The lives 
and future of our children are far too important to be used 
as political footballs."21
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While West threw his hat into the ring, Watson drew a 
line in the sand. On February 22, Albert Watson spoke in 
Lamar, South Carolina, where 2,500 whites gathered and 
circulated petitions calling for freedom of choice 
desegregation plans. The Darlington County school system, 
that included Lamar, had recently come under a federal 
court-ordered desegregation plan that increased the number 
of black students from 400, under the freedom of choice 
plan, to 7,000 attending integrated schools. "I have been 
called a racist, a bigot and a political buzzard," Watson 
told the rally, "but I intend to tell the people where I 
stand and tell it like it is. . . . Every section of this 
state is in for it," said Watson, "unless you stand up and 
use every means at your disposal to defend [against] what I 
consider an illegal order." Among cheers and applause 
Watson said that he had been criticized for speaking to 
this group of "hard core rednecks." In answer to those 
criticisms he told the gathering: "God bless anyone
interested in their children. I applaud you. I stand with 
you. "22
The day after the Lamar rally James Duffy wrote a memo 
to Arthur Ravenel. "Watson has had a field day with the 
school situation and West sounded like a weak 'me too.'" 
Duffy recommended that Ravenel make a statement enumerating 
his beliefs. The candidate should say that he supported 
freedom of choice and disapproved of the timing of the
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recent court orders because they created such a rush in 
allocating students to schools. But he also should say 
that he opposed any school boycotts and point to the 
success of Greenville County in meeting the court ordered 
desegregation schedule and continuing the education of 
their children. Ravenel should promise that as governor he 
would oppose any federal law that was alien to the beliefs 
of the state, would strive to alter those laws, but would 
nevertheless support and uphold the law. "To do otherwise 
would be deceitful to those that elected me," Duffy 
suggested Ravenel say.23
Shortly after Watson's appearance in Lamar an ugly 
incident there captured the attention of the entire nation. 
While protesting the implementation of the court-ordered 
desegregation plan, an angry mob of whites attacked and 
overturned two buses that had carried black children to 
school. This spectacle of white violence aroused criticism 
and disdain. Governor McNair condemned the protest. In a 
news release Senator Strom Thurmond said that "the 
spectacle of a school bus filled with students being 
attacked by adults has sickened South Carolina and the 
nation." Even Albert Watson spoke out. "As do all 
thinking South Carolinians," said Watson, "I deplore 
violence and there is no justification for it whatsoever."
A state senator from the Lamar area attributed the trouble 
to a small minority who had hurt themselves by their
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actions, "when you talk about maybe hurting children -- 
black or white -- decent people won't stand for it." The 
general public, in the words of one local official, were 
"appalled and a little scared" by the Lamar incident.24
The largest newspaper in South Carolina, the State 
condemned the actions at Lamar in an editorial. While 
opposing "drastic measures ordered by federal courts," the 
editorial demanded that criminal charges be brought against 
those who incited and participated in the riot. The paper 
pointed to two decades of responsibility and reason by the 
people of the state which set them apart from some of their 
fellow southerners. "The truth is," the paper said, 
"violent reactions not only do not delay desegregation, in 
many instances they hasten it. . . . It is demonstrably 
stupid to invite retribution and punitive federal 
legislation by breaking laws, breaking heads, or breaking 
down buses and buildings.”25
On the night of March 2, 1970, all three national 
network news programs led off their broadcasts with 
coverage of the incident and closely followed events 
stemming from the Lamar incident over the next two days. 
Eric Severeid of CBS delivered an editorial warning that 
other southerners might follow the example of Lamar if the 
government did not take strong measures. The Atlanta 
Constitution blamed Nixon's desegregation vacillations for 
the Lamar disturbance. The government's southern director
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for civil rights enforcement resigned, accusing the 
administration of a failure of leadership. Two HEW 
regional heads, one in Atlanta and one in Dallas, did so as 
well, declaring ineffectiveness on the part of the 
administration in handling civil rights.26
While some pointed to the Nixon administration, others 
placed the blame much closer to home. Many in South 
Carolina could not forget that Albert Watson had addressed 
the "freedom of choice" rally in Lamar the week before the 
mob had attacked the school buses. The local NAACP 
president said that Watson's appearance at the rally 
"poured gasoline on the fire." The editor of the weekly 
newspaper in the neighboring town of Hartsville wrote that 
Watson's appearance at the rally "lent an air of 
respectability" that the protestors did not have before. 
Governor McNair's press spokesman claimed that Watson 
caused the incident. "He helped create the public attitude 
that led to this." Senator Thurmond countered by blaming 
the governor who was responsible for maintaining law and 
order, said Thurmond. If the governor could not control a 
mob of 150 people, he should have requested federal 
assistance. "Those in the state who seek to parcel out 
blame by suggesting that Republicans caused the disturbance 
by speaking out strongly for freedom of choice fail to 
realize an important element of human psychology," said 
Thurmond. "People are less likely to resort to violence if
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they have faith that their leaders will stand up for them 
by using every legal resource provided within our system." 
Drake Edens, the GOP national committeeman for the state, 
also blamed the Democratic administration. "If the action 
of any public official brought this thing on," Edens said, 
referring to Lamar, "it was probably the surrender 
statement by Governor McNair when he said 'we've run out of 
courts, we've run out of time.' That left a group of 
frustrated and hopeless people with no place to go, no way 
to seek relief."27
Not all Republicans, however, could forget Watson's 
role in fanning the fires of racial frustration. One woman 
from nearby Darlington wrote to a party official describing 
her disappointment at the handling of the school situation 
by her fellow Republicans. The woman asserted that she 
knew of no one who would not have preferred to keep freedom 
of choice. "However, a force has grown up in our county 
that upsets the vast majority as much as forcing 
integration." She singled out Watson who inspired the 
local "rabble rouser" leading the protests. "They advocate 
closing the schools, boycotting to force this and have now 
resorted to violence by stopping school buses from taking 
children to school," she complained. "If these people are 
representative of the State Republican Party then I want no 
part of the State Republican Party and have begun to let
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others know how I feel." Her letter went on to assess the
mood of her community.
The majority in our county are people who want 
their children in school while our state and county 
leaders try sensibly to solve this problem. I feel 
we would be on the road to normal now if these few 
men had not continuously kept stirring up crowds. In 
Watson's speech to this crowd in Lamar a week before 
the outbreak, he . . . advocated openly forcing the 
schools to close. Had he not further incited this 
already emotional filled crown [sic] -- the buses may 
not have been overturned. . . . Please tell me how
the Republican Party can support men such as this?
They are as guilty in my mind as the ones who wielded 
the axe handles, chains and overturned the buses.
They have encouraged, prodded and condoned this same 
mob. How can they say they do not advocate 
violence?"28
One woman active in GOP political circles assigned 
both the blame and the appropriate spin for the Lamar 
incident in a letter to James Duffy. "If there's any rope
to be pulled you can bet I want in on the Albert Watson
lynching. . . .  If there's any way to do it, I think that 
the Lamar tragedy should be deposited on the back of one 
state Democratic administration of which Mr. John West is 
such an 'integral' part."29
Ten days after the buses were overturned, James Duffy 
sent a memo to Ravenel and his top advisors. "Each of us 
have heard from people, personally and by mail, who are 
appalled over the Lamar incident." Duffy stated that the 
situation was encouraged by Watson and that other party 
leaders supported him. "This puts . . . the Republican 
Party stamp of approval on the affair. The issue is
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racism. We can define it as bussing, freedom of choice, 
supreme court interference, etc., but the truth is simply 
race. That the process followed by the court was difficult 
and unreasonable might well be defended. However, it was 
the law."30
Duffy further expressed his disgust in a letter to a 
political consultant in Birmingham, Alabama, working for 
the campaign. "Our Party leadership has definitely gone to 
the racist format of a campaign and it remains to be seen 
how successful this strategy will be. Regardless of how 
effective it does not seem to be a basis for building the 
Party, state, or nation."31
Ravenel spelled out his own feelings in a letter to a 
GOP supporter. "Quite frankly, I am appalled at the 
prospect of our party running a racist campaign with Albert 
Watson heading our ticket. Whether such a ticket could win 
or not is immaterial to me, for I believe that this type 
appeal would be wrong for South Carolina."32
Arthur Ravenel failed in his bid for a state-wide 
primary to select the party's nominee; Albert Watson gained 
the nomination at the state Republican convention held 
March 21, 1970. Ravenel also failed to steer his party 
toward a more moderate racial course. The statement of 
principles adopted at the convention reflected the hard­
line stance of the Watson forces. Under education the 
principles statement read: "We believe that education in
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South Carolina is undergoing a grave crisis. The 
requirements of massive integration are creating burdens 
which are always difficult and often inpossible." The 
statement condemned "the vacillation and defeatism of the 
McNair-West Administration on the issue," and urged that 
the Federal government maintain the tax exempt status for 
private schools. The statement also recommended that 
elected officials "speak out firmly and in protest against 
unwarranted Court orders, and that every legal avenue to 
upset these orders . . .  be explored to the fullest."33
After Watson garnered the Republican nomination, Harry 
Dent offered the candidate suggestions on strategy that 
were reminiscent of George Wallace's tactics. "Go hard for 
the country music-working man vote," Dent wrote in a memo. 
Watson should travel with a country music band and visit 
country music radio stations to do campaign spots. Dent 
also told Watson that the average man, who "feels a little 
alienated . . . will like your 'square' virtues. . . . 
Remember, he is 40, earns less than $7,000, didn't finish 
high school, likes bowling and stock car racing, and is a 
Baptist." Dent also advised Watson to emphasize his 
relationship with Nixon-Agnew and stress that he could do 
more for the state because of access to a friendly 
administration. On the other hand, Watson should tie West 
to Governor McNair, paint West as a national Democrat and 
link him to Hubert Hurrphrey.34
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Watson and the Republicans took much of Dent's advice 
to heart. In September the state Republican Newsletter 
wrote that the voters would have to decide if they wanted 
to be led by John West "who supported liberals like 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Humphrey or someone like Albert 
Watson who has consistently supported conservatives right 
down the line from Nixon in '60 to Goldwater in '64 and 
Nixon again in '68. Watson has the conservatism of 
Thurmond and West has the liberalism of Hubert Horatio 
Humphrey." The Republicans also tried to link West with 
the NAACP. They criticized West for publicly praising the 
NAACP's Roy Wilkins. And a campaign flyer blamed the NAACP 
for the rejection of South Carolina judge Clement 
Haynsworth's appointment to the Supreme Court and for 
"destruction of freedom of choice in our public schools," 
then admonished West for using "the prestige of his high 
office to dignify the aims and activities of this 
organization." Watson employed the campaign slogan "Your 
kind of man." He also ran newspaper advertising under the 
caption: "Which men are your kind of men?" The left column 
of the advertisement stacked pictures of liberal Democrats 
with little support in the state, Hubert Humphrey, Edmund 
Muskie, Lyndon Johnson, and Birch Bayh, a Democratic 
Senator blamed for leading the successful fights against 
Haynesworth and another southern jurist, Harold Carswell, 
nominated by Nixon to fill seats on the Supreme Court.
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Below these "liberals" West was pictured and, lest anyone 
missed the point, the advertisement added that West had 
supported all these men, while South Carolina had rejected 
them. In the right column Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew,
Barry Goldwater and Strom Thurmond, all popular figures in 
the state, were pictured above Watson.3S
West responded in kind, running an ad of the same 
format with different pictures. Popular Democrats such as 
South Carolina Congressman Mendel Rivers, Representative 
Wilbur Mills, and Senators Richard Russell and Sam Ervin 
were pictured above West. On the other side were 
photographs of New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits 
said to have an "anti-South bias," former Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Earl Warren widely blamed in the South for 
his role in the Brown decision, Robert Finch the HEW 
secretary "who helped kill freedom of choice in the South," 
and Jerris Leonard the assistant Attorney General for civil 
rights who openly declared "freedom of choice is dead." 
Albert Watson was pictured below these men above the 
caption "Yes, indeed! Which man will best represent you as 
Governor? Elect a good man governor -- John West."36
The West advertisement sought to parry the Watson 
thrust by appealing to the same type voter; it also served 
to point out the inconsistency of Watson and Thurmond's 
claims that they and the Republicans had done anything to 
turn back the assault on the South and southern
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desegregation progress. The danger in this ploy lay in the 
inconsistency of the Democratic message. By favoring the 
discounted freedom of choice and continuing to claim 
adherence to the law, Democrats participated in a type of 
hypocrisy of their own.
While the Republicans sought to associate West with 
liberal Democrats and themselves with a popular president 
and vice-president, the actions of some in the Nixon 
administration created political havoc for South Carolina 
Republicans. Officials in HEW and the Justice Department 
charged with implementing desegregation had targeted South 
Carolina, as well as other southern states that had not 
fully complied with federal mandates. This posed problems 
for those South Carolinians who had sought to make the 
gubernatorial campaign a test of the so-called southern 
strategy of the Nixon administration. Senator Thurmond 
wrote to the President on April 30, 1970 complaining that 
Jerris Leonard, the assistant Attorney General for civil 
rights, had visited South Carolina to inform school 
officials of the "ramifications" of a law suit being 
threatened against the state by the Justice Department. 
Senator Thurmond related that he had called half a dozen 
people in the administration who oversaw desegregation 
matters and advised them that the trip was ill advised and 
that it would "be detrimental to the Republican cause in 
South Carolina." The meeting as Thurmond predicted,
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generated unfavorable publicity. At the meeting one school 
board chairman told Leonard that in the 1968 campaign Nixon 
had given them the impression that the state would have 
freedom of choice. "That was a political statement," 
Leonard responded, according to Thurmond. Then Leonard 
went on to make a point of saying that freedom of choice 
was dead. "This undercutting was not only harmful to you, 
it also hurts Congressman Watson, who is running for 
Governor," Thurmond complained. "The repercussions of this 
visit and to these statements have been severe and will be 
difficult to overcome between now and election day."37
Vice President Spiro Agnew also let the president know 
that the administration's actions might jeopardize the 
South Carolina political races. "Therefore we should have 
HEW and Justice do everything possible to settle these 
school negotiations in a very reasonable manner," said 
Agnew. "The Party leaders, Congressman Watson and Senator 
Thurmond feel that the school superintendents have the 
impression there has been no change at HEW. They say they 
are having difficulty getting proper cooperation at HEW.”38
Watson also pleaded with the administration concerning 
the backlash to Leonard's visit. Writing directly to the 
president, Watson quoted extensively from a columnist 
identified as "an experienced, astute, highly respected and 
usually conservative writer." The article described Watson 
as being stabbed in the back by presumed friends. "Whether
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he can recover only time and events will tell." The writer 
contended that Jerris Leonard and Robert Mardian, executive 
director of the vice president's task force on school 
desegregation, had delivered the blows as they "alternately 
bullied and cajoled" school leaders in the state to 
"knuckle under to 'unitary' integrated classrooms by 
September 1 or face a statewide desegregation suit." The 
decision was "a monumental blunder that may rob Nixon of 
the southern votes he will need for a second term and 
Watson of any real chance to win the governor's office. . .
. With such 'friends,' the hapless Watson has no need of 
any enemies." The writer suggested that Watson's only hope 
for political survival would be to disavow and disassociate 
himself from Nixon and his administration. Watson assured 
the President that "such a suggestion is both abhorrent and 
shocking to me, but even the public suggestion by a 
responsible columnist should disturb us all." Watson 
warned the President that "unless help is forthcoming, the 
political harvest for 1970 and '72 will be mighty lean."39
By July the Democrats had tired of Republican efforts 
to blame them for desegregation and tried to take advantage 
of the Republican administration's enforcement of 
integration in the state. HEW had recently filed suits 
against ten South Carolina school districts. State 
Democratic Chairman, Harry Lightsey, pointed out that 
Republicans had failed to come through with promises to
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slow down federal encroachment on local school systems.
The Republicans responded by claiming that the HEW took 
these actions because radicals from previous Democratic 
administrations dominated the agency.40
Governor McNair defended his administration's record 
of opposing federal efforts to impose racial integration on 
South Carolina's public schools. When Greenville and 
Darlington school districts faced "instant" desegregation 
in January 1970 and McNair had made his statement that the 
state had run out of courts and run out of time, the 
governor asserted that further resistance would have 
invited the courts to extend an "instant" order statewide. 
McNair called on Republicans to admit that they had 
"intentionally misled" the people of the state. "Freedom 
of choice prevailed until this administration came into 
office. "41
West also got into the act of pointing out the failure 
of Republicans to deliver on their promises. Prior to July 
West had attempted to deliver a positive message 
emphasizing the importance of maintaining quality education 
rather than criticizing desegregation. But West and his 
campaign advisors now believed that he must make his 
opposition clear and place the responsibility for the 
recent spate of school desegregation rulings on the 
Republicans. So West hedged his statements and even 
attacked the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
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for "social experimentation." West sought to claim the 
middle ground on the issue. If elected he would resist 
federal pressure to integrate schools, but West would not 
guarantee ultimate success, promising only to obey the law. 
The Nixon administration and state Republicans had extended 
false hopes. West vowed that the state would continue to 
fight desegregation suits in the courts. "We have 
succeeded in gradually adjusting to what was forced upon us 
in a way that did not divide our people or destroy their 
respect for law and order," West said. He accused the 
Nixon administration of extending false hope by promising 
freedom of choice. The so-called southern strategy, West 
asserted, consisted of "soft words and hard deeds" meaning 
"massive integration of every facet of our education system 
this year so all the broken promises will be forgotten by 
1972. "<2
West and the Democrats gleefully reminded South 
Carolinians of Senator Thurmond's "broken promises" in 
television advertisements. These commercials replayed 
speeches of Senator Thurmond campaigning for Nixon in 1968 
promising that the state would have a sympathetic ear 
concerning desegregation pressures in Washington. The 
advertising ploy reminded voters that Thurmond and the 
Republicans had made commitments that they did not keep and 
demonstrated the futility of resisting federal 
desegregation pressures. Thurmond vented his anger by
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threatening that the Federal Communications Commission 
would revoke the licenses of the television stations that 
ran the ads.'*3
The mid-summer decision to move closer to the Watson 
position on race relations made West feel uncomfortable; 
years later he would call this the low-point of his 
campaign. Not only did West feel bad, but he received 
criticism from both ends of the political spectrum. Watson 
accused West of making a "180 degree turn" and coming over 
to his position, which both West and McNair had criticized 
Watson for earlier. On the other end of the political 
spectrum, the state NAACP field representative, Isaac 
Williams, believed that West had "torn his pants" with 
black voters. West's statement attacking desegregation 
seemed "designed to appease white bigots and racists," said 
Williams reminding the candidate that black voters made up 
a quarter of the electorate in the state.44
The black segment of the electorate had not escaped 
the attention of West or of the Republicans. In 1968 the 
Nixon campaign had used the so-called southern strategy to 
entice white voters in the region to support a presidential 
candidate who would ease federal desegregation pressures 
that had steadily increased since the mid 1960s. Once in 
office the Nixon administration could do little to stop the 
inevitable. The implementation of the southern strategy 
degenerated into blaming the judiciary. These face-saving
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measures did little to fool southerners. In South Carolina 
the Republicans suffered disproportionately because of the 
efforts of Senator Thurmond to elect Nixon. So as the 
gubernatorial election neared Republicans attacked one 
element of the Democratic coalition. Since the Republicans 
had attempted to focus resentments concerning desegregation 
they did not expect to g a mer any of the black vote, and 
for that reason began to identify this group as a "bloc 
vote." The master of southern political efficacy, George 
Wallace, had recently saved his political career by using 
this ploy. In 1970, throughout the South, whichever 
candidate or party that could not count on the black vote 
sought to demonize it. The state Republican Newsletter 
wrote of a bloc vote in South Carolina that would support 
the Democrats. "Don't let any 3rd or 4th party effort fool 
you. Both are a hoax. . . .  In the final analysis, 90% of 
the Negro voters in this state will remain 'political 
slaves' . . . .  All of these bloc voters will be told how to 
vote Sunday night prior to the general election on November 
3." In an effort to counteract this so-called bloc vote 
going to West, the Republicans encouraged a fledgling black 
oriented third party. West's campaign strategy had placed 
him in a precarious position. While he desperately needed 
black votes as part of a winning coalition, he feared 
aligning himself too closely with black voters would 
alienate the white majority in the state. Although black
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leaders criticized West's hedging statements, they also 
realized the pragmatism of supporting him. Not to do so 
would guarantee a governor opposed to the interests of 
black citizens. And so the same black leaders who had 
publicly criticized West quietly went about the state 
convincing black voters that supporting Republican-inspired 
third party efforts would elect Watson by draining off 
support from John West.45
Although West had raised the ire of friend and foe 
alike, he had hit close to home with his labeling of the 
southern strategy as "soft words and hard deeds." An open 
rebellion among state and national Republicans had erupted 
over federal desegregation pressures. On July 17, 1970 CBS 
led off the evening news with coverage of Senator Thurmond 
publicly criticizing the Nixon administration's handling of 
school desegregation. Nixon's "breach of faith," warned 
Thurmond, could cost the president the election in 1972.
Two moves by the administration had spurred these 
criticisms. One involved the reversal of the IRS policy of 
extending tax exemptions for private academies that were 
springing up around the South to avoid integration; the 
other was the "proposed invasion of one hundred 
carpetbagging Justice Department lawyers" ordered South to 
monitor school desegregation. "I condemn these actions," 
Thurmond said. "I strongly condemn them; without end I 
condemn them. They are wrong as social policy, and they
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are wrong as law. This is the sort of program we would 
expect to get from a Democratic administration. They are a 
breach of faith with the people of the South." Nixon's 
southern point man, Harry Dent, went to work smoothing the 
feathers of Thurmond, his former boss. But just as Dent 
believed he and the President had gotten Senator Thurmond 
back on track, an HEW official leaked a story that Thurmond 
had in effect helped to integrate South Carolina schools 
for the purpose of avoiding a state-wide lawsuit that would 
hurt him politically. Although Thurmond publicly called 
the story "absolutely false," he blasted Dent and demanded 
to know who sprang the leak. Dent sent a memo to Bob 
Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, asking that the leak be 
traced and "someone properly chastised." The leak would be 
used, Dent explained, to "hurt Thurmond and the Watson for 
Governor campaign effort." The pressure from Thurmond 
compelled Nixon to backtrack. On the last day of July he 
announced that southern desegregation would not be forced, 
and that justice department desegregation monitors would be 
sent into the South only upon request. Justice department 
officials, responsible for implementing the policy, 
admitted confusion as to exactly what the current 
administration position demanded or allowed.46
The administration's actions and the president's 
vacilations had rendered Nixon so unpopular in the South, 
said Thurmond, that he would not want the president
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campaigning for him in South Carolina. Neither did Watson. 
The president's popularity, according to a high source in 
the Watson campaign, had declined in the state due to the 
school situation. The gubernatorial candidate arranged for 
Vice-President Spiro Agnew to make several stops in the 
state. Agnew visited Greenville in October and denied that 
the Nixon administration had raised false hopes with its 
opposition to busing. "I don't think there's much doubt in 
the minds of the people of the South how Judge Haynsworth 
or Judge Carswell would have felt about compulsory busing," 
Agnew said. "If we are given a Senate where the Republicans 
have a majority," he continued, "we should be able to get a 
southern strict constructionist on the Supreme Court."47
In September, in response to West's efforts to move 
closer to his opponent's position, Albert Watson moved 
farther to the right. He ran a five-minute television 
commercial in which the candidate narrated over footage of 
black rioters. "Are we going to be ruled by the bloc?" 
asked Watson. "Look what it did in Watts . . .  in the 
nation's capital." Following Watson's question, film clips 
showed clashes between police and black rioters. In the 
wake of criticisms Watson refused to "label" the 
commercial. Watson said at a news conference that the 
people of the state could decide for themselves if his 
campaign was "racist." The usually conservative Greenville 
News expressed its decision clearly in an editorial that
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said "the Republican campaign has to be regarded as racist 
to a disturbing degree." The Republican mayor of 
Greenville, South Carolina, R. Cooper White Jr., also made 
up his mind when he accused Watson of conducting a campaign 
that was "polarizing the races" and refused to greet Watson 
and Vice President Agnew during a campaign stop in his 
city. In the midst of the controversy Senator Thurmond 
recorded a radio and television spot in support of the 
Republican candidate. "Albert Watson will stand up and 
fight for the people," said Thurmond. "The South is under 
attack and we need a man who will exert positive leadership 
in this time of crisis." And in an interview Thurmond 
rejected charges of racism in Watson's campaign. "I know 
of nothing Watson has said that he could be accused of 
being a racist," said Thurmond in an interview. "But the 
Democrats down here have tried to accuse him of that. Some 
of the liberal press has. It is purely expedient politics 
to do that. But I'm confident he has not done or said 
anything which would make him guilty of racism.
The South Carolina Republican Newsletter blamed the 
injection of race into the campaign on the opposition. 
"Democratic leaders in this state will stop at nothing to 
win this election . . . even to the point of calling our 
candidate a racist," asserted the newsletter in October.
The opposition party had "used, abused, and manipulated the 
Negroes in this state for their own personal political and
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economic gain. Every knowledgeable person is aware of 
this. ”49
The Greenville Piedmont condemned Watson's 
concentration on the bloc vote in the campaign and his 
commercial question: "Are we going to be ruled by the 
bloc?" The paper asked voters if they would want a person 
in a position of statewide power "who would make such a 
prurient TV appeal to racism? "so
Harry Dent circulated an internal memo at the White 
House [for Bryce Harlow] refuting accusations of racist 
intent in Watson's campaign. Dent criticized a feature 
article in the Los Angeles Times on the South Carolina 
gubernatorial campaign as badly slanted against Watson.
The reporter even tried to portray the Republican candidate 
as further to the right on the race question than George 
Wallace, complained Dent. "This is simply not so." Dent 
said that the writer had taken Watson's comments concerning 
racism out of context and included a transcript of Watson 
being questioned on a South Carolina telecast. While 
alluding to the five-minute television program that 
concentrated on a bloc vote in the state, Dent claimed that 
it had been "done in haste" and without the candidate's 
"prior review as I understand it," and Dent pointed out 
that it had been pulled off the air almost immediately.51
When accused of racist campaign tactics Watson 
replied: "If they're calling me 'racist' then they're
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calling the majority of the people of this state 'racist.'.
. . I'll stand with the people." Watson believed that the 
Democrats were "trying the same liberal trick against me 
that is daily used against our courageous Vice President, 
who continues, as I am doing, to tell it like it is," 
charged Watson. "Just as his liberal critics have not 
silenced Vice President Agnew, I will not be silenced by 
mine." Watson's fiery rhetoric of resistance spoke to the 
frustration of many whites in the state. And Watson did 
little to discourage this identification. "Only thing 
folks are talking about is if the colored are gonna run our 
schools or if we are," one white South Carolina truck 
driver told the New York Times. "For my money only one man 
is standing up for white folks, and that's Albert Watson." 
Indeed Watson's approach seemed effective among some South 
Carolinians. In October the 1968 George Wallace campaign 
leadership in the state endorsed Watson. This endorsement 
came despite the fact that Wallace's own American 
Independent party had a candidate running for governor who 
claimed George Wallace's unannounced support.52
In October Watson called for a probe into school 
disrupt." ' 5fter a racial fight erupted at Flora High 
School in Columbia while two of his aides happened to be 
there with a cameraman. Watson called an "emergency" news 
conference where he strongly urged the state legislature to 
pass an anti-busing bill. Senator Thurmond praised Watson
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for "doing his duty" in speaking out about school trouble 
in Columbia. David Eisenhower, son of one former 
Republican president and son-in-law of the current one, 
visiting South Carolina at the time, added his praise for 
Watson as one who recognized that "law and order is not a 
code word for racism but a legitimate demand for every 
American citizen."53
Governor McNair angrily accused Watson of inciting the 
incident and exploiting racial trouble at the high school. 
So too did the Columbia police department. John West made 
no mention of Watson but issued a statement calling the 
"safety and future of children" too important for partisan 
politics. In an editorial, the State took Watson to task 
for commandeering the school integration issue. The 
candidate had perhaps struck "political oil," but the 
editorial warned of explosive gases, i.e. human emotions. 
"Mr. Watson is a polished political performer with a keen 
appreciation of what people want to hear." The editorial 
pointed out that Watson had supported freedom of choice, 
anti-busing legislation and stronger discipline in schools 
and that these matters had struck responsive chords among 
most citizens. But the newspaper pointed out that freedom 
of choice had been ruled out by the Supreme Court and that 
unless it changed or Congress and the states approved a 
Constitutional amendment then the state could do nothing to 
restore freedom of choice integration plans. On the issue
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of busing to achieve racial balance the paper pointed out 
that the Supreme Court had the issue under consideration 
and that the South Carolina legislature could do nothing to 
influence the outcome. The State expressed the hope that 
in the emotional atmosphere surrounding these issues that 
Watson and all other candidates would "guard against 
letting exploitation develop into explosion.1,54
While Watson's rhetoric and actions suggested that if 
elected he would do something about unpopular methods of 
mixing the races, West made no promises. "False promises 
and political rhetoric," said West, "have complicated 
problems in newly integrated schools." And busing, 
according to West, was a "phony issue. We are all against 
busing," West maintained. Earlier that year the largely 
Democratic state legislature had passed a law that forbid 
the assignment of children to schools to meet racial 
quotas. "It is not in the scope of your governor to do any 
more than has now been done." Only the Supreme Court or 
Congress could decide the issue and regardless of what they 
decided, West maintained, "we've got to provide quality 
education for every black and white child despite the 
disenchantment, disappointment, and frustration. We can't 
afford to withdraw one iota of our support of public 
education. The future of South Carolina depends on it.”
And in a state wide mailing West wrote: "Right now, our 
state has no greater challenge than the preservation and
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defense of our public school system. There are no easy 
solutions and politicians who promise them only compound 
the problems by deluding the people."55
Relying on survey data shortly before the election, 
Republicans believed that their candidate led among those 
committed voters but that more than thirty percent of the 
voters had not made up their minds as to how they would 
vote in the upcoming governor's race. "This is an 
unusually high percentage of undecided voters at this 
stage." During the first two weeks of October the 
Republicans commissioned pollsters to ask the opinions of 
480 white voters in twenty-eight counties and forty-six 
precincts that voted within a few percentage points of the 
way the entire state had voted in previous elections. When 
asked about problems facing the state, thirty-nine percent 
responded that racial problems concerned them most while 
twenty-nine percent believed that education and school 
problems (presumably meaning recent integration orders) 
topped the list. When asked what they thought about recent 
large-scale public school integration, sixty-four percent 
characterized these actions as bad while only eighteen 
percent called them good. But when asked the results of 
the integration measures thirty-eight percent said things 
had gone better than they expected while only nine percent 
said it had been worse than they thought it would be.5*
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Indeed integration had gone quite well in South 
Carolina's ninety-three school districts. Even Strom 
Thurmond High School in Edgefield County had been 
desegregated. M. Hayes Mizell a white civil rights 
activist contended that the school districts had done 
"pretty much what they're supposed to do," he said. "I get 
no feedback from blacks of chicanery." James Klybume, 
head of the state's committee on farm workers, and the 
first black member of the state legislature, believed the 
revulsion to the violence at Lamar in March had contributed 
to the peaceful school integration that fall. "The sight 
on national television of parents overturning a bus was too 
much for South Carolinians," said Klybume. "They were 
determined not to let it happen again." Robert S. Davis, 
head of the state's Education Advisory Committee set up by 
the Nixon administration to help smooth the desegregation 
process believed that businessmen were largely responsible. 
"We sold the business community on the idea that if public 
education goes down the drain, then business goes down the 
drain," said Davis. "We didn't tell them desegregation was 
right or humane or Christian.1,57
Rather than applauding the success of South 
Carolinians for gracefully acquiescing to a difficult 
situation, Albert Watson sought to stir up feelings of 
resentment resulting from school integration. Watson 
wrapped up his campaign concentrating on the three largest
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cities of the state which happened to be those areas 
hardest hit by desegregation: Columbia, Charleston and 
Greenville. He boiled his message down into a "neatly 
packaged twenty-minute talk stressing economy, school 
discipline and crime." Watson tied school discipline and 
lawlessness together and then proclaimed this "the issue in 
the campaign."58
With more than 220,000 registered black voters among 
the state total of almost 900,000, John West was counting 
on a coalition of white and black voters to seat him in the 
governor's chair. West, stumping the state in the last 
week of the election, outlined the progress the state had 
made under Democratic rule and proclaimed that "the real 
issue" in the election was "whether we continue our 
progress of recent years or stop, change directions and 
turn back the clock."59
Most newspapers in South Carolina endorsed John West. 
The largest daily newspaper, the State, did so even though 
the editor of the newspaper had run for the United States 
Senate as a Republican in 1962, and the paper had endorsed 
Richard Nixon in 1968. Readers of the State contributed 
their opinions to the newspaper concerning the candidates a 
few days before the election. "I am particularly impressed 
with the calm, reasonable manner in which Mr. West has 
approached the problems in our schools," said one reader 
from Blythewood. "His refusal to resort to emotional
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appeals, but to firmly stand up for quality education and 
law and order has captured my respect. I agree with his 
opposition to busing to achieve racial equality and his 
support of the neighborhood school concept." Noting the 
recent visit by Spiro Agnew to the state, a man from 
Blackville believed that voters would demand a governor who 
"can offer more than an echo of the rhetoric of the Vice 
President. . . .  Let us not fool ourselves. There are no 
simple answers to the problems that confront our state and 
nation. . . . The issue, then, is one of leadership versus 
destructive and reckless rhetoric."60
Robert McNair, the outgoing governor also feared what 
a Watson victory could bring. "I can see all the good 
we've done in handling the school situation, under adverse 
conditions, just being lost." McNair need not have 
worried, his lieutenant governor won over fifty-two percent 
of the vote. Watson received almost forty-six percent, and 
A. w. Bethea of Wallace's American Independent party 
received only two percent of the vote. West garnered over 
ninety percent of the black vote accounting for fifty-six 
percent of his total. That made him the first South 
Carolina governor to receive more black votes than white. 
But he also pulled support from both Nixon and Wallace 
voters. For example, in the upper middle-class suburban 
Arcadia precinct near Columbia, Nixon in 1968 had received 
667 votes, compared with 132 for Humphrey and 69 for
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Wallace. Watson won this precinct, but only by 23 votes 
out of 843 votes cast. Wallace carried Anderson County in 
1968 with a majority of 6,419 votes, while Nixon and 
Humphrey achieved a combined total of 5,043. West defeated 
Watson in Anderson County by almost a two to one margin, 
10,532 to 5,362. In Columbia's Ward Nine, where all but 24 
of the 1,904 registered voters were black, it was West 
1,006 and Watson 19. Even Nixon voters reacted against 
Watson's raucous rhetoric of resistance, and Wallace 
voters, many of them traditional Democrats, saw little 
improvement in the Nixon administration. And the influence 
of Strom Thurmond was greatly diminished by the actions of 
the Nixon administration and the airing of the "broken 
promises" commercials by the West campaign.61
There was no shortage of Republicans offering 
evaluations of Watson's loss. Arthur Ravenel wrote to 
Harry Dent after the election with harsh words for the GOP 
in the state. "The idiocy of this 'the Party will not 
change direction' is astounding. The only direction we 
need to change is not from conservative to liberal, as 
Harris implies, [Ray Harris, state party chairman] but from 
negative, which Watson proved bankrupt, to positive."62
Harry Dent summed up the election from his vantage 
point in Washington. "Obviously, the entire school problem 
was of great concern, but to my knowledge," Dent said, "it 
was never determined exactly what the average voter wanted
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done -- or not done -- about it." Dent maintained that the 
Watson campaign was labelled as racist because of the 
television ads and the last minute appeal for school 
discipline. "Carefully considered, however, these, in 
themselves, could not be considered 'racist'. . ." The 
Watson campaign suffered the onus of racism, Dent believed, 
because of its inability to define any other issue. "We 
did not hit long enough on the right to be creditable, nor 
were we . . . palatable to the center. Although the 
incumbent Administration was attacked for its wrongs, we 
offered virtually no positive programs to offset these 
wrongs. . . . To my knowledge, there was no conscious 
development or study of issues, but rather reaction to 
isolated events.63
The South Carolina R^pnhl ican Newsletter claimed 
unrepentently that Democratic accusations of racism leveled 
at their party for mentioning the "bloc vote" had cost them 
the election. "Yet, during the final days of the campaign, 
the news media consistently reported on the importance of 
the Negro vote in John West's campaign. What Republicans 
were accused of promoting became a fact of life in the end.
. . . The news media reported that 97 percent of the Negro 
vote went for the Democrat ticket. It wasn't the 'silent 
majority' that elected Mr. West as he claimed, but rather a 
vocal minority." Moderate white voters "who in previous 
elections voted Republican gave support this year to the
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Democrat ticket," claimed the newsletter. "This can be 
credited to two things: a)the unfounded 'racism' charges 
against Republicans; and b)unfair treatment by the news 
media. Democrats exploited the 'racism' charge, and the 
news media gave them all the support they needed."64
One prominent Republican pointed the finger of blame 
at his own party. James Duffy evaluated Republican efforts 
bluntly in a letter to Harry Dent. "The campaign was lost 
because our party ran a stupid race. All other reasons, or 
excuses, stem from this one base. . . .  We will not 
immediately gain the black vote. . . . If we never are 
positive, and we certainly have not been, we will never 
take the first step. Better to lose an election by 
appealing to all and then win the next election then [sic] 
to never make an appeal and never win." In another letter 
to a political consultant who had worked with the Ravenel 
campaign, Duffy said that the state GOP "managed to take a 
certain winner and blow the election. . . . The story is a 
long one but essentially it was racist oriented and that 
would not wash with too many non-party Republicans who 
would not vote for what they considered to be the Wallace 
image." And in a letter to the failed Republican 
lieutenant gubernatorial candidate, Duffy wrote: "No one 
suggests making a deal for any votes, bloc or otherwise.
But by the same token it is absolutely necessary that we
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counteract the negative image some of our leadership is 
burdened with."6S
Another Republican intimately involved in the race 
gave his own assessment of the campaign. On election night 
Senator Thurmond put his arm around the defeated candidate 
and said: "Well, Albert, this proves we can't win elections 
any more by cussin' Nigras." Not long after this election 
Strom Thurmond began to develop a new image. In February 
1971 Harry Dent discussed plans in an interview with a 
South Carolina newspaper to build a new image for the 
senator. "We've got to get him on the high ground of 
fairness on the race question," Dent said. "We've got to 
get him in a position where he can't be attacked like 
Watson was attacked by liberals as being a racist."
Shortly thereafter Thurmond took his former aide's advise 
and hired a black staff member, former Voter Education 
Project official Thomas Moss, to help coordinate race 
relations between the senator and his state's electorate. 
Others in the Republican party also saw the need for 
change. The new state GOP chairman said that the party 
would seek to attract black voters by convincing them that 
conservative principles will provide the best government 
for all the people. And in a memo from the Republican 
executive committee to GOP officers at all levels around 
the state was this advice: "We shouldn't talk about seeking 
black votes and vice versa we should stop talking about
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block votes. . . .  As Republicans we should offer all 
voters the same -- the opportunity to participate. That's 
all - - n o  more, no less. As Republicans, we should make no 
special public plea -- just let everybody know this party 
is open."66
By not welcoming South Carolina blacks into the GOP in 
1970, the party made sure that West would receive the black 
vote with very little effort or accommodation. The extreme 
Republican position on busing allowed West to promise 
little more than compliance with the law. Although West 
moved to the right in the course of the campaign, he could 
always answer the wild rhetoric of Watson with calm and 
dignified assurances that he would resist federal 
desegregation pressures while maintaining law and order and 
providing quality education for all the state's children. 
This played well on television. West drove home the 
futility of defiance, advocated by the Republicans, with an 
effective television advertising campaign that pointed to 
the broken promises of the Nixon administration and Senator 
Thurmond in slowing the pace of desegregation. While 
Watson's fiery speeches and the resulting mob violence 
embarassed South Carolinians and reminded them of the 
turbulent disruptions of the previous decade, West urged 
voters to "Elect A Good Man Governor." After he won the 
election West demonstrated that he meant to live up to his 
slogan with statements promising an end to racial politics.
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"We in the South have too long been concerned with the 
problem of race," said the new governor. "For the last 30 
years it has been the burning issue in political campaigns. 
It has taken most of the thoughts and energies of 
candidates. . . .  I would hope last fall's campaign would 
be the last time race will be the issue in the governor's 
race." In his inaugural address West signalled a change in 
his state. "The politics of race and divisiveness 
fortunately have been soundly repudiated in South 
Carolina," West said. "We pledge to minority groups no 
special status other than full-fledged responsibility in a 
government that is totally color-blind.1,67
End Notes
1. V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New 
York: Random House, 1949), 131.
2. Jack Bass and Walter Devries, The Transformation of 
Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequences 
Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 258, 256.
3. Florida Times Union. 24 January 1970, Al, All; Jack 
Bass, Porgy Comes Home: South Carolina . . . After 300 
Years (Columbia, South Carolina: R.L. Bryan Company, 1972), 
78; Ripon Forum. July-August 1970, 65.
4. Facts on File. 1970, 39, 54; Bass & Devries, 
Transformation. 260; Bass, Porgy. 68-9; Wall Street 
Journal. 28 October 1970, 18.
5. Bass, Porgy. 76, 71, 73.
6. Michael Spivey and Robert D. Voreis, "A Study of Voting 
Behavior of Laurens County" 13 Feb 70, in Folder 136, James 
Duffy papers, Special Collections, Clemson University.
7. New York Times. 30 November 1969, 111.
272
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8. Flyer dated August 1970, "Citizens for Watson," Folder 
141, James Duffy papers; New York Times. 30 November 1969, 
111; Piedmont (Greenville, South Carolina), 19 November 
1969; New York Times. 22 March 1970, 44.
9. New York Times. 30 November 1970, 111; Piedmont. 9 
December 1969, 2.
10. Greenville News. 19 December 1969; Ibid.. 7 March 
1968; both in folder 143, James Duffy papers.
11. Arthur Ravenel to William B. DePass, Jr., 23 December 
1969, Folder 134, James Duffy papers; Arthur Ravenel to 
Harry Dent, 13 January 1970, Box 6, Folder 207, Harry Dent 
papers, Special Collections, Clemson University.
12. James Duffy to Harry Bandouvers, 13 February 1970, 
folder 136, James Duffy papers; James Duffy to Richard 
Hines, 31 January 1970, Folder 135, James Duffy papers.
13. Los Anaeles Times. 11 October 1970, 4A.
14. Tiger (Clemson University), 20 February 1970, Folder 
143, James Duffy papers;
15. Invitation letter from Dennis Moore, 7 January 1970, 
Folder 135, James Duffy papers.
16. Letters in folder 134-5, James Duffy papers.
17. Arthur Ravenel to Harry Dent, 13 January 1970, Box 6, 
Folder 207, Harry Dent papers, Clemson University.
18. Letter Duffy to Ravenel, 27 February 1970, folder 137, 
Duffy papers; John West interview with author, 5 July 1994; 
Letters in box 23, folder labeled "political affairs -- 
campaigns -- April to December 1970," Strom Thurmond 
papers, Special Collections, Clemson University.
19. John West interview by author 5 July 1994.
20. Bass and Devries, Transformation. 258.
21. New York Times. 24 February 1970, 28; Piedmont. 24 
February 1970, 7.
22. Charlotte Observer. 23 February 1970, npn; Piedmont.
24 February 1970, 7, both articles in folder 143, James 
Duffy papers; Bass, Porcry. 390.
23. Duffy to Ravenel, 25 February 1970, folder 137, James 
Duffy papers.
273
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
24. Thurmond news release, 5 March 1970, box 6, folder 
207, Dent papers, Clemson University; Washington Post. 7 
March 1970, A3.
25. State (Columbia, South Carolina), 4 March 1970, 12A.
26. Television News Index and Abstracts (Nashville, 
Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Television News Archive), 
2-5 March 1970.
27. Washington Post. 7 March 1970, A3; Thurmond news 
release, 5 March 1970, box 6, folder 207, Harry Dent 
papers, Clemson University; Washington Post. 7 March 1970, 
A3.
28. Typed letter with "Confidential" hand-written across 
top, from Llewellyn ? to Bill ?, 2 March 1970, folder 138, 
James Duffy papers.
29. Mary Daniel to Duffy, 12 March 1970, folder 138, James 
Duffy papers.
30. Duffy Memo, 12 March 1970, folder 138, James Duffy 
papers.
31. Duffy to Harry Bandouveris, 25 March 1970, folder 138, 
James Duffy papers.
32. Ravenel to Colonel. C.A. Nelson, 11 March 1970, folder 
138, James Duffy papers.
33. "Statement of Principles" adopted by South Carolina 
Republican Convention, 21 March 1970, folder 138, James 
Duffy papers.
34. Dent to Watson, 27 April 1970, box 6, folder 207,
Harry Dent papers, Clemson University.
35. South Carolina Repnhlican Newsletter. 10 September 
1970, 2-3, folder 141, James Duffy papers; Nadine Cohodas, 
Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 411; State. 1 November 1970, 
8A; Ibid.. 31 October 1970, 3A.
36. State. 1 November 1970, 8A; Ibid.. 31 October 1970, 3A.
37. Thurmond to President Nixon, 30 April 1970, box 6, 
folder 202, Harry Dent papers, Clemson University.
38. Memorandum draft Vice President Agnew to President 
Nixon, dated [c. 1970], box 6, folder 207, Harry Dent 
papers, Clemson University.
274
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
39. Watson to President Nixon, 5 May 1970, box 6, folder
207, Harry Dent papers, Clemson University.
40. Charlotte Observer. 12 July 1970, 1C.
41. Charleston News and Courier. 17 July 1970, IB.
42. John West interview by author, 5 July 1994; Bass and 
Devries, Transformation. 262; Charleston News & Courier. 11 
July 1970, 1.
43. State. 29 October 1970, IB; John West interview by 
author, 5 July 1994.
44. Charlotte Observer. 11 July 1970, IB; Charleston News 
& Courier. 23 July 1970, 5C.
45. South Carolina Republican Newsletter. 10 Sept 70, 2-3,
in folder 141, James Duffy papers; John West interview by 
author 5 July 1994.
46. Memo Dent to Bob Haldeman, 31 July 1970, box 6 folder 
207, Harry Dent papers, Clemson University; Washington 
Post. 18 July 1970, Al; Ibid.. 25 July 1970, A2; Television 
News Index and Abstracts. 17 July 1970, 31 July 1970 & 6 
August 1970.
47. Washington Post. 25 July 1970, A2; Los Angeles Times. 
11 October 1970, 4A; State. 28 October 1970, 3B.
48. New York Times. 4 October 1970, 33; Greenville News.
11 September 1970, 4; State. 7 October 1970, IB; Ibid.. 3 
October 1970, 7A; Washington Post. 30 October 1970, Al, A 7 .
49. South Carolina Republican Newsletter, 16 October 1970,
folder 142, James Duffy papers.
50. Piedmont. 9 September 1970, editorial page, in folder 
143, James Duffy papers.
51. Memorandum for Bryce Harlow from Dent, 14 October
1970, Box 6, folder 207, Harry Dent papers, Clemson
University.
52. State. 25 October 1970, 6B; Los Angeles Times. 11 
October 1970, 4A; Wall Street Journal. 28 October 1970, 1; 
New York Times. 24 October 1970, 13; State. 12 October 
1970, IB.
53. State. 16 October 1970, 1A; Ibid.. 18 October 1970,
2B; New York Times. 24 October 1970, 13; State. 28 October 
1970, IB.
275
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
54. Ibid.. 17 October 1970, 1A; Ibid.. 18 October 1970, 
2B.
55. Ibid.. 1 November 1970, 1A; Ibid.. 28 October 1970,
IB; Ibid.. 29 October 1970, IB; Ibid.. 20 October 70, IB; 
Wall Street Journal. 28 October 1970, 1, 18; John West 
letter to Mr. & Mrs. James Duffy, 23 October 1970, folder 
142, James Duffy papers.
56. South Carolina Republican Newsletter. 16 October 1970, 
folder 142, James Duffy papers; "Voter Opinion Survey - SC -
Oct 2-15, 1970" Central Surveys Incorporated, Shenandoah, 
Iowa, box 6, folder 181, Harry Dent papers, Clemson 
University.
57. Cleveland Plain Dealer. 28 September 1970, box 4, 
folder 104, Harry Dent papers, Clemson University.
58. State, l November 1970, 1A.
59. Ibid.. Atlanta Journal. 23 August 1971, 4A; State. 1 
November 1970, 1A.
60. State. 30 October 1970, IB; Bass, Porcry. 39; State. 31 
October 1970, 13A.
61. Wall Street Journal. 28 October 1970, 18; Atlanta 
Journal. 23 August 1971, 4A; Bass, Porgy. 40.
62. Letter from Arthur Ravenel to Harry Dent, 24 November 
1970, folder 142, James Duffy papers.
63. Undated document assessing Watson campaign by Harry 
Dent, box 6, folder 207, Harry Dent papers, Clemson 
University.
64. South Carolina Republican Newsletter. 24 November 
1970, 2, in folder 142, James Duffy papers.
65. Letters Duffy to Harry Dent and Duffy to Harry 
Bandouveris, both dated 25 November 1970, also letter Duffy 
to James Henderson, 9 November 1970, all in folder 142,
James Duffy papers.
66. Cohodas, Strom Thurmond. 412; New York Times. 17 
October 1971, 46; Charlotte Observer. 12 January 1971, 1C; 
Aiken Standard. 16 February 1971; Peirce, Deep South. 402; 
Memo from Dan Ross to GOP County, District and State 
officers, November 1970, 3, folder 142, James Duffy papers.
67. Atlanta Journal. 23 August 1971, 1A, 4A; New York 
Times. 20 January 1971, 1.
276
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 6 
GEORGIA
Georgia, a deep-South state that had often served as a 
bellwether for the region as a whole, reflected the 
ambivalence of the South. Before 1970, the state had more 
difficulty with race relations than much of the upper 
South, but seldom demonstrated the defiance of the other 
deep-South states. The civil rights movement had persuaded 
many Georgians of the injustice of de jure segregation 
while strict federal enforcement convinced others that 
defiance of civil rights laws was futile. Yet the pace of 
integration and the threat of busing school children out of 
their neighborhoods tempered the newly formed moderation 
among the state's largely white electorate. In 1970 
Georgia, like the other southern states which elected 
governors that year, chose a young, moderate, forward- 
looking governor. But the methods of the campaign in 
Georgia differed from those other states. In Arkansas, 
Florida and South Carolina, the successful candidates spoke 
in the quiet tones of moderation and assiduously avoided 
giving voice to the rhetoric of desegregation defiance, 
while their noisy opponents, all of whom either represented 
the demagogic past, or at least its tactics, proved that 
blatant racial politics no longer appealed to the bulk of 
white voters. In Georgia a figure from the past who as 
governor had introduced the tactics of political moderation
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in the early 1960s sought to reclaim the governor's chair. 
But the successful candidate would master new techniques 
for binding a diverse and ambivalent coalition by tapping 
into class resentments that included race antagonisms 
without calling direct attention to race.
By 1970 certain prominent features of Georgia's 
political landscape were becoming clear. On the one hand, 
Georgia was going to have the first black candidate for 
governor in its history, and black voters constituted 
twenty percent of the electorate. On the other hand, 1970 
would be the first gubernatorial election since George 
Wallace carried Georgia in his 1968 bid for the presidency, 
and the state's electorate remained highly receptive to his 
brand of anti-establishment, anti-integration rhetoric. To 
complicate matters further, the Republican party, for the 
first time since Reconstruction, had a good chance of 
capturing Georgia's governorship. In 1966 the Republican 
candidate had actually received a plurality of the votes in 
the general election, but had lost when the lack of a 
majority for any candidate threw the election into the 
heavily Democratic state legislature. The outcome of that 
decision placed Lester Maddox in the governor's chair, who 
before entering politics had gained national notoriety by 
using axe-handles to prevent blacks from entering the 
Atlanta chicken restaurant he owned.
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In other words, Georgia would be standing at a 
crossroads in 1970. In which direction would it go? Did 
Lester Maddox's election in 1966 indicate a trend, or was 
it just a fluke? If the Georgia political scene just prior 
to Maddox's election was any indication, the state had 
stumbled off its path and would probably resume its 
previous course. The state's governor from 1963 to 1967, 
Carl Sanders, had been one of the first southern 
politicians to stake out and hold to a moderate position on 
racial matters. Sanders promised to use "every legal means 
to preserve segregation of the races in Georgia," but he 
also vowed that he would govern with dignity. "I won't 
cause you and your state to be spread across headlines all 
over the nation, and cause you embarrassment." According 
to the Christian Science Monitor. Sanders was "one of the 
South's most moderate, progressive chief executives." He 
ran promising to keep public schools open even if it meant 
integrating them, and as governor, he stuck to his promise. 
Moreover, he kept a tight reign on the legislature and 
never allowed it to influence public opinion with anything 
like the series of anti-integration enactments passed by 
many southern state legislatures of the time. At the end 
of his term Sanders remained immensely popular; had Georgia 
law not prevented successive gubernatorial terms, he would 
almost certainly have been reelected in 1966. During his 
four years out of office Sanders continued to have strong
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political and financial support; virtually all political 
observers considered him the odds-on favorite to win in 
1970. Sanders' popularity and strong support suggested 
that Georgia in 1970 would resume her moderate-liberal 
course, after a four-year Maddox aberration.1
On the other hand, the enormous popularity Maddox had 
gained during his four years in office could not be 
ignored. Some Georgians had wildly applauded his branding 
of integration as "un-American, un-Godly and even criminal" 
and had responded to his criticism of busing with a zeal 
not seen in the state for many years. Maddox's popularity, 
taken in conjunction with the 1968 Wallace-for-president 
vote in the state, could well be read as an indication that 
in 1970, Georgia was destined for another Maddox-like 
Democrat or even a like-minded Republican.2
With Maddox prevented by constitutional provision from 
succeeding himself and with no fiery segregationist of 
prominence, Carl Sanders would be the man to beat. William 
Hamilton, a Washington pollster hired by another candidate, 
Jimmy Carter, conducted five polls between September 1969 
and October 1970. The first of these surveys confirmed 
what most political observers already suspected. Eighty- 
four percent of Georgia voters had a favorable view of 
Sanders' governorship, and twenty percent rated him 
"excellent." Hamilton noted in his report to Carter that 
"this is one of the best job ratings I have ever seen given
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a former governor after three years out of office." If the 
election were held immediately, Hamilton's poll indicated, 
Sanders would get fifty-three percent of the vote and 
Carter only twenty-one percent. But the report also 
pointed out that no one had started "shooting at" Sanders 
yet and that Carter had plenty of time to build a 
"favorable image" among voters who did not yet know him.3
Moreover, Hamilton's report stressed, there were a few 
chinks in Sanders' armor. From twenty to twenty-five 
percent of Sanders' support was "soft," meaning there was 
something about him that his supporters did not like: his 
affluence since leaving the governor's office, his ties to 
the "Atlanta bigwigs", his closeness to Washington. The 
poll echoed a 1968 memo to an aide scribbled by Carter: 
"Some images to be projected regarding Carl Sanders . . . 
refuses to let Georgia Democrats have a voice in the 
Democratic party . . . Atlanta-oriented . . . pretty . . . 
nouveau riche . . . excluded George Wallace from state . .
. right now we just need to collect all these rough ideas 
we can. Later we can start driving a wedge between me and 
him." Hamilton's poll, therefore, confirmed Carter's 
earlier assessment of Sanders and convinced Carter to 
portray Sanders as a rich "brash, young, eager man who 
doesn't deserve to be governor" and himself as a humble 
country boy who was "not going to let him be."4
281
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
The 1970 race was not Carter's first try for Georgia's 
governorship. He had run four years earlier, in 1966. 
Carter did not like being positioned on the left or right 
of the political spectrum, saying "I believe that I'm a 
more complicated person than that." But in 1966 Carter 
appealed to moderate-liberal voters and conducted a 
gentlemanly, non-racist campaign. Bruce Galphin of the 
Atlanta Constitution wrote at the time that it was hard to 
meet Jimmy Carter and hear him talk without "admiring his 
integrity." Carter, Galphin went on to say, was a breed of 
politician new to Georgia, subdued, frank even about his 
deficiencies, and unwilling "to torture the traditional 
whipping boys." In 1966, race was still Georgia's most 
readily exploitable political issue. But Jimmy Carter had 
refused to use it. He was not a racist. Years earlier in 
his hometown of Plains, Carter had refused, in the face of 
considerable pressure, to join the White Citizens Council, 
and in a heated congregational squabble he made an 
impassioned speech in favor of allowing blacks to worship 
in his church. As a state senator, he made one of his 
first speeches in opposition to Georgia's infamous "thirty 
questions" law used to disqualify black voters.5
Though he finished a surprisingly close third in the 
1966 race, Lester Maddox's victory convinced Jimmy Carter 
that the racial issue, like it or not, could not be 
ignored. After his 1966 loss, therefore, Carter began some
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hard thinking and decided two things. One, he would run 
again in 1970. That surprised no one who knew him or had 
watched him closely. As one journalist observed, "to go 
out and make nice speeches and lose is not Jimmy Carter's 
style." The other thing Jimmy Carter decided was, as he 
later wrote in his autobiography, that he "did not intend 
to lose again." That meant he was going to have to make a 
third decision.6
Eight years earlier, George Wallace, like Jimmy 
Carter, had lost his 1958 bid for Alabama's governorship 
because he was perceived as more moderate than his race- 
baiting opponent, John Patterson. As a result, Wallace had 
decided, and declared, that he would never be "out-nigguhed 
again." Jimmy Carter was going to have to decide if he 
would go in the same direction, and if so, how far. Before 
he made that decision, he waited to see how the Georgia 
political situation would shape up in 1970.7
Not surprisingly, Carl Sanders' candidacy dominated 
the political landscape. A reputation as a racial moderate 
coupled with the widespread backing of the growing moderate 
electorate along with his record of progressive governance 
made Sanders the man to beat. If a candidate expected to 
be successful his strategy must cut into Sanders' appeal. 
Jimmy Carter realized this instinctively and looked toward 
another candidate to assist him in that task. One 
contender in the Democratic primary who might cut into
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Sanders' constituency was the black candidate, C. B. King. 
King was an Albany lawyer (one of only three black 
attorneys in the state outside Atlanta in the early 1960s) 
who had played a prominent role in the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference's Albany movement in 1962. King's 
candidacy, it should be noted, was legitimate and had no 
connection with Carter's machinations. Some black leaders 
and political organizations endorsed King, but most of the 
others, believing that he could not win, even if he made 
the Democratic run-off election, supported Sanders. Few 
black voters supported the largely unknown Carter. But for 
Carter that was a blessing. King could not possibly make 
the run-off, but he might draw enough black voters to keep 
Sanders from winning on the first ballot, giving Carter a 
good chance of being in a run-off with Sanders.8
But where would Carter get enough votes to make it 
into a run-off? With his natural constituency of 
moderates, liberals, and blacks preempted by Sanders and 
King, Carter's only hope lay with the Maddox-Wallace camp. 
Getting their votes would be tricky. He would need to make 
himself attractive to Georgia's "lower status whites" as 
Numan Bartley called them in his From Thurmond to Wallace, 
the state's "most politically conservative people . . . 
racists in social attitudes, fundamentalist in religion, 
provincial in outlook." At the same time, Carter could not 
make himself so attractive to the Maddox and Wallace people
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as to permanently alienate Georgia's moderate, liberal and 
black voters. If he managed to win the Democratic 
nomination, he would need their support in the general 
election, in which he would face a Republican. The GOP had 
revealed its character by inviting Lester Maddox to join 
its ranks and by opening remarks in the state convention 
assuring newsmen that C. B. King would not be welcome in 
the Republican primary.9
Carter's plan to paint Sanders as a smug, citified 
dandy would sell well in poor rural Georgia. It always 
had. Sanders would be an easy target, for after his term 
expired he had remained in Atlanta to become a rich lawyer. 
Looking back on the campaign twenty years later, Carl 
Sanders admitted that Carter succeeded in drawing "more of 
a class distinction than a race distinction. I think he 
postured himself as a peanut farmer from outside of Atlanta 
and . . .  he pictured me as a corporate lawyer in Atlanta 
who had capitalized on being governor and who was now 
representing the fat cats and he was out there representing 
the average citizen. That's a pretty tough thing to 
overcome." Indeed it was. Carter even criticized Sanders' 
wife claiming that while his own wife shook hands with 
factory workers, Mrs. Sanders attended a fashion show. The 
actions of the wives were, Carter suggested, "symbolic" of 
the interests of the candidates: "high society versus the 
working man." Caricaturing Sanders and his wife, however,
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would not be enough. Carter would also have to appeal to 
the Maddox-Wallace people on issues. In the memo he 
dictated in 1966, Carter had noted that he might need to 
portray Sanders as too liberal for Georgia voters, "more 
liberal" was his exact phrase. And William Hamilton's poll 
of 1969 had confirmed that hunch. Hamilton noted that 
Sanders had "a slight problem with his liberal image."10
Carter decided that to win the support of the Maddox- 
Wallace followers, he was going to have to place himself to 
the right of Sanders. Although Carter was, in fact, the 
more liberal of the two, his record was not as well known 
as Sanders'. That fact made the scheme possible. As a 
first step in portraying himself as more conservative than 
Sanders, Carter made his cousin, Hugh Carter, his campaign 
manager. Hugh Carter was a good-old-boy politician with 
solid conservative credentials. His job was to reassure 
conservatives in the state that "Jimmy Carter was a safe 
man." Jimmy Carter could easily combine his planned 
portrayal of Sanders as too rich to understand the average 
man, too citified, too sophisticated and too liberal for 
Georgians, with attacks on his ties to "big government," to 
"the power elite," and to "the Washington establishment," 
all phrases George Wallace had made popular. In short, 
Carter would make Sanders into a "limousine liberal."11
But even that would not be enough. While it was true, 
as Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver pointed out in The Southern
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Strategy, that "liberal" and "conservative" were racial 
code words in the South, "liberal" meaning integrationist 
and "conservative" meaning segregationist, such code words 
alone would not convince the Maddox-Wallace camp. As much 
as he may have wished to, Jimmy Carter could not escape 
dealing with the integration issue. According to one poll, 
public sentiment that integration was moving too fast rose 
from thirty-five percent in March 1968 to fifty-four 
percent in April 1970. As Jim Gillis, Jr., a county 
commissioner and son of Georgia's powerful highway 
department director said at the time: "The school thing is 
like a funeral. The family knows you can't bring the body 
back to life, but they want you there holding their hands." 
Although Jimmy Carter never heard Gillis' analogy, he 
understood it well, and he determined to be there, holding 
the hands of Georgia's segregationists.12
At the same time he was holding hands with 
conservatives and segregationists, Jimmy Carter had to 
reach out to liberal and black voters. This was an awkward 
posture, to say the least, but one Carter found necessary 
both to assuage his conscience as well as to insure liberal 
and black support against the Republican nominee in the 
later general election. In effect, Carter's campaign plan 
called for a two-faceted -- his critics would say a two- 
faced -- campaign: one facet designed to appeal to
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segregationists and the other to give heart to liberals and 
blacks.
To obscure the inconsistencies in his two-faceted 
strategy and to excuse his personal attacks on Sanders, 
Carter cloaked the whole of his campaign in the guise of 
"populism." According to one of the early polls Hamilton 
did for Carter, eighty-one percent of the Georgia 
electorate felt alienated from government. In addition to 
integration coming too fast, they were most concerned about 
high taxes and the welfare system, "the issues of Nixon's 
forgotten man, middle America." Political pragmatism 
dictated that Carter must appeal to racist elements in 
Georgia's electorate, but he would run a "redneck" 
campaign, emphasizing class rather than race distinctions. 
He would embrace all workers in the rhetoric of populism, 
while carefully avoiding any overt appeal to racism. That 
way he could perhaps deflate the race issues. "Jimmy is a 
populist," asserted Charles Kirbo, a long-time Carter 
friend and political advisor. "Jimmy can and does appeal 
to the Wallace voter, but not on the racial thing."13
There was nothing unusual, much less unique, about 
Jimmy Carter's appeal to "populism." What James Perry of 
the National Observer called a "new populism" was sweeping 
the South in 1970. New faces in the Democratic party were 
winning elections to governors' and senators' seats by 
refocusing their party objectives in terms of the common
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man. "More important for the Democrats than specific 
issues was the successful selling of the populist symbols," 
wrote James Clotfelter and William Hamilton (Carter's 
pollster) in South Today. "The common ingredient was 
voters believing the candidate cared about what they cared 
about, that he was one of their own and would not forget 
them."14
When Carter announced his candidacy in early April 
1970, he mapped out his strategy for Steve Ball, political 
editor of the Atlanta Journal. He would aim his campaign 
at a coalition of Georgians in the middle and low-income 
brackets. This included Nixon's silent majority, the poor, 
both black and white, and the conservative Georgians who 
had voted for Lester Maddox in 1966 and for George Wallace 
in 1968. His appeal, he went on to say, would be to 
"average working people" who wanted "someone in the 
governor's office who understands their problems."15
Jimmy Carter succeeded, to be sure. But his success 
proved to be both gruesomely hard and soul-taxing. The 
only easy part was adopting, adapting, and inventing his 
own brand of "populism." In the minds of rural and urban ' 
blue-collar Georgia voters, nothing better represented the 
wealth and power of the establishment than the Atlanta 
press. "The people in the state," said one long-time 
politico, "whatever the Atlanta newspapers are for, they're 
against." Successful Georgia politicians had been
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haranguing "those lying Atlanta newspapers" since the 
campaigns of Eugene Talmadge in the 1930s. Jimmy Carter 
simply continued the tradition. He did not want, he 
insisted, the support of "the big-shots that own the 
Atlanta newspapers." He charged that the Atlanta 
Constitution made a "major editorial commitment" to smear 
him, particularly in its political cartoons. Carter's 
press aide, Bill Pope, said after the campaign: "We loved 
all those scurrilous cartoons. We just didn't want it to 
stop." Bill Shipp was right when he later wrote that 
Carter had "calculatedly incurred the wrath of the big city 
daily press."16
At the same time, Jimmy Carter made himself look as 
ordinary and colorless as he could, or at least his 
political image packager, Gerald Rafshoon, did. Billboards 
and brochures carried the ugliest photograph of Carter his 
staff could find. "It made Jimmy look like an average 
working man," a Carter campaign aide said. The picture 
made him look like "he had a little fear in him . . .  a 
little wary perhaps." That Carter made sure he looked like 
a populist was significant because, in the words of his own 
pollster, William Hamilton, Carter was a "stylistic 
populist" whose success derived not from changing specific 
policies, but from "personal campaign style."17
More uniquely his own was Jimmy Carter's ability at 
personal campaigning. He traveled the state on the civic
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club speech-making circuit; kept active in the Baptist 
church, farm organizations, business groups, and the Lions 
Club; and had himself made state chairman of the March of 
Dimes. By the time he announced his candidacy Jimmy Carter 
had visited more than 400 towns, made more than 1,800 
speeches, and met 600,000 Georgians. Once the campaign 
began in earnest, he shook thousands of hands in factory 
shift lines at five A.M. and again at midnight. Eighteen- 
hour days of non-stop campaigning were typical. In many 
small counties a visit from someone running for governor 
was rare. Carter visited most of the small counties not 
once but two or three times, and shook every hand he could 
find. Numerous observers noted the effectiveness of this 
person-to-person campaigning: "It is a peculiar thing, 
involving human warmth, and not relating at all to issues," 
wrote the Atlanta Journal's Steve Ball. "It works for him 
everywhere." Even Reg Murphy, editor of the Atlanta 
Constitution and one of Carter's severest critics, admitted 
that "one-on-one, he's probably as convincing as anybody 
I've ever seen."18
Carter found the personal campaigning natural, did not 
mind the toning down of his looks, and managed the populist 
rhetoric easily because, in his heart, he believed it. But 
Carter would also have to draw sharp class distinctions 
between himself and Carl Sanders. Carter's polls indicated 
that average voters watched television but did not read
291
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
newspapers, which dictated a TV crusade against Sanders. 
That crusade focused on portraying Jimmy Carter as the 
candidate of the working man, and Carl Sanders as the 
candidate of the ultra-rich. One commercial showed Carter 
harvesting peanuts. The voice-over asked, "can you imagine 
any of the other candidates for governor working in the hot 
August sun? Isn't it time someone spoke up for you?" 
Carter's fund-raising ads said other candidates were 
supported by "big money asking for big favors," but that 
"Jimmy Carter made it the hard way." Perhaps Carter's most 
effective commercial opened with the camera panning in on a 
closed door. Voice-over: "This is the door to an exclusive 
country club where the big-money boys play cards, drink 
cocktails, and raise money for their candidate, Carl 
Sanders." Country club door swings open; close-up of man 
writing check. Voice-over: "People like us aren't invited. 
We're too busy working for a living." Footage of Carter 
talking with an "average man." Voice-over: "That's why our 
votes are going for Jimmy Carter. Vote for Jimmy Carter, 
our kind of man, our kind of governor."19
"Carter used television effectively," remembered Bill 
Shipp, "with Gerry Rafshoon doing a whole series of some of 
the best negative advertising I've ever seen aimed at 
Sanders. And Sanders' own advertising played right into 
their hands." Sanders' advertising campaign actually 
benefited Carter. His ads were expensive, slick, and
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elitist. Sanders was pictured jogging, boating, and flying 
his plane. Sanders avoided appealing to the common man and 
portrayed himself as prosperous and prestigious. Even the 
Sanders campaign slogan did not sit well with many 
Georgians. "Carl Sanders ought to be governor again." Two 
of Sanders' own campaign aides later admitted that the 
slogan sounded like Sanders had a right to be governor, as 
if it were a "monarchial privilege."20
Carter saw his opportunity and made the most of it.
He immediately began portraying Sanders as a king who had 
robbed his subjects. In one of Carter's televised spots 
Sanders, whom Carter always called "Cuff Links Carl," was 
shown boarding a Lear jet; then the camera quickly cut to a 
close-up of a man's hand taking hold of a brief case full 
of money. At the wrists were huge cuff links. Throughout 
the campaign Carter harped on the theme that Sanders had 
"used secret-information to get rich." Over and over, 
Carter proclaimed that "Georgians never again want a 
governor who will use the tremendous power and prestige of 
office for his own personal wealth." And once, while 
campaigning at a bank, Carter stuck his head into a vault 
and quipped: "Looks like Carl Sanders' basement." When 
Sanders retorted by calling Carter a penny-ante politician, 
Carter again bested him. Yes, he said, "my campaign is 
based on peanuts, pennies, and people. That's better than 
one based on bucks, banks, and boondogles. "21
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In fact, Carl Sanders' administration had not had a 
hint of scandal about it. And Carter's own polling 
information indicated that only one percent of the 
electorate believed Sanders had used the governor's office 
for personal gain. But Jimmy Carter would make sure that 
by election day a great many more voters believed it.
Carter attacked Sanders daily and promised the press that 
he had proof of Sanders' misdeeds that he would release in 
due course. At the same time, Carter put Sanders on the 
defensive by repeatedly calling for public disclosure of 
his personal finances. Sanders lamely protested that his 
personal finances were not part of the campaign.22
Two weeks before the primary Carter released his long 
awaited "proof" that Carl Sanders had abused the powers of 
the governor's office. He charged that Sanders, while 
governor, had used his influence with the Federal 
Communications Commission to help a friend and business 
associate acquire several television and radio stations. 
Carter handed out copies of papers filed with the FCC. The 
documents listed Sanders as secretary of his friend's firm, 
gave his occupation as governor of Georgia, and listed his 
address as the governor's mansion. But the documents also 
showed that Sanders owned no stock in the company.23
Carter's bombshell had proven a dud, and the 
newspapers had a field day. Carter had, in the words of 
the Macon Telegraph, "over-promised and under-delivered."
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The Macon News labeled Carter "a classic example of a good 
man whose high standards have been undermined by political 
ambition." And the Atlanta Constitution wrote that Carter 
had gone at Sanders with a "vengeance." While Jimmy Carter 
admitted that there was no proof of illegality, he insisted 
that the facts showed "a consistent pattern of combining 
political and business interests on behalf of Mr. Sanders." 
The weakness of the response did not matter, for the damage 
to Sanders had been done. The dirty trick had worked. But 
discrediting Sanders amounted to blackening the former 
governor's character and Carter was beginning to pay the 
price of conscience. According to Phil Gardner, editor of 
the Atlanta Journal. Jimmy Carter, at the time, agonized 
over "whether he should have used the tactic in the first 
place. "2“
But Carter played far more and dirtier tricks on 
Sanders. Early in the summer the Carter campaign put out a 
series of anonymous pamphlets and "fact-sheets" that hit 
Sanders from all sides. One of the most effective was a 
photograph of Carl Sanders being doused with champagne by a 
black Atlanta Hawks basketball player during a victory 
celebration. The picture became known as the "champagne 
shampoo." Copies were mailed to small-town barbershops, 
rural churches, service stations, and country stores, and 
were passed out at Ku Klux Klan rallies. Sanders was part 
owner of the Atlanta Hawks and the photograph originally
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had run on the sports page of the Atlanta Constitution.
But as a political flyer it reminded people that Sanders 
was rich and associated him with high-living and alcohol, 
both still bugaboos in puritanical and teetotaling rural 
Georgia.25
Most important, the photograph associated Sanders, in 
a close personal way, with blacks. That association was 
carried further by "fact-sheets" that said or implied that 
Sanders was a close ally of the controversial black state 
representative, Julian Bond (actually the two detested each 
other), that Sanders had attended the funeral of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., (which in fact, he had) and that as 
governor Sanders had conspired to keep George Wallace out 
of Georgia (Sanders did). Bill Pope, Carter's press 
secretary, prepared the leaflets and Carter's top campaign 
aide, Hamilton Jordon, directed their mailing. Such 
tactics were all part of an operation Carter campaign 
workers called the "stink tank."2*
In order to win the Democratic nomination, Jimmy 
Carter needed to draw as much black support away from 
Sanders as possible. But at the same time, he needed to 
string black voters along, for he would need their support 
in the general election in which he would face a 
Republican. The two-faceted campaign was again in play.
The "stink tank" was once again put to work. The 
Carter campaign created a fictitious "Black Concern
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Committee." The "committee" sent pamphlets that charged 
Sanders had not kept his 1962 campaign promises to black 
voters and even implied that Sanders had been responsible 
for the death of a black prison inmate. These sheets were 
mailed to black barber shops, funeral homes, and pool 
halls. Simultaneously, the Rafshoon agency, in order to 
draw black voters away from Sanders, prepared and paid for 
radio spots for C. B. King. At the same time Carter 
consistently asserted that he had "excellent support from 
the NAACP and Negro churchmen across the state," and he 
told black Atlanta leader Vernon Jordon, "You won't like my 
campaign, but you will like my administration."27
Carter also went directly to black voters. Although 
Carter's staff advised against it, he was the only white 
candidate to campaign openly in black communities. "I've 
been to see 'em in their filling stations, in their 
churches," Carter would be able to say. "I've been to see 
'em in their drugstores and in their homes." On one 
occasion, for example, Carter walked to the back of a small 
town drugstore to shake hands with a black janitor whom he 
could easily have ignored, while three whites he had just 
been talking to looked on disapprovingly. Carter promised 
to appoint black citizens to high-level state offices and 
constitutional boards: "the state ought to set the example 
in its employment," he explained.28
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In stringing black voters along even as he appealed to 
Georgia's segregationists, Carter employed dual purpose 
rhetoric with acumen. While he never outright said he was 
a segregationist, he managed to leave that impression with 
a great many voters. Hamilton Jordon told the Atlanta 
Journal that in some counties the Carter campaign actually 
set up two organizations, one designed to cultivate the 
backing of Wallace-Maddox supporters and the other to 
appeal to more moderate voters. Similarly, Republican 
candidate Hal Suit said that Carter had one brochure for 
use in extreme segregationist-minded areas of south 
Georgia, and another one for distribution in the rest of 
the state. And during the campaign Carter, on several 
occasions, gave different answers to the same questions, 
depending on where and to whom he was speaking. On one 
occasion Carter had said he was against giving a "single 
dime" to private schools; on another occasion and in a 
different place -- this time at one of the many private 
schools being established in order to avoid integration -- 
he told an audience, "you can rest assured I'll do 
everything I can for private schools." More often and more 
typically when asked about forced integration, he 
sidestepped the question with responses such as "I don't 
like being pushed around."29
Throughout the primary Carter sought to identify 
himself with George Wallace, even incorporating Wallace's
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campaign slogan, "our kind of man," into his own 
advertising. He said he expected "to have particularly 
strong support from the people who voted for George Wallace 
for President and the ones who voted for Lester Maddox."
And he repeatedly promised he would invite George Wallace 
to Georgia to right the slight done the Alabama governor by 
Sanders, who had refused to allow Wallace to speak to the 
Georgia state legislature. ABC-TV's fact-book on the 
election concluded that Carter largely "confined his 
campaign promises to one issue -- if elected governor he 
would invite George Wallace to Georgia."30
Five days before the primary Carter visited the 
Augusta police station in order to show support for two 
policemen charged in the shooting of two blacks during 
riots in Augusta. There he made a tough law-and-order 
speech. "The main thing I want you to know," Carter told 
the assembled police force, "is that when I am governor of 
Georgia, you need not ever fear I will pull the rug out 
from under you when you try to enforce the law against any 
sort of rioters or lawbreakers. I'll back you up one 
hundred percent." Press Secretary Bill Pope summed it all 
up after the election when he told the Washington Post that 
he had run a" "nigger campaign" for Carter.31
In the Democratic primary on September 9, Carter won 
handily, with 388,280 votes or 48.6 percent of the total. 
Sanders came in second with 301,179 votes, or 37.7 percent.
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Carter had missed winning without a run-off by only 10,000 
votes. Carter's strategy had worked. He had swept the 
rural areas and small towns and left Sanders only urban and 
black voters to draw from. In the counties where Lester 
Maddox did well, Carter also did well. Maddox, running for 
lieutenant governor, was the only Democrat in a multi­
candidate race to win without a run-off. In 1966 Jimmy 
Carter's liberal image served him well in the city and in 
the state's northern, generally liberal to moderate 
counties. In 1970 these were Carter's weakest areas of 
support.32
Carter still faced a run-off election with Sanders.
But Carter's unexpectedly large, 87,000-vote margin called 
for a change in tactics. In the run-off Carter would no 
longer attack Sanders, who, no longer forced to be 
defensive, would probably take the offensive and start 
attacking. Carter would then play the part of the "little 
man" being put upon by the rich and powerful Sanders.
As expected, Sanders came out swinging. Two days 
after the primary, he called a press conference and 
launched into the first of a series of attacks on Carter as 
a liar, a "smiling hypocrite," an oppressor of tenant 
farmers, and an ultra-liberal who was trying to pass 
himself off as a hard-working farmer. "The last time 
Carter worked in the fields in the hot August sun," Sanders 
shouted, "was when his slick advertising agency took the
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pictures you see on television every day." Carter had 
worked to delete the word "God" from the Georgia 
constitution, had voted against old and disabled persons, 
and had sided with organized crime, Sanders charged.
Carter was an "unprincipled grinning chameleon." Jimmy 
Carter responded by labeling Mr. Sanders "an embittered and 
desperate man . . . waging a smear campaign."33
In spite of repeated challenges by Sanders, Carter 
ruled out a debate with such a "bad loser." "My strength 
is with the people," he said, "and I intend to spend my 
time with them." In desperation Sanders had a television 
debate anyway, with an empty chair. But Carter one-upped 
him again. "Some folks," he quipped, "said the chair was 
ahead.1134
C. B. King, the black candidate who placed third in 
the Democratic primary, accused both Sanders and Carter of 
running racist campaigns. Asked for comment, Carter 
replied in a typical two-faceted statement, that he would 
appreciate any Negro votes, but added, "I can win this 
election without a single black vote." One day later 
Carter met with Roy Harris, the former chairman of 
Georgia's White Citizens Council, George Wallace's 1968 
Georgia campaign director, and editor of the racist Augusta 
Courier. At the end of the private, but much speculated 
upon meeting, Carter emerged with an endorsement from 
Harris. The Sanders camp was delighted. They immediately
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distributed a flyer featuring a cartoon of Carter climbing 
into bed with Roy Harris and saying: " . . .  move over, Roy. 
You're right! Who needs black votes." Shortly afterward, 
the Sanders people released another flyer that had pictures 
of run-down tenant houses on Carter's farm, captioned with 
a slightly altered version of the Carter campaign slogan: 
"Isn't it time someone spoke up for these people?"35
Carter immediately fired off memos to all his county 
campaign chairmen telling them to get the word out that 
Sanders was mailing "smear sheets" that attacked him 
personally and stirred up racial hatreds. He was right. 
During the final days of the run-off the Sanders campaign 
launched what amounted to a massive "smear sheet airlift." 
But Carter again outmaneuvered Carl Sanders. Local Carter 
campaign people simply met the incoming planes, posed as 
Sanders' campaign workers, picked up the "smear sheets," 
and had bonfires.36
On election day Sanders got his old supporters back to 
the polls, plus most of C. B. King's, who gave him ninety- 
three percent of the black vote. But Carter won three out 
of every four white votes and carried 135 of 159 counties 
for a sixty percent win. In rural counties he had 
routinely triumphed with three to one margins.37
Almost as good news for the Carter camp was that the 
Republican nominee was Hal Suit. If Suit's nomination 
surprised virtually everyone in the state, it delighted
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Carter and his people. Like everyone else, they had 
expected the Republicans to run James Bentley, and they 
dreaded the prospect. State Comptroller Jimmy Bentley was 
the Georgia GOP's most able politician and one of the most 
conservative political figures in the state. Elected as a 
Democrat, Bentley switched parties in 1968. Bentley had 
sent out $1,600 worth of telegrams to public officials 
warning that Earth Day was also Lennin's birthday and 
suggesting that the observances were somehow Communist 
affiliated. Like Carter, he saw that the Maddox-Wallace 
vote in Georgia would be the deciding factor in the 1970 
governor's race. Three months before the Republican 
primary Bill Shipp had written that Bentley was already 
"taking a campaign cue from George Wallace's victory in 
Alabama and is taking a hard, perhaps even vicious turn to 
the right." Bentley had begun running a television 
commercial that opened with the camera focused on an 
oncoming school bus. Voice over: "This year this bus and 
the laws that drive it threaten to change the life of your 
child. . . ." The bus roared closer and closer and loomed 
larger and larger until the screen was filled, then 
obliterated, by its front bumper and radiator grill.
Carter had placed Sanders to his left with little 
difficulty, but it would be impossible to move to the right 
of Jimmy Bentley.38
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Hal Suit, on the other hand, an Atlanta broadcaster 
virtually unknown outside the urban area, was a political 
novice. More important from the Carter camp's point of 
view, he had no established, much less well-known, 
reputation as a hard-liner on segregation. And as Newt 
Gingrich, then a history professor at West Georgia College, 
wrote: "Suit had only about one-fourth as much money as 
Carter, and about one-tenth as much organization."39 
Compared to Bentley, Suit would be a pushover. But even 
that would require careful planning and a lot of work. 
Carter would need to continue to portray himself as 
"conservative" and brand Suit a "liberal." That meant 
continued courting of the Maddox-Wallace vote. But at the 
same time, Carter wanted to appeal to moderates, urban and 
black voters.
Suit recognized the importance of a conservative label 
as well as Carter did but, in fact, there were few issues 
on which the two candidates really differed. So the two 
candidates hurled accusations of "ultra-liberal" and 
"counterfeit conservative" at each other. "The big issue 
in the lackluster contest," the Atlanta Journal observed, 
"boiled down to who is the 'liberal.'"40
In the liberal-hurling contest, Suit proved no match 
for Carter. For example, although Suit knew of Carter's 
voting for the integration of his own church in Plains, he 
considered it irrelevant to the campaign, and did not
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mention it. In retrospect he realized he should have. The 
problem, as Newt Gingrich wrote, was that Suit "lacked the 
experience to tear away at the phony image and reveal the 
liberal heart under the blue collar picture. "41
At the same time, Carter began to cut into Suit's 
urban constituency by shifting his target from the Atlanta 
establishment to the Washington power structure and the 
Republican Party which was, he repeatedly charged, 
"controlled by a handful of big-shots." Instead of going 
to the Georgia voters for support, Suit had, Carter said, 
"snuck off to Washington" for help from President Nixon.
But all Suit got, he added, was "a ballpoint pen and an 
autographed golf ball. "42
Even though Hal Suit was not the staunch 
segregationist he had expected to face in the general 
election, Carter followed his original plan of trying to 
retrieve the black support he had relinquished to Sanders 
in the primary. He began to soften his segregationist 
image and talk again in terms, however vague, of a 
colorblind "populist" coalition: "I got the vote of a lot 
of segregationists and integrationists" in the primary, 
Carter maintained, and "I never did ask their philosophy 
when I sought their vote." To a group of farmers in 
Abraham, Georgia, as in other towns around the state, he 
began saying that conservatism no longer meant, "hatred of 
another person because he is different from us." Nor did
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it mean "a lack of passion or foresight, but simply an 
insistence that individuals be left alone as much as 
possible to guide their own destinies. "43
Despite his new moderation, Jimmy Carter's earlier 
courtship with segregationists paid off big in late 
September. Lester Maddox at that point endorsed him and 
praised him for "running a Maddox-type campaign." And 
Maddox kept up his support; two weeks later, at a state 
Democratic meeting, he promised that as lieutenant governor 
he would be watching to make sure Carter kept his campaign 
promises, "When I put my money into a peanut machine, I 
don't expect to get bubble gum, and neither do the people." 
Carter at the same meeting, swallowed his pride and praised 
Maddox: "He has brought a standard of forthright
expression and personal honesty to the governor's office 
and I hope to measure up to this standard." And on the 
last day of the campaign Carter announced he was going to 
vote for Maddox as lieutenant governor.44
In Las Vegas, Jimmy the Greek set the odds for the 
Georgia election: Carter to win at two-and-a-half to one. 
The Greek was right. On November 3, 1970, Carter won 
sixty-two percent of the vote and became the seventy-sixth 
governor of Georgia.45
The 1970 election represented a watershed in Georgia's 
history, but the fact that Jimmy Carter won it did not.
Even if Carl Sanders won, it would have been a major
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turning point in the state's political history because both 
he and Carter were a new breed of political leaders 
emerging in the South at the time. Race as a campaign 
issue, at least as a public campaign issue, would have 
ended with a Sanders victory as surely as it did with 
Carter's victory.
For any newcomer to stand a chance of winning, he 
would have had to steal Maddox's thunder and make himself 
the candidate of the state's segregationist camp. At the 
same time, because Sanders' record was unassailable, any 
newcomer would have had to bring the former governor down 
by tarring him with personal attacks.
The newcomer in this case was, of course, the 
personally honorable and politically liberal and 
integrationist-minded Jimmy Carter. No one but Jimmy 
Carter knew then, or knows now, how hard it was for him to 
decide to do what was necessary to win. But what is clear 
is that actually doing what he decided to do caused him 
great personal suffering. It was immediately obvious to 
others that Jimmy Carter had not run a campaign he could be 
proud of. Shortly after the election, state senator Leroy 
Johnson, Sanders' black campaign leader for the Atlanta 
area, made a poignant observation: "I understand why he ran 
that kind of ultra-conservative campaign . . . you have to 
do that to win. And that's the main thing."46
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But Carter had far more trouble justifying his actions 
to himself. After the election, Carter was distraught. He 
immediately telephoned Carl Sanders to apologize for the 
personal attacks and began confiding to close friends that 
he "felt bad" about some of the things he had said and 
done. He confessed "to the Lord" and "prayed for 
forgiveness," and told Rosalynn that he would never go 
through such a campaign again. When he began his campaign 
for the presidency in 1976 he employed the slogan, "I'll 
never lie to you."47
In his famous 1976 Playboy interview Carter said that 
when he looked on women with lust he was committing 
adultery in his heart. For born-again Jimmy Carter, the 
thought was equivalent to the action. Although he 
convinced himself that the subterfuge of his campaign did 
not make him a racist, Carter's personal anguish over the 
campaign of 1970 had profound consequences for the politics 
of the South. Upon winning his election he immediately 
began to build bridges to black citizens with his inaugural 
address. "I say to you quite frankly that the time for 
racial discrimination is over," he declared. "Our people 
have already made this major and difficult decision. No 
poor, rural, weak or black person should ever have to bear 
the additional burden of being deprived of the opportunity 
for an education, a job, or simple justice."48 This 
pronouncement by a deep South governor that racism was dead
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created front page news in the national media. Carter's 
speech and the campaigns and speeches of the other moderate 
southern governors signalled an end to racial politics and 
allowed the region to rejoin the nation in a way heretofore 
impossible since the Civil War. The fact that Carter found 
it necessary to conduct a campaign that was less than 
forthright affected him not only as a politician, but as a 
moral, religious man who believed in the powers of 
redemption. Carter believed that his campaign and his 
experience as a southerner could heal the racial divide.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
The four 1970 gubernatorial campaigns reveal a great 
deal about the men who won them, the southern body politic, 
and the changing politics of race. Each campaign, of 
course, exhibited distinctive characteristics, shaped by 
history, issues and political developments peculiar to each 
different state. Republican incumbents dominated the 
political contests in Arkansas and Florida, while in the 
other two states, no incumbent was eligible to run. In 
Arkansas and Georgia, the toughest test came from a former 
governor in the Democratic primary. In South Carolina, 
neither party held primary contests. These differences 
dictated candidates' strategies and tactics as they 
marshalled their forces according to the strength and 
number of their opponents.
Nevertheless, Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter had 
taken several common characteristics into the campaign.
All the candidates were whites from rural areas and modest 
backgrounds. Each of the candidates were active in their 
Protestant churches. All four had served in the military; 
two of them, West and Carter, attended military academies. 
All had been b o m  during the Depression of the 1930s but 
had come of age during a time of prosperity and optimism. 
They represented a new generation of southerners who saw 
the corrosive effects of racism on the region.
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These four gubernatorial candidates pursued office 
with an attitude of personal confidence and idealism. They 
believed that if given the chance, they could accomplish 
great things. They campaigned, therefore, emphasizing 
their personal qualities rather than focusing on issues.
All four of the successful gubernatorial candidates in 1970 
avoided controversial issues by selling themselves. All 
sought to portray themselves as good people whom voters 
could trust. A powerful new medium in southern politics 
facilitated this approach. These young men were of the 
television generation. They had seen the changes the new 
medium wrought in public perceptions. They had observed 
the power of televised images of the civil rights movement 
-- pictures of the persecution of people seeking justice 
and the negative images of segregationist leaders who 
opposed them. They had witnessed the impact televised 
images had had in national political campaigns during the 
previous decade. Television presented the perfect tool for 
avoiding controversial issues and presenting personal 
qualities. Image replaced substance.
The power of images benefitted all four of these men. 
Bumpers effectively employed television in presenting 
himself as a leader the people could trust. Even though 
Askew could not afford an extensive television advertising 
campaign, he made the most of the coverage he received.
His single most important asset in the 1970 campaign,
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according to a New York Times Magazine feature article, was 
"the ability to project the image of complete sincerity 
over television." Askew also benefitted in the general 
election because of the negative images produced by 
Governor Kirk when he seized a school district in defiance 
of court orders. John West also profited indirectly by the 
televised images of overturned school buses provoked by his 
opponent's speeches. And West employed an effective 
advertising campaign pointing out the futility of defiance 
by playing back Republican Senator Strom Thurmond's "broken 
promises" to ease federal desegregation pressure. Jimmy 
Carter utilized the medium to cast his opponent as a rich, 
corrupt politician who could not understand the problems of 
common folk while portraying himself as a man of the 
people.1
The medium of television allowed the successful 
candidates of 1970 to emphasize their personal qualities 
without dwelling on the issues. The candidates knew, 
however, that they must seek favor from a diverse and 
ambivalent electorate. All four men shared an appreciation 
of how the environment in which they competed had changed. 
The civil rights movement had convinced many southerners 
that the abuses heaped upon black southerners in the past 
must cease. While many did not like integration, they came 
to accept it, even if only because they believed that 
defiance only generated more stringent measures and federal
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intrusion. This coupled with the turbulence of the 
previous decade compelled many to embrace those candidates 
who seemed sincere in their efforts to find solutions that 
would not cause undue disruptions.
One issue that threatened the resilience of this new 
found moderation, however, was busing. In every campaign 
in 1970, at least one candidate unsuccessfully sought to 
play on the racial misgivings of southern whites. The 
rejection of political pandering to racial antagonisms 
takes on added significance when one considers the furor 
over busing in the South and elsewhere in the nation. To 
their credit, the successful candidates did not try to 
exploit the busing issue. Busing seemed to many to involve 
issues that went beyond simple justice. Roundly opposed by 
a wide spectrum of voters, busing offered tremendous 
political appeal. Bumpers, Askew, West and Carter did a 
great service to the South by not jumping on the anti- 
busing bandwagon at a critical time in the South's 
political and racial development. Growing racial 
moderation among the people of the region could have 
deteriorated into the racial intolerance of old, especially 
with an issue as unpopular as busing. The men who would 
ultimately represent the New South, however, refused to 
encourage the furor over busing.
While Orval Faubus ranted about busing, Dale Bumpers 
calmly pointed out that all the candidates opposed busing,
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but that until the Supreme Court ruled none of them could 
do anything about it. Bumpers expressed the sentiments of 
many in the southern electorate in his willingness to abide 
by the law. He also assured voters that they could trust 
him to do the right thing, without ever saying exactly what 
that might be.
Reubin Askew refused to enter the busing brawl 
initiated by Kirk. While conceding that Kirk may have 
voiced the sentiments of the majority of the people 
concerning busing, he emphasized that Kirk's goal was to 
g a mer headlines rather than solve the dilemmas of 
desegregation. ft.skew himself refused to compete in the 
busing melee created by Kirk, later saying that he could 
not allow "the emotions of the hour to become the legacy of 
a generation." Askew disapproved of busing, even though 
he, more than any other southern governor, would defend the 
necessity of busing. Governor Askew would later tell 
parents of his state:
"Nobody really wants [busing] . . . yet the 
law demands, and rightly so, that we put an end 
to segregation in our society. We must demonstrate 
good faith in doing just that . . .  we must stop 
inviting, by our own intransigence, devices which 
are repugnant to us. In this way and this way only 
will we stop massive busing . . . only in this way 
will we put the divisive and self-defeating issue of 
race behind us once and for all. And only in this 
way can we redirect our energies to our real guest 
-- that of providing an equal opportunity for quality 
education to all of our children."2
In the campaign, however, Askew said very little about
racial problems facing the state. Like Bumpers, he said
318
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
only that he would work for solutions and not cause more 
problems.
In South Carolina, Albert Watson, a political protege 
of Strom Thurmond, sought to test the limits of the 
Republican southern strategy. Albert Watson called on the 
electorate to reject the more moderate stance of recent 
Democratic administrations. Like candidates in the other 
southern states, Watson chose busing as an issue through 
which to exploit the ambivalence of many whites over the 
pace of integration. An impassioned anti-busing speech by 
Watson led to violence. Pictures broadcast around the 
world of a white mob overturning buses that had carried 
black school children in Lamar, South Carolina, allowed 
John West to portray himself as someone who sought peaceful 
solutions to the integration problems without really 
offering what those solutions might be. Calling busing a 
"phony issue" West conceded that "we are all against 
busing, " but he reminded voters that only the Supreme Court 
or Congress, and not the governor, could decide the issue. 
West promised that whatever was decided, his administration 
would not take any action that might harm public schools. 
West's approach reflected the sentiments of an electorate 
opposed to busing, but committed to education.3
In Georgia the strongest opponent of busing would be 
eliminated in the Republican primary. Jimmy Carter did not 
want to become embroiled in the busing debate. Because of
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the political realities he faced in that campaign Carter 
had to ease the current fears of the segregationists 
without calling the racial shibboleths of the past out by­
name. He focused on resentments of class and avoided 
blatant racial appeals. In political forums when other 
candidates concentrated on busing, Carter pointed to 
estrangement of the common man from government decisions.
He subtly appealed to the rancor of those whose wishes were 
ignored in racial matters, without alienating the growing 
moderate body of voters who saw the necessity for 
integration. The two-faceted campaign cost the moral 
minded Jimmy Carter. But Carter, like the other New South 
candidates, knew he did not hold racist views and would, if 
elected, right many of the wrongs done to black citizens. 
Carter may have eased his moral dilemma by taking refuge in 
Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that in democracies perfection 
is never possible and the moral, i.e., Christian, man must 
content himself with accepting a necessary amount of 
compromise. Carter opened his autobiography, Why Not the 
Best? with a quotation from Niebuhr: "The sad duty of 
politics is to establish justice in a sinful world."4
All of the South's successful gubernatorial 
candidates, in sum, refused to exploit the busing issue in 
1970 and then delivered inaugural speeches announcing an 
end to exclusionary efforts by state governments toward 
black citizens. National ambitions shared by these young
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politicians militated against pandering to racial politics. 
Their elections helped sustain the improving image of the 
South and thereby improved their national political 
prospects. The success of these four New South governors 
also demonstrated the durability of moderation in the 
region. And finally, the elections signalled an end to the 
politics of persecution and defiance.
And yet, none of these men took firm stands on racial 
justice as candidates. Never publicly acknowledging racial 
antagonisms during their campaigns, all the successful 
southern gubernatorial candidates of 1970 tacitly 
acknowledged those fears by neglecting to reach out to 
black voters. The candidates realized that they could not 
alienate the large number of white voters who held 
reservations about busing and that the issue could destroy 
the region's new-found moderation. Although good 
intentions may have lain behind dodging issues such as 
busing, the efforts also precluded any real effort to 
incorporate racial justice into their platforms. After 
examining the successful campaigns of 1970, one might 
applaud the transformation of southern politics, or one 
might come away saddened by the missed opportunity to end 
racial politics. Even though all these men issued a 
repudiation in their inaugural addresses, their campaigns 
set a precedent of obfuscation that future politicians 
followed nationwide -- and may have even propelled some of
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these New South governors into the national political 
arena. Real racial progress missed its chance. None of 
these men met the challenge to renounce revived attempts to 
unite the white electorate in the name of resistance to 
integration. In the future, electoral success would lay in 
subliminal appeals.
Rather than reaching out in an effort to unite, the 
representatives of the New South had finessed the issues 
and rested their appeal on their image. They called on 
voters to elect them because they could trust them to do 
the right thing; whatever the right thing might be. 
Different voters had different right things in mind. One 
of the losing candidates who sought to challenge the busing 
issue may have been prescient in his observations. Claude 
Kirk called Reubin Askew, his opponent in the Florida 
gubernatorial campaign, a "middle-of-the-road, don't-do- 
anything individual." Kirk asserted that the smiling 
"trust me" image that proved so successful for Askew, and 
the other New South candidates of 1970, masked an avoidance 
of controversy and damaged democracy. Kirk would later say 
that Askew "went in with [Jimmy] Carter -- another smiling, 
'Trust me' type of character. One shouldn't have been 
governor. The other shouldn't have been president. . . . 
Anytime you just sit around, eat hamburgers, and act like a 
good guy, you are letting cancers grow. . . .  If you stand 
around and watch a bank robbery, you're not going to jail,
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but you ought to be ashamed of not picking up the 
telephone."
Kirk's mixed metaphor rings true. Perhaps 
malignancies were growing undetected within the body 
politic of the South. Maybe the voters were being robbed 
of the value that comes out of facing up to responsibility 
while these new politicians stood by silently. The days of 
the yelling southern demagogic race-baiter had ended.
White southerners' desire to shed the image of noisy, 
violent resistance and the soft, smooth medium of 
television had changed the nature of politics. After 1970 
most political operatives focused on these campaigns and 
saw the practical benefits of evasion. Subtle avoidance of 
racially charged issues appealed to an electorate that had 
grown weary of upheaval. In the long run, the new trend of 
political avoidance of race, of trying to mollify a 
moderate electorate that would accept integration as long 
as it did not lead to disruptions, may have encouraged 
attractive candidates with soothing voices to say nothing 
and exacerbate racial harmony by smoothing over festering 
problems.5
This work began with the words of a retired Georgia 
farmer. "Always before, you could tell right easy how 
somebody stood on the nigras," said the farmer, puzzled by 
the racial stance of the gubernatorial candidates during 
the campaign in 1970. "I don't say it isn't a good thing,
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but it does make for a mighty peculiar election." The 
farmer's statement reflected not only the ambivalence of 
the region in regard to racial moderation, but also the 
obfuscation of the politicians who sought to manipulate 
that ambivalence. Mighty peculiar elections indeed.
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